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Chapter One 
Development and Democracy in Himachal Pradesh 
  
1.1. Introduction 
This thesis is an attempt to understand Himachal Pradesh’s development experience in 
the post-Independence period. Himachal Pradesh (henceforth Himachal for short) is a 
small state in the northwest of India located almost entirely in the Himalayan region. It 
has recently begun to attract attention for its outstanding social indicators. In terms of 
overall human development, Himachal ranked first in the 2000 report of the National 
Institute of Rural Development (NIRD), and first in a more recent survey conducted by 
the magazine India Today (2005). The relatively new Education Development Index 
formulated by National University for Education Planning and Administration (NUEPA, 
2007) ranks Himachal Pradesh third on the basis of various parameters related to 
education provision and achievement. In fact, Himachal has the highest school 
attendance, and the second highest literacy rates among the younger age groups (7-15 
years) of all major Indian states. Indicators pertaining to health facilities, child 
vaccination, sex ratios, rural poverty, social infrastructure and related matters are also 
impressive (see Table 1.1 in the next section).1 
 
The state’s broad-based progress accelerated after 1971, when Himachal acquired the 
status of an independent state. Generous grants from the Central Government to enable 
backward hill states to join the mainstream of development are regularly cited as the 
primary explanation for Himachal’s success. However, Himachal’s success has not been 
limited to human development alone. It has simultaneously improved its economic 
performance, with per capita incomes above the national average and poverty levels 
among the lowest in the country. Thus, its investment in human development has not 
come at the cost of economic development as suggested by arguments of a trade-off 
between economic and social development, or growth and equity. In fact, the even spread 
of human and economic development within a strong democratic structure is a unique 
                                                          
1 For further indicators refer to International Institute of Population Sciences (2007); NCAER (2003); 
UNDP (2002). 
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feature of Himachal’s success.  
 
While much of Himachal’s success can be attributed to state intervention, the nature and 
pace of development witnessed here calls for a more comprehensive analysis of possible 
enabling factors, going beyond the state, to explain its development trajectory. For 
instance, the relatively equitable nature of development, achieved without a great deal of 
social unrest, suggests that government initiatives did not encounter the kind of resistance 
that equity enhancing measures often do in hierarchical societies. This implies that 
societal factors had an important role to play as well. In particular it suggests that state 
and society have been marked by a degree of commonality, if not convergence, in their 
interests. 
 
This dissertation argues that relatively equal social relations found in Himachali society 
have enabled a collaborative process by which state and society have worked together to 
strengthen both egalitarian social outcomes and the democratic state. The complementary 
web of processes and outcomes that has resulted from this positive relationship between 
state and society has ‘made democracy work for development’ and is perhaps a more 
convincing and comprehensive explanation of Himachal’s success. Institutions both 
within society and the democratic state in working towards their common objectives used 
participatory processes to build a more inclusive form of development and democracy. 
This has created a sort of ‘multiplier’ effect which helps explain the unusual success of 
Himachal in achieving growth with equity and a more substantive form of democracy.     
 
In Himachal, traditional egalitarian relations enabled society to arrive at goals that 
displayed a fair degree of consensus across a range of developmental issues by averting 
large disparities in the distribution of power.  Correspondingly, state action in Himachal 
was able to more closely reflect the needs and demands of society, which were not 
fractured at the margins of class, caste and gender. The democratic state provided the 
institutions by which these goals and aspirations could be realized. Since societal goals 
were the “common” goals of society, realizing them resulted in an inclusive form of 
development that further consolidated social equality and participation. Thus the story of 
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Himachal is as much about deepening democracy as it is about inclusive development. 
Indeed one of the main finding of this thesis is that the twin goals of development and 
democracy are unlikely to be achieved, unless the hierarchical structures of society are 
challenged and moulded towards greater equality. Himachal was fortunate to have 
inherited a relatively egalitarian social structure that enabled it to use the democratic 
institutions of the state to further the goals of development and deepen democracy. In the 
absence of such a historical societal endowment, the democratic state can nevertheless 
play a larger and pro-active role in facilitating equitable development. As has been 
observed in Kerala, re-arranging forces within society through class mobilization pushed 
the state to adopt an agenda of social restructuring. However unlike Himachal, society in 
Kerala continues to show divisions along various lines and therefore consensual state 
action is relatively limited to areas such as education, health and human development.  
 
In Himachal, on the other hand, the widespread nature of convergence between state and 
society has actually increased the scope of state action. In fact it would be fair to say that 
Himachal’s equitable social structure per se would probably not have achieved the 
magnitude of success it did, without the intervention of the state. This mutual 
reinforcement or synergy of social equality and constructive state action can be seen as 
the defining characteristic of Himachal’s development experience. What emerges as one 
examines this relationship is the development of a “virtuous circle” of state action and 
social equality building and being reinforced by a model of social development and a 
more participative democracy. 
 
This chapter gives a broad-brush account of the main arguments in the thesis. These 
arguments are substantiated in greater detail in subsequent chapters, and placed in the 
context of relevant literature. 
  
1.2. Human Development in Himachal Pradesh 
1.2.1. Rapid Progress in Social Indicators  
Despite Himachal being a small state with a mostly rural population tucked away in the 
mountainous north of India, it has in the last few decades overtaken most other states in 
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the country to claim a top position in human development. Himachal’s performance is 
remarkable because it started off in 1948 (the year when 30 princely states were 
amalgamated to form the Himachal region within the state of Punjab) ranking amongst 
the lowest of all Indian states2. With a literacy rate of 19 per cent in the 10-14 age group, 
little infrastructure, subsistence agriculture, no industry and per capita incomes among 
the lowest in the country, it had a truly uphill task3. In fact Himachal Pradesh was at the 
time widely considered to be one of the poorest states in India.4 This task was all the 
more challenging due to three additional features: (i) a rural population comprising 91 per 
cent of total population, (ii) a higher than average proportion of Scheduled Castes (SC) 
and Scheduled Tribes (ST)5, and (iii) difficult mountainous terrain. 
 
The high incidence of poverty and lack of physical infrastructure and other support 
services in rural areas has typically made the task of bringing education and health 
facilities and even infrastructure to these areas especially difficult. In Himachal, the very 
difficult mountainous terrain made this even more challenging. Another big challenge in 
the Indian context has been to include Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes 
(STs), economically and socially marginalized for centuries, in the mainstream of 
development. In most cases, special attention and incentives are required to enable them 
to access, both financially and socially, development opportunities such as schools. 
 
Thus, on many different counts, Himachal was in a particularly disadvantaged position 
when it became an independent state in 1971 (see Table 1.1). The National Council of 
Applied Economic Research (NCAER) characterized Himachal Pradesh as “one of the 
poorest and backward territories in the Indian Union in early 1960s”. Only Bihar, Orissa 
and Manipur had a per capita income lower than Himachal in the mid-1950s (1955-56).  
                                                          
2 Since Himachal Pradesh did not exist as a separate state in 1948, these statistics refer to the districts that 
were then part of the state of Punjab, but in 1971 formed the independent state of Himachal Pradesh.    
3 See PROBE Team (1999); Anon. (2001) and other background papers prepared for the Himachal Human 
Development Report (2002). 
4 Referring to 1948 when the princely states were amalgamated into one unit Anon (2001) says: “…this 
area was decidedly among the poorest, if not the poorest administrative unit of India” (2001:9).  
5 Scheduled Castes (SC) comprise 25.3 per cent of the state’s population and Scheduled Tribes (ST) 4.2 per 
cent. Eleven of Himachal Pradesh’s twelve districts have a higher than national average SC population and 
three have a higher than national average ST population. National average of SCs is 16.5 per cent and of 
STs, 8 per cent. (North India, Human Development Report, 2003 NCAER).  
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Since then it has recorded a steady improvement in its economic status and is now among 
the top eight states in terms of per capita income. By 2001, its human development 
record, particularly in education, had improved dramatically as illustrated in Table 1.1. 
The literacy rate (age 10-14 years) is far ahead of the national average and is today on par 
with Kerala: 98 and 96 percent respectively for boys and girls. The state’s health statistics 
are also impressive with for instance child mortality rates being only one third the 
national average. What is remarkable about Himachal’s progress is that the positive 
achievements in human development are not confined to health and education but also 
extend to less conspicuous domains such as the incidence of violence whether homicide 
rates or domestic violence or violence against lower castes.6  As can be seen from the 
Table below, Himachal’s performance is spread across a wide spectrum of quality of life 
indicators.  
Table 1.1: Social Indicators for Himachal and India 
  
Himachal 
Pradesh 
 
India 
Total Literacy Rate, 2001 77% 65% 
Literacy Rate (age 10-14), 2001 
Male 
Female 
 
98% 
96% 
 
88% 
79% 
 
School Attendance Rate (age 6-17 years), 2005-6 
 
89% 
 
71% 
Child Mortality Rate, 2005-6 5.6 18 
Children Fully Vaccinated (12-23 months), 2005-6 74% 44% 
Total Fertility Rate, 2005-6 1.9 2.7 
Sex Ratio (female/male), 2001 970 933 
% of households with electricity connection, 2005-6 98% 68% 
Homicide Rate, 2004 (murders per million persons) 18 35 
Sources: International Institute for Population Sciences (2007); Census of India (2001); 
                                                          
6 Himachal has the lowest homicide rate among all major Indian states National Crime Report Bureau 
(2004) and also the lowest levels of domestic violence (IIPS, 2007).  
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National Crime Records Bureau (2004). 
 
1.2.2. Egalitarian Development 
While these achievements are commendable in themselves, two particularly noteworthy 
aspects of Himachal’s success are less widely known. First, its achievements in human 
development are spread relatively equally across caste and gender. For instance its female 
literacy rate for the 10-14 years age group is 96 percent, as against the male literacy rate 
of 98 per cent (Census, 2001). Similarly child mortality rates are among the lowest in the 
country at 9.3 and 9.0 for girl and boy children respectively.7 In terms of caste too, the 
literacy rate does not show much difference between the Scheduled Castes and the 
‘Others’ (includes all the upper caste categories) at 92 per cent and 94 per cent 
respectively. This is particularly notable as even in situations of aggregate economic 
advancement, pockets of relative deprivation are typically found to be concentrated 
around women, lower castes and other disadvantaged groups. The smaller social 
disparities in education, health care and other aspects of development in Himachal are an 
unusual aspect of its success story that merits special attention.  
 
1.2.3 The Role of the State 
The second unusual feature of Himachal’s development is that it builds on a considerable 
amount of state initiative. The importance of the state’s role in education is evident from 
the level of public expenditure in Himachal Pradesh, which has been consistently higher 
than the 6 per cent of State Domestic Product (SDP) recommended by the National 
Commission on Education in 1966 (barring Kerala none of the other states have met this 
target yet). In addition, government schools in Himachal function far more effectively 
and with less evidence of corruption and malpractice than they do in other north Indian 
states (see Chapter 6)8. Private schools do not have a large presence in rural areas yet and 
non-government initiatives in education are relatively few.9 In fact, Himachal’s 
‘schooling revolution’, has been brought about almost exclusively by the state sector. 
                                                          
7 These figures are based on NFHS –II and refer to 1998-99 as present figures based on NFHS –III are yet 
to be released. For further evidence on health achievements in HP, see IIPS (2007), UNDP (2002). The 
caste specific literacy figures are also from NFHS-II. 
8 Himachal’s remarkable transition towards universal education has been widely discussed; see e.g. PROBE 
Team (1999), and further studies cited in Chapter 8. 
9 Seventh All India Educational Survey, 2002.  
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While much of Himachal’s success in government-provided schooling has been attributed 
to state spending, it is not budgets alone that have contributed to its so-called ‘schooling 
revolution’. In fact, as we will see in Chapter 6 dedicated to the education sector, it is 
societal commitment evident in the effective use of funds as well as in the support 
provided by communities through collaborative efforts that has transformed the schooling 
system in Himachal. A similar consensus exists in other areas as well allowing the state 
to play a constructive role in the fields of health care, land reforms and provision of rural 
infrastructure as well. This feature of Himachal’s experience is particularly striking as 
there is growing scepticism today about the state’s role in the provision of public 
services. It is widely believed that government-provided services in India signify a drain 
on public funds, as corruption, clientelism and lack of accountability divert resources 
away from the intended beneficiaries.10 This may well apply in many Indian states but 
Himachal has escaped this predicament to a large extent.  
 
1.2.4. Democratic Depth 
It might be useful to place the enabling role of the state, discussed above, in the context 
of the political framework of Himachal. As mentioned earlier, democracy has provided 
the political context for the developmental state in Himachal. But state action in a 
democracy need not necessarily reflect people’s choices. For instance, in the 
representative form of democracy that exists in India, it is possible to have a 
democratically elected government represent majoritarian or sectarian, rather than 
consensual views. Further these majoritarian or sectarian views could themselves span a 
whole ideological range, from the ‘communist’ (as seen in West Bengal) to the 
‘capitalist’ (as seen in Gujarat). Thus we have an elected government in Gujarat 
symbolized by majoritarianism and neo-liberal economic policies and at the same time an 
elected communist government in West Bengal with a mandate to follow a left wing 
economic agenda. In other words, ideological extremes with respect to development 
strategies can co-exist within representative democracy where state governments (e.g. 
                                                          
10 To illustrate according to a recent review of India’s public services: “The broad picture that emerges 
from our analysis of the public feedback is that the quality of governance in many Indian states is 
appalling” (Paul and others, 2004). See also Keefer and Khemani (2004), Banerjee and Somanathan 
(2001,2005).   
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Gujarat and West Bengal) have electoral majorities giving them a mandate to make very 
different policies. But do these states represent deepened democracies? 
 
The short answer is no. They are legitimate democracies where elections are regularly 
held and they claim to form governments committed to development of the people who 
voted them to power. But, in real terms, they do not go much beyond that, falling short of 
the true priorities and choices of the people as a whole. In both cases, violent incidents 
mark elections including capture of polling booths and intimidation of voters.11 Further, 
the respective governments have repeatedly used electoral majorities to over-ride 
minority concerns, often suppressing oppositional voices with brutal force.12 
    
Clearly elections are an important feature of a democratic state but not necessarily the 
defining feature of a mature democracy. It is democratic practice during and more 
importantly between elections that helps define democratic depth. Democratic practice 
can best be understood through the nature of peoples’ participation in institutions of state 
and society. What is the level of participation in matters of governance? How much are 
women, Dalits, religious minorities able to participate in the decision-making and 
implementation of government programmes? Are minority voices stifled or are they 
given a chance to express themselves? Do elections merely provide a platform for 
powerful groups to usurp democratic spaces and influence policy in their favour or is 
there a vibrant and active opposition? How do the institutions of direct democracy like 
the Gram Panchayats and Gram Sabhas function? How democratic is civic action? These 
issues of participation give democracy its teeth and sustain it even through electoral 
changes and upheavals. It is suggested in this dissertation that Himachal’s record on most 
of these counts has been fairly good. This is evident, for instance, in the regular and 
timely elections held without disruptive incidents, the adherence to reservation norms and 
quotas, the successful implementation of land reforms, public service delivery and 
transparency in government, and the integrity of institutions of local governance (such as 
Gram Panchayats and Gram Sabhas). 
                                                          
11 Jayal (2004). 
12 The communal violence in Gujarat and the violence in Nandigram (West Bengal) are the most recent 
examples of the blatant use of state power in each of these states.  
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Hence, while ruling parties have changed at regular intervals, the basic development 
priorities of the state have not varied sharply and the participatory character of its public 
institutions has been maintained. This is probably an important reason why elections in 
Himachal are marked by a lack of violence and minimal allegations of rigging, contrary 
to many North Indian states where violence, intimidation of Dalits and other 
marginalized communities and the shrinking of choices to rival factions within dominant 
caste groups are the hallmarks of electoral politics.  
 
Democratic depth is about eliciting maximum participation in decision-making and goes 
beyond the vote and electoral politics. As will be seen further on in the thesis, in 
Himachal people are able to express their opinion on an ongoing basis within formal and 
informal platforms of government. Active parent teacher associations and their range of 
discussions, Mahila Mandals (women’s groups) and their activities, open and accessible 
government offices and officials, and functioning Gram Sabhas are some of the features 
that indicate Himachal is moving towards a form of participatory democracy. In fact, 
easy and open access to government offices and functionaries is a good indication of a 
government’s propensity to include people as a part of its decision making process. The 
Gram Sabhas are in theory an advanced form of direct democracy, where the general 
assembly is made up of all the voters of a Panchayat with an equal voice in its decision 
making process. There are very few states that have shown success with Gram Sabha 
functioning, as both the elected political class and the bureaucracy have refused to hand 
over powers (of decision making) that should lie with the Gram Sabha. In Himachal, this 
cornering of power by elite minorities has not taken place to the same extent. As a result, 
Gram Sabhas play an important role deriving their strength from the high level of 
participation by the people, not just in numbers, but also in their active involvement, in 
the decision making process.   
 
As will be discussed later, there are important complementarities between the 
participatory processes witnessed in Himachal and its social achievements. The high level 
of participation and collaboration seen in Himachal contributes to the virtuous circle 
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mentioned above and signifies Himachal’s progressive shift towards a form of 
participatory democracy.  
 
1.3. Himachal in Comparative Perspective: Haryana as Counter-point  
Himachal’s choice of development path and its achievements in following it acquire 
greater salience if we place them in the context of north India which is notorious for its 
many developmental failures. To convey this contrast I will make occasional 
comparisons of Himachal with Haryana - a neighbouring state with high levels of 
economic growth, but a relatively poor record in the social sector. This comparison also 
helps to contrast Himachal’s experience with the dominant paradigm of development 
based on economic growth, which was the model followed by Haryana.13 
 
The development priorities adopted by Haryana provide a useful counterpoint to 
Himachal’s development goals and the means adopted to reach them. The Himachal-
Haryana comparison is also appropriate because the two states share many common 
features while at the same time differing significantly in several key respects. Both 
Haryana and Himachal were carved out of the state of Punjab in 1966 and 1971 
respectively.14 They are both small states with relatively high levels of economic 
development and a well-developed physical infrastructure.15 However, the two states 
differ significantly in terms of their social indicators. In most demographic as well as 
human development indicators Haryana is behind Himachal, in aggregate terms as well 
as in terms of distribution of outcomes (see Table 1.2 below). 
 
Looking back at the districts of Punjab that later formed the state of Haryana in 1966, one 
finds that these districts were among the most backward parts of Punjab.16 They were 
                                                          
13 For an introduction to Haryana’s development experience see Bhalla (1993). 
14 The reorganisation of Indian states on linguistic lines resulted in the Hindi-speaking Haryana separating 
from the Punjabi-speaking state in 1966. Himachal, however, had to wait until 1971 to become 
independent. More details on political history in Chapter 4. 
15 Himachal used to be much poorer than Haryana, but the gap has significantly reduced in recent years, 
and seems to be relatively small today.  For instance, while Himachal’s per capita net state domestic 
product was only around 70 % of Haryana’s in 1993-94, ten years later it was more or less the same (GOI, 
Economic Survey 2004-2005, pp S12). 
16 Haryana districts: Ambala, Karnal, Jind, Rohtak, Gurgaon, Mahendergarh, Hissar. Himachal districts: 
Bilaspur, Chamba, Hamirpur, Kangra, Kinnaur, Kullu, Lahaul Spiti, Mandi, Shimla, Sirmaur, Solan, Una. 
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relatively arid, with poor soil and water conditions and a low per capita income. Further, 
land distribution was skewed in favour of the Jat community and human development 
indicators were low, particularly of the women and lower castes. Politically the region 
had been dominated by the ‘bhaichara’ (or clan) system controlled by large land holding 
families. Reform movements (in particular the influential Arya Samaj) while critical of 
Brahmanical domination were highly patriarchal (Datta 1999). Hence in 1966 when 
Haryana separated from Punjab, it inherited socio-economically an unenviable set of 
circumstances in many ways different from the rest of Punjab. Himachal Pradesh, for its 
part, started off in 1971 with an even poorer economy, very minimal industrial base, and 
limited agricultural possibilities given the terrain and poor human development 
indicators. However, it had a relatively favourable socio-political order with, for instance, 
lower economic and social disparities, stronger traditions of cooperative action and less 
patriarchal gender relations.17 
 
Since 1971 (and 1966 in the case of Haryana) the two states have followed very different 
development trajectories. While Himachal Pradesh chose to adopt a development 
approach based on social development, Haryana followed the economic growth model. 
As Bhalla (1993) among others has observed, development in Haryana has been 
primarily income driven:  
 
The Haryana experience suggests that sustained growth in agriculture, plus a 
deliberate policy of income and occupational diversity is the most effective cure 
for poverty. Public interventions through centrally sponsored programmes for 
poverty alleviations have been strictly peripheral to the observed reduction in 
poverty over the past 25 years. 
  
Himachal Pradesh’s outlook on development reflects a very different vision. It is best 
summed by in the words of Y S Parmar, the first Chief Minister of independent 
Himachal:  
 
The people of Himachal [now] do not want to introduce a new order of capitalists 
but are on the contrary, determined to raise the general standard of living and 
                                                          
17 Details of the institutional arrangements vis-à-vis land rights, influence of ecological factors on the 
economy and society, traditional systems of local governance, structure of social relations including caste 
and gender relations, etc., in Himachal and Haryana are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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earning capacity of the people… what is required is an extension of a helping 
hand in the shape of the development of these areas in the matter particularly of 
communications, health, education and other development projects. (1965:16-17).  
 
The statistics presented in Table 1.1, reflect the fact that a period of rapid change 
occurred in Himachal Pradesh, especially in terms of human development, after it became 
an independent state in 1971. In Haryana too there has been rapid change, but this has 
been largely confined to the economic sphere, with much less progress in terms of social 
development. While per capita incomes have grown rapidly transforming Haryana into 
one of India’s richest states, education and health outcomes have lagged behind. For 
instance, child mortality rates are about twice as high in Haryana as in Himachal, and 
three times as high in the case of girls.18 Other social indicators for Haryana are often not 
very different from the national average and some of them such as violence against 
women and lower castes are among the worst in India.19  
 
However, the starkest contrast between the two states relates to distributional matters and 
social disparities. Himachal has been able to sustain and consolidate its relatively 
egalitarian society, through land reforms, universalization of elementary education and 
other basic public services, promotion of backward regions and related interventions. In 
Haryana, by contrast, there has been little economic redistribution, through land reforms 
or otherwise. For instance, according to the Third National Family Health Survey (2005-
6), more than half of rural households in Haryana are landless compared to less than 20 
per cent in Himachal Pradesh. The hold of traditional inequalities, including the caste-
class nexus, also remains strong in Haryana. This contrast also emerged in my field 
survey (discussed in Chapter 7) where I found that the proportion of landless households 
was more than twice as high in the Haryana sample as in the Himachal sample. Further, 
there was a high correlation between caste and land ownership in Haryana, while in 
Himachal land ownership was similar across castes.20 
                                                          
18 IIPS (2001:194) and the corresponding state specific reports. 
19 IIPS (2007). 
20 See also Punia and Sharma (1982) 
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Table 1.2: Himachal and Haryana Compared 
 
Himachal Haryana 
Aggregate Indicators 
Literacy Rate, 2001 
Infant Mortality Rate 
Total Fertility Rate 
 
76.4 
3.6 
1.9 
 
67.1 
4.2 
2.7 
Gender Specific Indicators 
School Attendance, age 6-17 
Female 
Male 
 
 
88.0 
90.5 
 
 
72.0 
78.5 
Child Mortality Rates, 1998-99 
             Female 
 
             Male 
 
 
 
9.3 
9.0 
 
 
30.2 
13.8 
 
Caste-Specific Indicators 
Literacy Rate, age 7-15 
            SC 
             Others 
 
 
94 
95 
 
 
79 
87 
Children Not Immunized 
SC 
Others 
 
1.8 
2.7 
 
14.7 
6.3 
Women with Severe Anaemia 
SC 
Others 
 
2.0 
2.2 
 
12.0 
5.0 
Total Fertility Rate 
SC 
Others 
 
2.15 
2.05 
 
3.7 
2.5 
Sources: IIPS (2007); Census of India (2001). Unless stated otherwise, the 
reference year is 2005-6. 
 
As Table 1.2 shows, this contrast is reflected in a range of social indicators, particularly 
in the difference across social groups. For instance, while literacy rates in Himachal are 
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much the same for Dalits and others (at least in the younger age groups) there is a wide 
gap between the two groups in Haryana.  As a result, not only is a Dalit child in Himachal 
more or less at par with other Himachali children, and much better off than a Dalit child 
in Haryana, he or she is also typically much better off than a non-Dalit child in Haryana.  
Similarly, the chance of not being immunized is three times lower for a Dalit child in 
Himachal (1.8 per cent) than for a non-Dalit child in Haryana (6.3 per cent). The similar 
contrast is seen in gender disparities: Himachali girls are not only much better off than 
their counterparts in Haryana, they are also doing much better than Haryana boys in many 
respects. The comparison with Haryana brings Himachal’s achievements in sharper focus 
and points once again to the fact that state intervention can make a crucial difference. The 
question remains as to why the state played such different roles in the two states - 
somewhat narrowly geared towards economic growth in one case and more socially 
encompassing in the other.  
 
1.4. Elements of Interpretation 
1.4.1 State Action and Social Equality 
One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the distinctive feature of state-society 
relations in Himachal is a virtuous circle of constructive state intervention and social 
equality. On the one hand, the social role of the state has been facilitated by relatively 
egalitarian social relations (partly a historical legacy) and on the other hand, state action 
itself has played a crucial role in promoting social equality (e.g. through land reforms and 
universal education).  
  
The claim that egalitarian social relations facilitate the social role of the state is worth 
elaborating (for further discussion see Chapter 7). This claim relates to the debilitating 
nature of social inequality in a democratic political system. One important way in which 
social inequalities undermine the constructive role of the state is by distorting policy 
priorities, as public policy comes under the influence of powerful interests. In a highly 
unequal social setting, the institutions through which state action is supposed to operate 
are vulnerable to being captured by vested interests and elite groups21. The contrasting 
                                                          
21 Bardhan (1984), Kaviraj (1997).  
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experience of land reforms in Himachal and Haryana provides a useful illustration.  
Haryana has a long history of unequal land ownership and harsh struggles over land 
which, have left their mark in many ways, on social and cultural relations. After 
independence, strong landowner lobbies blocked land reforms, consolidating this aspect 
of the economy and society.22 By contrast, the lack of a landed aristocracy in Himachal 
has made it possible to implement relatively successful land reforms, in turn reinforcing 
the egalitarian aspects of Himachali society.   
 
A similar process occurred in the field of elementary education (Chapter 8). Universal 
elementary education has been an overwhelming priority of public policy in Himachal 
Pradesh from its independence onwards, and state initiative has been the driving force 
behind the “schooling revolution” that took place there in the last few decades.  In the 
social milieu, relatively devoid of sharp class inequalities, it was possible to promote the 
notion that schooling is a natural part of every child’s upbringing.  The schooling system 
in Himachal, much more than in most states, is a “common schooling system” which cuts 
across the barriers of class, caste and gender that have been so destructive elsewhere.  
Even the fact that elementary education quickly became a major policy priority reflects 
the relatively democratic nature of the political process in Himachal, where people have a 
“voice”.  Over time, universal elementary education itself helped to preserve – for some 
time at least – the legacy of a relatively equal society.  In all these respects, the situation 
is radically different in Haryana, where education has not been much of a policy priority 
and the entire schooling system has become highly fragmented, with privileged children 
attending private schools while disadvantaged children languish in ramshackle 
government schools (Aggarwal, 2000). 
 
Some of these issues have been discussed in the literature on equality and development.23 
For instance, the fact that class divisions can undermine the quality and reach of public 
services; that public priorities can be over influenced by interest groups etc., However, 
Himachal Pradesh’s experience points to the need for a more comprehensive and 
                                                          
22 For a useful case study of this process see Sethi (1986). 
23 World Development Report (2006), Bowles and Gintis (2000), Calinicos (2000), Sen (1992), Bardhan 
(1984), Hirschman (1970). 
 16 
integrated approach to the links between social equality, state action and development. 
For instance it is clear that the inequalities of caste and gender need to be included in the 
analysis instead of focusing on class inequality alone. Further, in the Indian context at 
least, the entire discussion needs to be linked with an understanding of democratic 
processes, since public priorities and state action are outcomes of these processes. 
 
Social inequality is also a frequent obstacle to informal cooperative action among village 
communities, which is an important complement of state action in many contexts. These 
and other links between social equality and state action will be further discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
 
1.4.2 Social Relations and Cooperative Action 
Himachal’s experience draws attention to various connections between social equality, 
state action and democracy that will receive sustained attention in this thesis. In so far as 
these links have been recognized in the literature, it has been mainly with reference to 
economic inequality (e.g. how class divisions affect policy priorities, as discussed in the 
literature on “state capture”). The relatively limited extent of economic disparities in 
Himachal is indeed an important aspect of the conditions that have facilitated rapid and 
equitable social development, as will be discussed further on. The comparative 
development experiences of Himachal Pradesh and Haryana, however, highlight the need 
to also bring inequalities of gender and caste centre-stage. 
 
Among the traditional forms of social control that have undermined democratic practice 
in India, caste discrimination is one of the most pernicious and persistent. For instance in 
Haryana dominant caste groups still exercise control over institutions of local governance 
such as the Gram Panchayats and even to some extent over electoral politics at the state 
level (e.g. the Chief Minister is almost invariably from the Jat community). Everyday 
forms of caste discrimination are manifested in numerous ways and Dalits are constantly 
reminded that they must remain in their place. When they step out of line they expose 
themselves to the worst brutality. Further, seeking protection from state institutions, such 
as the police and the courts is often futile as these institutions tend to side with the 
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dominant castes. 
 
Caste relations are significantly different in Himachal Pradesh and tend to be generally 
less hierarchical and less oppressive. Caste identities do not overwhelm other identities 
and leave room for social interaction across caste lines. For instance exchange labour 
arrangements are practiced across castes. Collective participation across castes is also 
common on many different occasions such as weddings, funerals, festivals and public 
functions. Further, universal access to basic public services such as education, health and 
essential amenities (e.g. water and electricity) helps to create a sense of common 
citizenship beyond caste. Disadvantaged castes are also more actively involved in 
institutions of local governance such as Gram Panchayats and Gram Sabhas (Chapter 6). 
 
The virtuous circle of social equality and state action in Himachal Pradesh applies in 
particular in the context of caste relations. The absence of sharp caste inequalities has 
facilitated constructive state action, just as state initiative has played an important role in 
empowering the disadvantaged castes. This is reflected in the fact that caste disparities in 
basic social indicators such as school participation, mortality rates and even land 
ownership have been reduced to remarkably low levels in comparison with most other 
Indian states (see Table 1.2). 
 
One of the most striking contrasts between Himachal and Haryana concerns gender 
relations and the role of women in society. As discussed in Chapter 5, gender relations in 
Himachal Pradesh are very different (specifically less patriarchal) from the north Indian 
mainstream whether one looks at work force participation rates, marriage practices, 
domestic violence or participation in public life. Himachali women, for instance, 
participate actively in economic activity and public life while adult women in Haryana 
tend to be confined to domestic roles. 
 
The participation of Himachali women in the economy is also an entry point for their 
active participation in public life, including democratic processes in a wide sense of the 
term. The participation of women in political life tends to be associated with greater 
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pressure in terms of demand for improved health care, education and other public 
services. In patriarchal societies, where there are strict restrictions on women’s mobility 
and visibility, they are unable to step out of their homes and participate in political life. 
This changes the quality of public action and keeps an important element of voice from 
the public domain. Himachal appears to be ahead of other states in this regard. This is 
evident in women’s active participation as members of Panchayats and Mahila Mandals 
and many other associations that enable them to tackle various issues that affect their 
lives. In Haryana, by contrast, this potential is unexploited as restrictions prevent women 
from making their presence felt in the public sphere. If Himachal’s success is largely 
about participatory democracy, as was argued earlier, the participation of women is 
undoubtedly a big part of that story. 
 
1.4.3 The State in Himachal and Haryana 
Although India has a federal structure with a very powerful centre and a detailed 
Constitution which defines the legal framework for the whole country, social relations 
and the moral legitimacy they carry differ significantly at state levels. These differences 
affect the policies, institutions, and financial allocations for carrying out the broad agenda 
of the nation-state as defined in the Constitution. Looking at development policies within 
this framework of federalism helps to understand Himachal and its neighbouring state 
Haryana in the context of the national agenda. 
 
The positive role of the state in Himachal, whether seen in isolation or in comparative 
perspective, indicates the need to analyse the state more closely. At a formal level, 
institutions of the state, such as the bureaucracy, judiciary, electoral system, etc., are 
similar in Himachal and Haryana. In both states the basic structure and mandate of these 
institutions derive from the Indian Constitution (including the Directive Principles of 
State Policy). And yet these institutions and principles have operated in very different 
ways and with very different outcomes. For example, the system of three tiered 
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI), which is supposed to provide the foundation of 
participatory governance, is essentially the same in Himachal and Haryana. However, as 
will be seen in later chapters, the substantive functioning of these institutions is radically 
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different: they are far more active and participatory in Himachal than in Haryana. 
Similarly, the functioning of other institutions of the state, such as the bureaucracy, is 
also vastly different in the two states – it is not just more efficient in Himachal than in 
Haryana, there is also a ‘culture of transparency’ in the former which goes beyond the 
formal structures of the state machinery (more on this in Chapter 7).  
 
The fate of the Directive Principles in the construction of policies by the two states also 
points to factors that extend beyond legal mandates of state action. These principles, 
which were introduced in the Constitution to provide safeguards, especially against 
increasing inequalities, have been treated very differently by both states. In the words of 
Ambedkar, member of the Constituent Assembly and principal author of the Directive 
Principles:  
…the Directive Principles have a great value, for they lay down that our ideal is 
economic democracy… [Our] object in framing the Constitution is really twofold; 
(1) to lay down the form of political democracy and (2) to lay down that our ideal 
is economic democracy and also to prescribe that every government…shall strive 
to bring economic democracy. 
 
While the first objective (that of political democracy) has been achieved by both states, 
the second objective has been by and large ignored in Haryana. Unfortunately, being non-
justiciable, the Directive Principles, were easy to neglect in a society and polity where 
resources – both material and of power – were quickly usurped by influential groups who 
did not stand to gain from economic and social equality (or democracy of the kind 
Ambedkar envisaged). This is borne out in the case of Haryana, where the policies 
adopted by the state in pursuit of economic development, paid scant regard to “economic 
democracy” (equality). In Himachal, however, where the social relations are more 
inclusive and the political process more participatory, far greater importance was given to 
the spirit of the Directive Principles as seen by the social policies adopted by the state. 
 
1.5. The Invisible Hand of Social Equality  
An important contribution of this thesis is to use the Himachal story to emphasize the 
critical role of social equality in the development process. The critical importance of 
social equality, it is argued, relates not just to interaction between citizens but also 
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between the state and its citizens. The latter enables social demands to be represented as 
state objectives, but also allows state action to further the goals of development. 
Therefore a careful look at elements of social equality in terms of caste and gender has 
been a particular endeavour of this thesis.  
 
In addition, the thesis attempts to locate development within the larger politics of 
democratic participation, arguing that development is as much a process of social change 
geared towards greater participation (democracy) of subordinate groups, as it is a process 
of securing specific development outcomes (health, education, incomes) to them. 
Participation of subordinate groups in democratic decision-making processes allows their 
concerns to be adequately represented and allows the state to use democratic processes to 
achieve social goals. In this way, not only is it possible to sustain the gains of 
development, it is also possible to tackle the dilemma of “dual transitions” (i.e., 
deepening democracy while improving development) that many developing countries 
find themselves in. An examination of state (Panchayati Raj Institutions, District and 
Block offices) and non-state institutions (Mahila Mandals, system of exchange labour 
etc.,) particularly their participatory character, has contributed to bringing to life the 
democratic culture that exists in Himachal. Along with secondary information on the 
procedural aspects of democracy, such as “regular and fair” elections, a picture of 
substantive democracy emerges.  
  
Arriving at this understanding has been a long personal journey through Himachal’s 
history of social relations especially gender and caste, the nature of civic cooperation, the 
nature of the state and its interaction with society, the manifestations of state-society 
synergy in the education sector, land relations, other forms of civic action and related 
matters, documented during field visits and substantiated by secondary data. Through this 
process, a more nuanced understanding of Himachal’s economic, social, and human 
development has emerged. Initially I was struck, as many others have been, by the 
remarkable progress made in schooling. However, as I discovered during my research 
there were a range of other significant successes in Himachal’s development. It was not 
just the education sector that had shot to prominence but health, infrastructure, political 
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participation, gender relations, per capita incomes all reflected stories of success. This 
called for a more fundamental look at Himachal – one that went beyond the sectors of 
education or health – and examined the processes that made these sectors perform better 
in Himachal than they did elsewhere, especially in other North Indian states.  
 
The almost puzzling model of development that Himachal presented began to fall into 
place as I tried to link the culture of democracy so evident in all spheres in Himachal with 
its distinctive state-society relations. It gradually became evident that democratic 
practices within societal and state structures provided the means by which state and 
society could and did collaborate to achieve their common goals. It also helped explain 
the success that Himachal has had with channelizing civic action into building social 
institutions (like the Mahila Mandals – women’s associations) that have provided a 
means of expressing and scaling up the demands of society. Himachal’s experience thus 
enriches the theoretical debates around development by drawing attention to the 
democratic processes, facilitated by social equality, that have enabled state and society to 
align their goals and collaborate towards their achievement. In other words I have argued 
that for mutually empowering state-society relations to be developed and sustained, social 
equality is both an end and a means. I am further suggesting that mutually empowering 
interactions between state and society are indicative of ‘substantive’ democracy. In other 
words, social equality is the invisible hand that makes democracy work for development.  
 
 
1.6. Outline of the Thesis  
The outline of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 links the main arguments of the thesis 
with the theoretical discourse of state-society relations. In particular it highlights theories 
of state-society interaction that emphasize collaboration between the two spheres as they 
provide the appropriate framework for analyzing Himachal’s success. The importance of 
social equality to collaborative state-society relations as well as to democratic 
participation is also explored in this chapter, as substantive democracy provides the 
political context within which Himachal’s development has taken place. The similarities 
and differences with Kerala’s experience, which also followed a model of state-led 
development in a democratic context, are touched upon. The chapter ends with a 
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discussion of the nature of the enquiry presented in the thesis.   
  
My field survey in the districts of Kullu in Himachal and Faridabad in Haryana is the 
focus of Chapter 3. After discussing the case study method, the survey areas are 
introduced. The chapter also lays out the research design and shares some field 
experiences.   
 
Community action is the theme of Chapter 4. Starting with a discussion of the historical 
basis of social equality in Himachal, it goes on to document various forms of community 
action in the past and in the present. It ends with a comparison with Haryana where the 
structure of social relations has had a very different history, leading to a highly 
hierarchical society with little scope for community action.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 unpack social equality in Himachal, especially as it relates to gender 
and caste. In Chapter 5, gender relations in Himachal and Haryana are analysed with 
special reference to the role of gender equality in facilitating women’s agency in 
Himachal and its corresponding absence in Haryana. Chapter 6 takes a look at caste 
relations in Himachal, highlighting the dichotomy between the public and the private face 
of caste. While caste barriers continue to exist fairly stringently in Himachal, especially 
with respect to inter-dining and inter-marriage, in the public domain village identity 
appears to be a stronger force allowing for various forms of cooperation across castes. In 
Haryana, caste is shown to be much more pervasive, affecting public spaces and 
interactions as well.  
 
Chapter 7 takes a closer look at state intervention in Himachal, highlighting the links 
between state action and social equality. Constructive state-society relations and their 
impact on public policy, particularly the implementation of the government’s social 
development agenda, is the subject of this chapter. State action in relation to land reforms 
and provision of public services are analysed in greater detail as manifestations of the 
social orientation of the state in Himachal. 
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Chapter 8 focuses on schooling in Himachal as a particularly striking illustration of state-
society collaboration for inclusive social development. 
  
The final chapter summarizes some of the main findings of the dissertation and briefly 
discusses the sustainability of the Himachal model of development.  
 
Throughout this thesis frequent reference is made to the contrast between Himachal and 
Haryana, introduced in this chapter. Needless to say they also have much in common. In 
particular conflict is not absent from Himachali society and nor are patriarchy or caste 
inequality. Nevertheless when they are seen in comparative perspective, social relations 
are evidently very different in Himachal than in Haryana. For instance, if one were to 
look at gender related indicators in Himachal in isolation, it would be easy to highlight 
wide ranging inequalities relating for instance to female-male ratio, property rights, work 
force participation and even education levels. It is when the same indicators are compared 
with other Indian states that the relatively equal nature of gender relations in Himachal 
emerges. Similarly while democracy in Himachal is not without its problems its relatively 
participatory character does stand out when it is compared with the corresponding 
situation in Haryana. This comparative perspective is an important aspect of the approach 
used in this thesis. Correspondingly the relative nature of Himachal’s achievements has 
to be borne in mind.    
24 
Chapter Two 
Theoretical and Methodological Issues 
 
2.1 Introduction : Social Development and State-Society Relations 
When I began my research, much of the existing discourse on Himachal related its 
success to ‘special’ features of the state, such as liberal financial assistance from the 
Centre, its small size, relatively cohesive village communities, and a high level of public 
sector employment.24 While these explanations suggest a role of the state (financial 
transfers and public sector employment) and a role of society (cohesive village 
communities), they only skim the surface and fail to provide a deeper understanding of 
processes and their relation to outcomes. In particular they still leave a range of questions 
unanswered: Why did Himachal choose to give priority to human development as 
opposed to focussing primarily on economic development as most states in similar 
situations were doing? Why did it use its central assistance to fund the social sector? Why 
is public service delivery so much better in Himachal? What role did the so-called 
cohesive communities play in the success story?  
 
Further, Himachal’s success is hard to explain without a look at the processes of 
democracy and participation, which have characterised both state and society and 
influenced the interaction between the two. While these processes have not been 
considered an ‘objective’, per se, they have facilitated higher levels of development than 
would otherwise have been possible. It is therefore important to understand what makes 
for high levels of participation and democracy in state and society in Himachal. This 
thesis endeavours to interpret the development and democratic achievements of Himachal 
by placing social equality in terms of class, caste and gender at the centre of the analysis.  
It argues that social equality has enabled greater participation within society allowing it 
to use the institutions of democracy within the state to further the goals of development. 
This chapter places this analysis in the context of recent theoretical debates on state-
society relations, and discusses some methodological aspects of the study. 
  
                                                          
24 See e.g. Sannan (2004). 
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2.2. Changing Perspectives of the State 
The questions raised above point to the need to look beyond the formal-legal structures of 
the state and to place them in the context of society. They point to a need to look at states, 
not in abstraction from social forces but in terms of the interactions between state and 
society. Earlier analyses of the state tended to invest a lot of power in the state derived 
largely from its control over institutions of authority. In its ‘contract’ with society the 
state was seen as playing the role of impartial arbiter as it closely followed the rules of 
administration and governance. However, as observed by Chandhoke (1995): “A statist 
perspective…which focuses on the state in abstraction from [civil] society is simply 
inadequate… does not allow for understanding of the complex interplay of state-society 
relations since it neglects to see how states constitute, as well as are constituted, by 
political agendas drawn up in civil society…Indeed, the statist perspective offers us states 
without societies….”. 
 
Political agendas drawn up in society have been the focus of the Marxist perspectives 
where the state is seen as part of a nexus between political and economic interests. For 
the Marxists, the state is caught in a “dialectical” relation with society where powerful 
interest groups, largely on the basis of economic power, are able to influence the political 
agenda of the state preventing the state from being impartial or “autonomous”. While 
neo-Marxists (Poulantzas, 1976) diversified the range of debates associated with the 
capitalist state, including a wide range of socio-economic interventions, they nevertheless 
remained tied to the idea that the state functions to meet the needs of the dominant 
economic class.  
 
These theories that challenged the Weberian paradigm of state autonomy based on the 
idea that the state is primarily true to its organizational structures and institutions, led to 
the hardening of positions around state-centric and society-centric paradigms which 
dominated the discourse for much of the latter half of the twentieth century. On the one 
hand the state was conceptualized in terms of its formal institutions, rules and procedures 
meant to regulate society and give it coherence, unity and order, and to which end it had a 
monopoly on force and coercion. And on the other hand society was seen as playing the 
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role of providing checks on the state and protecting elements of society from its excesses. 
As such state and society were seen as locked in a zero-sum game, where strengths and 
capacities of one ran counter to the strengths and capacities of the other. If one gained the 
other lost. While different theorists drew the actual boundaries between state and society 
differently, the common thread that ran through them visualised the two spheres as 
distinct and often in opposition to each other.  
  
These theories have since been re-visited by the work of neo-statists (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer and Skocpol,1985) who have tried to steer clear of “grand theories”, even 
as they reclaim the autonomy of the state, by asserting that the state is not a mere register 
of social forces but a “social actor” with institutional structures capable of influencing the 
culture of political discourse and public action. While not relying solely on Weberian 
typologies of bureaucracies, they posit that states, like social structures, have a history of 
interaction with societal forces, nationally and trans-nationally, that shape their modes of 
functioning and their pursuit of economic and social policies, which in turn affect the 
larger political agendas drawn up in society. An important contribution of their work is 
that it draws attention to the fact that in analyzing states, and state–society relations, 
history matters. They have thus tried to break out of theoretical absolutes – applicable to 
all states and societies at all points in time - embodied in earlier analyses and recommend 
comparisons of states across time and space as a more valuable method of understanding 
the functioning of states and their relationship with society.  
 
Post 1947 comparison of India and Pakistan is a case in point. In an important and 
interesting piece on Pakistan, Alavi (1972) claims that having to manage the interests of 
more than one set of powerful lobbies within society in effect allows the state to be, at 
least seemingly, impartial to all.25 In reality it may choose to favour one set or the other at 
different moments in time. But this ‘discretion’ born out of the need for self-preservation 
is embodied in the state and ultimately gives it autonomy from the sum total of social 
forces. In India on the other hand, despite the development rhetoric of the state its ability 
                                                          
25 In Pakistan it is the military, the bureaucracy and the economic oligarchies, all of whom have to be 
“appeased”.  
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to stay autonomous to the needs of the marginalized sections of society has allowed it to 
further its agenda of capitalist development (Jayal, 2001). While the military does not 
play a significant role in India, economic interests and according to some (Bardhan, 
1984) bureaucratic interests have consistently dominated state policy. In other words 
variations in the alignment of social forces have a corresponding influence on state 
decisions.  
 
The comparison of Himachal Pradesh and Haryana, as we will see in this thesis, provides 
further evidence of the inter-relatedness of state and society. In the case of Himachal and 
Haryana, both with similar organizational structures and similar Constitutional 
imperatives (Directive Principles included), and at similar points in time, followed 
different policy discourses, processes and influences resulting in different development 
trajectories.    
 
What accounts for these differences? An important objective of this thesis is to 
understand the reasons why Himachal and Haryana differed so crucially in their 
processes and outcomes. As indicated in Chapter 1, this thesis will focus on the structure 
of social relations and the interaction of state with society as an important explanation for 
the success (or failure) of the states in question.  The nature of this interaction, it is 
claimed, affects the policies, institutions, administrative and financial priorities of the 
states. 
 
2.2.1 Collaborative State-Society Approaches and the Relevance of Mutuality  
While the theories discussed above provide useful insights to foreground the discussion 
on Himachal and Haryana, they are constrained by being somewhat narrowly focussed on 
issues of power and domination between state and society. In contrast, the late 1990s saw 
a more nuanced framework emerge in state-society approaches which provide a closer 
‘fit’ to the situation in Himachal. These approaches, instead of treating states and 
societies as two distinct spheres, with separate sources of power and dominance (or 
autonomy, capacity, strength), focus on interaction, interdependence, mutuality, and 
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synergy between states and societies.26 Common to all of these approaches is the idea that 
boundaries between the state and society are porous and flexible; that capacities and 
strengths within state and society are mutually constituted by interaction with each other.  
Prominent in this theoretical discourse are the works of Migdal et al., (1994) and Evans et 
al., (1996), which mark a watershed in scholarship on the state by drawing attention to 
the possibility not only of “blurred boundaries” between state and society but also of 
cooperation between the two spheres. While Migdal, Shue and Kohli (1994) in their 
seminal work, State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the 
Third World, lay out what they call the “state-in-society” approach, based on a 
modification of the idea of state and society being in a “zero-sum” game of power, Evans 
et al., have focused on “state-society synergy” where complementarity and 
“embeddedness” in government and community efforts “enhance each other’s 
developmental efforts” (Evans,1996). Both these perspectives move beyond the 
traditional framework of strict dichotomy and conflict between state and society and 
recognize that spaces for mutual interaction and synergy exist between the two. Evans in 
particular relies on strong empirical evidence from developing countries (India, Taiwan, 
Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria) to demonstrate the possibilities of state and society working 
together for a common purpose. Each of these case studies highlights a different ‘version’ 
of state-society synergy – whether it be a “welfare pact” between state and society (India, 
Heller, 1996); or “co-production” (Nigeria, Ostrom, 1996); “scaling up” community 
efforts to state levels (Taiwan, Liam, 1996) or government-community partnership 
(Brazil, Tendler, 1997), they all focus on constructive linkages between state and society.  
 
Another strand of research that highlights state society interaction has grown up around 
ethnographic studies of the state that look not so much at the distinction between state 
and society but at the linkages formed in the daily interactions of people with the state 
Fuller and Benei,(2000). This blurring of boundaries between the state and society brings 
to the fore ways in which people negotiate and construct the state in the “lived realities” 
of their daily lives. This literature criticises the earlier approaches as proving inadequate 
in dealing with the realities of several third world countries, where the state is represented 
                                                          
26 Evans (1996), Tendlar (1995), Fox (1996), Osella and Osella (2000), Jayal (2001), Hansen (2001). 
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at micro/local levels in its day-to-day interactions with the people. Therefore they stress 
the importance of not following ‘unitary’ descriptions of the state but allowing for a more 
discursive analysis that takes into account the various ways in which the state is 
‘constructed’ by people as they confront it in their daily life (as well as in their 
imagination, part history, part media-induced) (Akhil Gupta,1995). 27 This is especially 
important for understanding the role of the state in development, as the whole project of 
development unfolds at the local level with the state being the main executor. The state in 
everyday life is probably the relevant space in which to analyse and re-claim the state in 
terms of its developmental role. Some of the field level evidence in this dissertation lends 
credence to this view. 
 
Migdal’s analysis makes a departure from conventional thinking in recognizing that 
under certain circumstances the state and social forces may be ‘mutually empowering’, 
creating more power for both. 28 While at some points states may be more effective in 
getting their objectives met, and at others societies may be more effective, there are still 
other points, where the goals of the two coincide, that could result in ‘mutual 
empowerment’ for both.  While the struggle for power and domination continues, the fact 
that state and society are in a dialogic relationship implies that the outcome of the 
struggle or engagement with each other is not necessarily pre-determined in favour of one 
or the other. It depends on a number of different factors, including the number and kinds 
of spaces available to both for engagement. In this process the possibility of mutual 
benefit or greater power to both is recognized as one of the outcomes, as opposed to 
earlier approaches where power tended to be vested disproportionately in either the state 
or society. It is important to note that by allowing for a positive sum notion of power 
between state and society, Migdal’s analysis seeks to provide a balance by 
acknowledging that under certain conditions, neither state nor society need dominate.   
 
Evans, et al., , also theorize a positive state-society relationship moving even further 
away from the standard terminology of power and domination by analyzing the state in 
                                                          
27 “ States have history...we must think historically about them” (Doornbos and Kaviraj 1997: intro). 
28 For a review of notions of power in political sociology see Xu Wang (1999).  
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terms of its effectiveness in meeting development goals. On the basis of their empirical 
work these scholars argue that developing countries typically embody situations where 
the state or non-state actors (community or private) on their own cannot bring about 
desired outcomes but in collaboration with each other they can achieve more effective 
and sustainable results. The most obvious instance of this collaboration is the 
“complementarity” role played by the state through the provision of law and order, 
infrastructural facilities etc., which provide an enabling environment for other goals to be 
pursued. But their idea of “synergy” goes beyond complementarity in state-society 
collaboration. It highlights the “embeddedness” of state in society, found on the contours 
of day to day interaction between state and society, and in the networks that enable 
interdependence and reciprocity between them.29 In a sense it refers, albeit obliquely, to 
social capital between state and societal actors, except that it extends the understanding of 
social capital by including the state as a possible partner in the network of social 
relations. Standard social capital literature, Putnam in particular, tends to take a fairly 
anti-state view, keeping the state completely out of the purview of social networks. Evans 
not only includes the state in synergistic networks, he goes even further by suggesting 
that the state can play a positive role in constructing social capital in society, by 
facilitating the formation of associations, and hence create an important condition for 
synergy between state and society. However the focus of the case studies on synergy is 
on “translating social ties from engines of parochial loyalties into vehicles for more 
encompassing forms of organization” (Evans, 1996). The case of Kerala discussed by 
Heller makes the point forcefully as he argues that in Kerala traditional caste and 
community ties could not have produced development results had they not been linked to 
what Evans calls a “universalistic set of identities’. The scaling up of community level 
concerns to a larger set of goals adopted by the state is thus recognized as crucial to the 
construction of synergy. It mirrors Migdal’s focus on mutuality of goals between state 
and society. 
  
2.2.2 Social Inequalities – Challenge to Collaboration  
                                                          
29 This idea has been developed further by CJ Fuller and Veronique Benei (2000) in their joint book, “The 
Everyday State and Society in Modern India” a collection of essays on the interaction between the state and 
people in different states of India. 
  31
While the state-society literature has moved the discourse out of the dichotomous zero-
sum framework of analysis, an important limitation with this interpretation is that it treats 
as ‘outliers’ situations of sharp social divisions and hierarchies. It is obvious that the 
presence of sectional interests in society can derail the process of collaboration. 
Cooperation between state and society as well as between elements of society can be 
severely hampered by the presence of disparities in the social fabric. Evans, in particular, 
cites social inequalities as one of the main impediments to building collaborative 
relations between state and society. In fact he states quite categorically that “basic hard-
to-change features of the social structure, like the degree of inequality, may put synergy 
out of reach for certain societies” (:1124). This follows logically from Migdal’s focus on 
mutuality as well since goals are unlikely to be “common” across highly differentiated 
groups. In fact homogeneity of interests across public and social (or private) actors is a 
running theme in the literature on state-society interaction just as it is in the literature on 
social capital with regard to members of associations (Putnam,1993). It is not surprising 
then that the ‘constructability’ of synergy discussed by Evans breaks down at the margins 
of sharp social divisions. But this presents a theoretical impasse for much of the 
developing world and India in particular, which is marked by hierarchies at multiple 
levels. Are positive state-society relations therefore beyond the reach of highly 
differentiated and hierarchical societies?  
 
Heller’s (2001) study of Kerala throws some light on this question by highlighting the 
role of political mobilization around mass interests as a possible strategy for overcoming 
the class divide. In Kerala the closing of the gap between the organized and the informal 
sector in industry added to the egalitarian social relations created in agriculture post land-
reforms. This provided the basis for generalized mobilization and the construction of a 
common agenda for the state which the interests of the elite could not override. Thus 
class mobilization allowed for a leveling of social forces that enabled Kerala to pursue 
the objectives of broad based development through constructive state-society interaction. 
Himachal, on the other hand was historically endowed with a more favourable set of 
social relations. Mass mobilization of the sort seen in Kerala was thus not required to 
create the conditions for society to present a cohesive force in its interaction with the 
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state in order to achieve its goals. The spaces within society which were marked with a 
high degree of participation born out of the relatively egalitarian nature of society sought 
corresponding spaces within the state in order to facilitate a collaborative interaction. The 
democratic institutions of the state provided that space and created the conditions for 
synergistic state-society relations and their up-scaling to positive development ends.  
 
Two useful implications of state-society theories discussed above (Migdal and Evans) are 
particularly worth mentioning: First, these approaches recognize the collective aspects of 
power, as opposed to just its distributional aspects, suggesting that cooperation can 
enhance joint power to achieve common goals. State and society can collaborate against a 
‘common enemy’ of say, poverty and social injustice, just as elements within society can 
cooperate to fight against it or elements within the state can avow commitment to it. This 
implies, among other things, that the state need not weaken when society is empowered, 
and vice versa as suggested by the earlier approaches. Second, these theories suggest that 
the development of capacities within society can provide a mechanism to link social 
demands to state power and help the state to define and realize its goals and promote 
larger social purposes (Xu Wang, 1999). Both these find resonance in the Himachal 
experience, as will we see further on in the thesis. 
 
2.2.3 Dilemma of “Dual Transitions” 
For progress to be both rapid and widespread, it is necessary to arrive at a stage where the 
goals of state and society are aligned. In transition economies pursuing the twin goals of 
economic development and democratization simultaneously, it is often found that either 
the states become strong and repressive or special interest groups in society interfere in 
the implementation of long term development goals. (Migdal, 1988) Typically, conflict in 
such situations reflects attempts by the weaker elements in society to enforce the rhetoric 
of the state as well as to mould policy institutions and financial allocations to reflect their 
priorities. It is not surprising therefore, that evidence from around the world, for instance, 
Brazil and India (Kerala), suggests that successful projects of democracy and 
development are closely linked to the adoption of a development paradigm that directly 
challenges structural inequalities. 
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Himachal Pradesh also provides interesting pointers to tackling the so-called ‘dilemma of 
dual transitions’ – that of economic development along with democratic deepening - by 
highlighting the conditions under which the goals of society and state can both be met. In 
Himachal the dual transition worked because relative social equality meant these interests 
were not divided and state and society were able to collaborate towards common goals. 
Spaces and capacities within society, sometimes developed with state support, such as 
Mahila Mandals or Village Education Committees, provided a further link to state power 
sustaining the collaborative efforts.  
 
Despite a spate of empirical studies (including the ones cited in section 2.2.1 above) that 
have highlighted the importance of inequalities, the current discourse fails to provide a 
more thorough understanding of the role of social inequalities in structuring state-society 
relationships and their link to outcomes of development and democracy30. It is in 
providing evidence of these links that the Himachal case is particularly instructive. 
Drawing attention to the importance of social equality through the illustration of the 
Himachal story is thus the main contribution of this thesis.   
 
2.3. Development and  Democracy  
It is clear from the discussion above that state-society relations have to be seen in the 
context of democratic processes and how they have shaped public priorities and state 
action. It will be argued in this thesis that the relatively social orientation of public policy 
and state action in Himachal reflects people’s active and informed participation in 
democratic institutions of both state and society. In that sense Himachal’s experience can 
be seen as a reflection of “participatory democracy”. Indications of the participatory 
character of democracy in Himachal Pradesh include functional institutions of local 
governance (eg: Gram Panchayats and Gram Sabhas), lively associational life (e.g. PTA, 
Mahila Mandals) and active use of available democratic spaces by the public at large.  
 
The relatively egalitarian character of social relations in Himachal has been conducive to 
                                                          
30 For recent theoretical work on the role of social divisions, especially in terms of impact on provision of 
public goods and services, see Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) and Banerjee, Iyer and Somathanan (2005) 
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community action and fostered a rich associational life (see Chapter 4). For instance, 
Mahila Mandals (women’s groups) and Yuva Mandals (youth groups) are comparatively 
active; programmes of Joint Forest Management (JFM) have achieved significant results; 
and institutions such as Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) and Village Education 
Committees (VECs) are functional.  In addition, informal systems of reciprocity still 
exist, binding communities and creating the grounds for cooperation at broader levels. 
Examples include traditional systems of exchange labour, collaboration to build a school 
or repair an irrigation channel, mutual help at weddings or funerals, and other forms of 
daily social interactions within the village.31 Such interaction or active associational life 
is starkly missing in Haryana. Deep-seated inequalities have divided village communities 
spatially as well as socially, making it very difficult for collaboration to take place. 
Hence, Mahila Mandals have stopped functioning, PTAs and VECs rarely exist, and 
reciprocity is limited to people of the same caste. 
 
Institutions of governance under the Panchayati Raj system are also active in Himachal. 
Gram Sabhas are routinely held on appointed dates and well attended; panchayat 
elections are held regularly in strict accordance with the rules of affirmative action; 
women and Dalits elected to the Panchayat are allowed to play their roles without being 
marginalized; and relatively easier access to higher levels of government makes it 
possible for local issues to be represented in public policy. Hence, people’s participation 
in democratic institutions has ensured that the state is responsive to their needs, and state 
action, in turn, has empowered people to exercise their democratic rights.  
 
2.3.1 Substantive Democracy and Social Development  
The foregoing discussion, where substantive democracy is also fostered along with social 
development, based on equality and participation, provides a more “political reading” of 
Himachal’s experience. There is no doubt that the political conception of development is 
a more complicated issue simply because what is meant by political is itself imbued with 
several meanings. Nevertheless, any public matter reflects some sort of politics, and in 
                                                          
31 For interesting examples in Himachal Pradesh as well as neighbouring Himalayan districts, see Rinki 
Sarkar (2007), Jayal (1999), Chetan Singh (1998), Ram Guha (1989). 
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India this would mean democratic politics. Substantive democracy is the form that 
democratic politics have taken in Himachal. 
 
Meanwhile, where the role of politics has been acknowledged, it has been mostly in the 
form of the influence of political parties on development outcomes (more in Chapter 7). 
Kohli (1991) and Harriss (2000) stress the need to include the lower castes in the political 
process and hence give them a voice. While this is no doubt a laudable objective, such 
alliances, being notoriously fickle, are not sustainable in the long term and could result in 
sharp reverses in policy and outcomes. Besides, the root of the problem, which is 
entrenched social inequality, is not systematically attacked even in grand alliances at the 
level of political parties. The focus on institutions, such as political parties, runs the 
danger of losing sight of the conceptual issues, and when the concepts themselves are 
contested, one can end up being twice removed from the outcomes one is seeking. 
Therefore, instead of focusing on political institutions such as parties it may be more 
useful to recast the ‘political’ in terms of the ‘public’, as the site or space of citizenship, 
of deliberation and consensus building among citizens on issues of common 
developmental concern. It includes all spaces of public discussion and public action.  
 
In the present context Himachal provides an excellent example of the importance of the 
“public” in development. What emerges in Himachal is a firmly entrenched healthy 
respect for the public space to which all sections of population feel they have a claim. No 
group is easily able to lay a dominant claim on the public space, whether it is the school, 
the panchayat, the Mahila Mandal, the district administration, the politician, or even the 
common physical space. Hence, gender and caste discriminations in schools are much 
less than elsewhere. If there is a violation, such as discrimination in schools, it is taken up 
by the whole community as happened in one of my sample villages. Panchayat elections 
have always been held on time and without disruptions (Sud, 2000). Reservations for 
lower caste and women are strictly adhered to in spite of private prejudices. Mahila 
Mandals (and other associations) function better than in other states. Discrimination 
against lower caste women within these associations, where it exists, has resulted in the 
latter forming their own Mahila Mandals, thus appropriating for themselves, a section of 
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the public space that was being denied them within the other Mandal. Physical space is 
largely gender neutral and crime rates are low. In all these respects the contrast with 
Haryana is striking. Here the space is distinctly male and crime rates are much higher 
(more in Chapter 5); social accessibility of government at all levels for all sections of the 
population is very low (details in Chapter 7) and collective/public associations are wholly 
lacking.  
 
What is particularly noteworthy is that the idea of the ‘public’ in Himachal encompasses 
the state. Hence there is a high level of engagement and expectation from the state in 
terms of its development role. There is space for expressing dissent but also for exerting 
pressure on the state to perform. Since the “public” is not fractured along economic or 
social lines, people have a “voice” which is heard and which has generated, what Walton 
and Rao (2004) evocatively call, the “capacity to aspire”. 
 
In Haryana, on the other hand, inequalities have resulted in the elite section of the 
population opting out of state institutions, in favour of private options, thereby removing 
an effective element of  ‘voice’ from the system. As a result the not-so-elite sections of 
the population who are forced to rely on public provision find themselves trapped in a 
system they are unable to influence. They sorely lack the “capacity to aspire”. 
  
This interpretation of Himachal Pradesh’s experience bears some similarity with Patrick 
Heller’s interpretation of Kerala. It builds on the distinction between formal or procedural 
democracy on the one hand, and “effective” or substantive democracy on the other. A 
distinction of this kind has been made by various authors in India from B.R. Ambedkar 
onwards.32 I will, however, focus on Heller’s work as it mirrors most closely the 
Himachal experience. There are important differences with Kerala, that will become clear 
as we move along, but the core of the analytical frame is similar in both cases. 
 
2.3.2 Similarities with Kerala 
                                                          
32 See Mehta (2003), Jayal (2001), Varshney (1995, 1996), Kothari (1988, 1995), Kohli (1987, 1990). For 
related discussion from other parts of the world, see: Huber et al (1999), Kurt Weyland (1996), Adam 
Prezeworski (1995), O’Donnell (1993), Barrington Moore (1966). 
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The crux of Heller’s argument is that most Indian states have failed to make the transition 
from procedural to effective democracy because,  
…the exercise of citizenship rights, even in the limited political sense of the term, 
is circumscribed by the persistence of traditional forms of social control.  With 
more than half of India’s rural households depending on landlords for access to 
land or labour, clientelistic ties, remain key to the survival strategies of 
subordinate groups.  With its ritualized exclusions and deeply ingrained 
hierarchical relations, the caste system has inscribed these material inequalities 
with a degree of social and cultural control that has few parallels...This failure of 
Indian democracy to give effective voice to substantive demands has locked in a 
vicious cycle (bold added) that is eroding the very legitimacy of democratic 
governance. (2000:493). 
 
Heller contrasts this state of affairs (which comes close to a description of the situation in 
Haryana) with Kerala’s relative success in achieving the transition to effective 
democracy. In Kerala, which he claims stands apart from all other Indian states, 
democracy  
has produced significant and measurable substantive outcomes, most notably 
important redistributive reforms and the expansion of the welfare state.  These 
substantive outcomes are the result of the inclusionary and encompassing 
character of democratic life, but they have also helped reinforce the effectiveness 
of state authority and levels of political participation (2000:497).  
 
For Heller, the health of a democracy is measured not just by the formal character of its 
institutions but also by the qualitative nature of the relationships between state and 
society as well as between its citizens. Effective democracy, as he defines it, is one “... in 
which democratic processes have spread throughout society governing not only relations 
between states and citizens but also public relations between citizens”.  
 
Further, in searching for the roots of this contrast between democracy in Kerala and “in 
the rest of India”, Heller focuses mainly on class mobilization.  It is through class 
mobilization, he argues, that traditional inequalities and modes of social control have 
been overcome, enabling subordinate groups to participate in democracy. “To a much 
greater degree than in any other Indian state, Kerala’s political history has been shaped 
by open and organized class conflict.” 
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2.3.3 Differences with Kerala 
Like Kerala, Himachal can be seen as a case where effective democracy has led to 
“significant and measurable substantive outcomes”, as seen in its remarkable social 
indicators. The difference between the two states relates to the manner in which effective 
democracy has been achieved. In Kerala, social movements (and particularly organized 
class action) have countered traditional inequalities, empowered citizens to participate in 
democratic processes, and enabled state action for consolidation of social equality and 
participatory democracy. In Himachal, on the other hand, effective democracy builds on a 
history of relatively egalitarian social relations. This has given democratic institutions a 
relatively participatory character, from the beginning of the state’s independent political 
history (in 1971). It has not just allowed democratic institutions of the state to function 
more effectively it has also enabled other spaces within society as well as on the edges of 
state-society interaction to be used more constructively. This has influenced the political 
culture and policy discourse in the state making it far more democratic in many respects.  
 
However, the Himachal situation indicates that it is not class politics that is the dominant 
determining factor, as was the case in Kerala, but a set of more egalitarian relationships, 
across class, caste and gender that helped strengthen participatory processes within 
society and laid the foundations for substantive democracy. The politics in Himachal is 
thus defined by the consensual nature of these social relationships that have fostered a 
more substantive form of democracy. To quote Rueschemeyer, et.al. (1992:41): “Is it 
really possible to differentiate the realm of politics from the overall systems of inequality 
in a society?” 
 
2.3.4 Civic Cooperation and Collective Action  
Another aspect of effective democracy in Himachal Pradesh relates to the diverse roles of 
civic cooperation and collective action. In this respect again the contrast between 
Himachal and Haryana is quite sharp. One of these roles is to facilitate the functioning of 
institutions of local governance and collective action. These are often critical for the 
success of state intervention, especially in the field of social development. For instance, 
effective Gram Panchayats can be of great help in facilitating the implementation of rural 
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development programmes (e.g. National Rural Employment Guarantee Act). In my 
sample of Himachal households a majority of respondents stated that they had confidence 
in the Gram Panchayat, with little variation between lower caste and upper caste 
respondents. In Haryana by contrast, confidence in the Gram Panchayat was 
overwhelming among the upper castes but extremely low among the Scheduled Castes, 
reflecting the elite capture of the institutions of local governance. 
 
Himachal’s strong culture of civic cooperation has further reinforced the virtuous circle 
of social equality and constructive state action mentioned earlier. Even outside the arena 
of state intervention, cooperative action at the local level has much to contribute to social 
development. To illustrate, active Mahila Mandals are often instrumental in facilitating 
collective resolution of women’s concerns in diverse fields such as child care, health and 
domestic violence.33  
 
The diverse links between social equality and civic cooperation are well illustrated in the 
context of education (Chapter 7). In Haryana, as mentioned earlier, the schooling system 
is fraught with social divisions of class, caste and gender. Privileged children are often 
enrolled in private schools while those of disadvantaged families attend poorly managed 
government schools, and many girls do not go to school at all. In this divided 
environment there is little collective pressure to ensure quality education for all children. 
Formal institutions created for this purpose, such as PTAs and VECs, exist largely on 
paper. In Himachal by contrast, there are widely shared social norms about the value of 
schooling for all children (irrespective of class, caste and gender) and most children are 
integrated in a common schooling system. Private schools are rare and the village 
government school is everyone’s school. In many of these schools PTAs and VECs meet 
regularly and parents take interest in these institutions.34  
 
Even where there is no visible collective action, social development can be greatly 
facilitated by egalitarian social norms and a culture of democracy. In Himachal, the 
                                                          
33 For some interesting examples of well functioning Mahila Mandals see, Sharma (1980).  
34 In fact almost two-thirds of Himachali parents in my sample stated that they had participated in school-
related collective activities (compared to less than a quarter in Haryana). 
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recognition of public spaces, including schools, as belonging to everyone is firmly 
entrenched, and cases of overt discrimination or hostility against lower caste children in 
schools are relatively rare. The social distance between parents and teachers is also 
relatively small, making it easier for them to build a constructive rapport even in the 
absence of formal institutions.35 In Haryana, this rapport is often marked by indifference, 
even hostility, partly because of the social distance that separates the teachers from the 
parents. Intimidation of lower caste children by upper caste teachers and pupils is often 
cited as a reason for dropping out of school. 
 
The preceding discussion focuses largely on cooperation at the local level (say, within the 
village community), but the positive influence of cooperative social norms may be much 
wider. For instance, there is some evidence that the social distance between people who 
occupy different positions in the “system” is often relatively small in Himachal Pradesh, 
not only at the local level (say, between teachers and parents, or doctors and patients), but 
also in the society at large.  To illustrate, the office of a Block Development Officer or 
even District Collector in Himachal Pradesh does not seem to have the intimidating or 
hostile character it often has elsewhere. Ordinary people (women as well as men) 
routinely visit these offices are at ease with them. Similarly, as discussed further on, there 
is no wide gulf between elected representatives and the people: Members of Legislative 
Assembly (MLAs), for instance, tend to be fairly accessible and are often personally 
known to many of their constituents, even in remote villages. In this respect, too, social 
conditions in Himachal Pradesh have been conducive to participatory democracy.36 
 
2.3.5 Social Equality and Political Democracy 
The fundamental role of social equality as a precondition of effective democracy was a 
recurring theme in Dr. B.R.Ambedkar’s writings. For instance, commenting on the 
                                                          
35  This is not to say that there are no issues of caste discrimination and exclusion at school in Himachal. 
However, such incidents are comparatively less frequent and there is less social acceptance of them.  In one 
of my sample villages, the beating of a Dalit child by an upper caste teacher became an issue around which 
the entire village came together, leading to the transfer of the teacher. 
36 Some of these arguments have been made in the literature on social capital which has drawn attention to 
the importance of civic cooperation for development and democracy [See particularly Putnam (1993) and 
with reference to India Blomkvist (2000, 2001, 2003), Jayal (2001), Anirudh Krishna (2002)].However in 
several important ways the social capital framework is inadequate for our purposes. I will return to this 
later in this chapter. 
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limitations of Parliamentary democracy in Europe, Ambedkar said:  
 
The second wrong ideology that has vitiated parliamentary democracy is the 
failure to realize that political democracy cannot succeed where there is no social 
or economic democracy…Social and economic democracy are the tissues and the 
fiber of a political democracy. The tougher the tissue and the fiber, the greater the 
strength of democracy. Democracy is another name for equality. 
(Quoted in Rodrigues 2002:62). 
 
More recently, there has been a revival of interest in this idea in the literature on 
democracy in India. For instance, as stressed by Jayal (2001), the effective exercise of 
democratic rights is a matter of “citizenship”.  In fact, she argues for “placing citizenship 
at the heart of the democratic project, and indeed making it the test of democracy itself.” 
Inequalities in social relations (including not only economic inequalities but also 
inequalities based on gender and caste) undermine citizenship, and are therefore one of 
the main obstacles to effective democracy. To quote:  
 
The project of democracy….cannot be said to have been accomplished till such 
time as the effective exercise of the rights of citizenship is achieved and 
guaranteed to all.  This in turn is a combined function of the enforceability of 
constitutionally guaranteed equal rights and of the social conditions that make 
their effective exercise possible.” [2001] 
 
In this framework, Himachal’s experience can be seen as a case where the “social 
conditions” (including the absence of sharp social inequalities) did exist in substantial 
measure, making it possible to build citizenship and effective democracy. 
 
The ‘critical modernist’ approach to development that calls for locating (or “re-locating”) 
participation within a more radical politics of development is another example of the 
increasing interest in the importance of social inequalities to the process of development 
and democracy. For instance, Hickey and Mohan (2005) highlight the fact that successful 
democratic projects are closely linked to the adoption of development paradigms that 
directly challenge structural inequalities. Both Kerala and HP are good examples of 
developmental success achieved through a levelling of social inequalities (through 
different routes) facilitating the use of democratic structures.  
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2.4. Nature of Enquiry  
Before elaborating on the methodology adopted it may be pertinent to say a few words on 
the nature of the thesis to foreground the methods and sources of information used to 
present the arguments. At the outset, it must be pointed out that the approach adopted in 
this thesis is rooted in the eclectic discipline of ‘development studies’, as opposed to 
either political science, economics or anthropology. While it draws on elements of all 
three, standard indicators such as state power or economic growth or purely cultural 
considerations are not at the centre of analysis. Instead, development outcomes and the 
nature of state-society interactions that facilitate the achievement of those outcomes are 
the focus of study. In this respect it is more akin to the work of Evans et al., (than Migdal, 
for instance) who have focused on the importance of synergistic state-society relations in 
meeting development goals. The difference between Evans work and that presented here 
is that while Evans et al., have treated the presence of social inequalities as the outliers in 
their analysis, I have made it the centre piece in my study.  
 
In order to illustrate the virtuous circle I have discussed several propositions regarding 
Himachal Pradesh’s development experience, and especially its social achievements, 
relating them to social equality and its impact on state-society relations. These include: 
 
1. Himachal’s exceptionally rapid (and broad-based) progress in the field of “social 
development” during the last few decades.   
2. The state has played a pro-active role in development.  
3. Himachal society is characterized by egalitarian social relations. 
4. The “virtuous circle” of constructive state action and social equality goes a long way in 
explaining Himachal’s success. 
 
The first three propositions are mainly of a factual nature, and seem to be well supported 
by available data – from the field as well as secondary sources. 
  
The fourth proposition, however, is of a more ‘speculative’ nature. It is not only a 
statement about the enabling roles of constructive state action and social equality, but 
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also a hypothesis about the interaction between state and society. Further, it places this 
interaction at the centre of our interpretation of Himachal’s experience by arguing that 
the mutually reinforcing interaction between egalitarian social relations and a pro-active 
democratic state is at the core of Himachal’s success. This raises the question whether 
other interpretations might be more plausible. In the next section I review other current 
interpretations and show how limitations in them led me to arrive at my proposed 
hypothesis. 
 
2.4.1 Does the Economics of Himachal Explain its Success   
In the literature on social development in Himachal Pradesh, other elements of 
interpretation have indeed been proposed, focusing for instance on economic growth, 
financial assistance from the Central Government, and the rapid expansion of public 
sector employment. Accordingly, it can be argued that Central Government transfers 
made it possible to invest in education and as incomes rose, educational uptake rose too 
and the expanding public sector by providing employment fuelled the demand for more 
education. This is no doubt a credible ‘explanation’ with a different kind of virtuous 
circle in it as well. However, it takes a limited view of human development in Himachal 
on several counts. First, the general evidence on income effects of development is 
relatively weak. Haryana is a clear case in point. With the highest per capita incomes it 
still lags far behind on most social indicators. The current situation of runaway growth, in 
India as a whole, is also seen to exist with little social progress. Second, it leaves 
unanswered the question of why Central Government transfers were used to support the 
social sectors in the first place and to the extent that they were. Third, it addresses the 
success in education in isolation from other aspects of social development; political or 
democratic development - an important part of Himachal’s story - do not figure at all. 
 
2.4.2 Or is it Social Capital?  
Another explanation, which has not (to my knowledge) been invoked in the context of 
Himachal Pradesh, but may come to mind to some readers in the light of the material 
presented in this thesis, runs in terms of “social capital”. Some of the arguments I have 
developed (for instance, regarding collective action and associational life) could indeed 
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be put forward in the framework of social capital.  
 
Anecdotal references from Himachal and other hill areas in India have highlighted the 
relative cohesiveness of social interactions in these societies. Reciprocity, cooperation, 
interdependence and less stringent hierarchies are aspects of hill culture that have figured 
prominently in the ethnographic research of several scholars such as Berreman 1979, Sax, 
1991, Narayanan, 1997 to name a few. More recent research (PROBE, 1999, Rinki 
Sarkar, 2007, Chetan Singh, 1998) has drawn on these features to make connections with 
development outcomes of the hill regions. Two strands emerge – one that links the 
cohesiveness of communities to greater possibility of “voice” and public action as a 
means of influencing policy in favour of social development (PROBE, 1999) and the 
other that has linked the rich associational life of villages to the concept of social capital 
and its attendant benefits (Jayal, 1999, in the context of Garhwal hills).  
 
All of the above, put together, offer a plausible explanation of Himachal’s success story. 
Greater social capital born out of the systems of reciprocity found in the interdependent 
hill societies translates into public action which has the desired impact on policy 
priorities which when backed by financial resources from the Central Government and 
the expanding public sector complete the circle (also virtuous). In fact I began my field 
work, somewhat on these lines. It seemed that cohesive communities with large stocks of 
social capital were responsible for “making democracy work” in Himachal which in turn 
was facilitating the achievement of development goals. There was enough secondary and 
anecdotal information to suggest that associational life was rich and democratic practices 
were thriving in Himachal. Social capital seemed the obvious ‘missing link’ and I thus 
proceeded to do my field work all set to uncover the networks of reciprocity – formal and 
informal and establish the connection between social capital and democratic development 
in Himachal. This perspective, however, turned out to require substantial modification in 
the light of ground realities. 
 
2.4.3. Ground Realities 
My field work, while providing support for much of what I set out to find, such as 
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networks of reciprocity, well functioning associations, importance of education and large 
public sector presence, also threw up some interesting surprises. In particular what I 
found was: 
 
1. Social relations had a far more nuanced and interesting story to tell than could be “fit” 
into a social capital framework: a) gender played a very important role; b) there were 
aspects of caste relations in Himachal that put to question the ‘horizontal” networks 
central to Putnam’s analysis of social capital. For instance exchange labour across castes 
and caste based Mahila Mandals, added another dimension to the nature and scope of 
“associationalism”, in Himachal.   
2. State had a prominent place in the lives of the people. Especially as provider of public 
services, expectations from the state were unusually high. This finding in particular ran 
contrary to the social capital framework which derides a role for the state, focussing 
disproportionately on communities as the engines of democracy and development.  
3. It was not just that public services were relatively well delivered, but rather that public 
institutions and spaces were marked with a degree of “respect” that is hard to ignore. 
What was even more striking was that the respect is mutual. For instance, teachers 
invariably arrived on time to schools, even in cases where they are located in remote hard 
to reach areas. And this “respect” / consideration / is reciprocated by students who were 
found in high attendance, and by parents who participate regularly in PTAs and other 
forums and willingly cooperate with school authorities. Prejudices with regard to caste, 
which may well exist in the private sphere, rarely spilled over into the classroom and 
hence Dalit children participate equally in the village schools. Similarly, other institutions 
of governance – the panchayats, for instance, ran far better than in most states. Gram 
sabhas were regularly held and well attended (a rarity in North India); panchayat 
elections were also held regularly and in full accordance with the rules of affirmative 
action. If a woman or Dalit was elected head of the Panchayat, they functioned as such 
and were not reduced to being rubber stamps of patriarchal or caste lobbies. Panchayats 
records were not just well maintained but easily available to the public – again a rarity in 
much of India. Other aspects of this respect was evident in the fact that women were not 
threatened by the world outside their homes – girls were able to travel long distances to 
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attend high school and women were often working in places far from their families.       
 
By the time I finished my field work it was evident to me that the social capital 
framework fell far short of providing an adequate explanation for Himachal’s story. 
There seemed to be a far more interesting and at the same time a more ‘essential’ story to 
tell. There was a “virtuous circle” in operation here, but its centre lay elsewhere. The 
virtuous circle I found unfolding in my fieldwork was of “collaborative state-society 
relations, built on – as well as reinforcing - equality and participation. 
 
This was brought into sharper contrast during my field work in Haryana where I was 
struck by the absence of social solidarity in rural Haryana coupled with a deep mistrust of 
the establishment. While Himachal had brought to the fore, mutuality, synergy, 
consensus and collaboration that existed within society and especially between state and 
society, Haryana was characterised by conflict, resistance, mistrust and violence in its 
society as well as in its relations with authority. Even though the contrast has been 
important to understand Himachal better, it must be emphasized, that Haryana is a more 
representative case of the general development story in India, where social development 
goals have repeatedly faced resistance from powerful forces in society and therefore got 
diluted or even distorted in their impact. In fact it fit more easily into already established 
theories of state-society conflict such as those of state capture or co-option (Chapter 7). 
The reality of a highly hierarchical society having driven a wedge between state rhetoric 
and outcomes was amply evident in Haryana. Thus the reality of implementation 
diverged widely from stated objectives, as they do in much of democratic India. For this 
reason, Haryana did not throw up surprises in the way that Himachal and could even be 
fit into a more standard social capital framework of the kind used, by Putnam to describe 
Southern Italy.  
 
It was the nature of Himachal’s “success” in particular the role of social equality and 
state action that poked holes in the social capital framework and forced me to look 
beyond at what was emerging as a more interesting interplay between society and the 
state. 
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2.4. Concluding Remarks 
There is, thus, no better alternative I could find to the proposed hypothesis as things 
stand. Further, the interpretation presented in this thesis (which focuses on the mutually 
reinforcing roles of constructive state action and social equality) fits well with a wide 
range of facts and observations, whether those emerging from secondary data, or from 
my fieldwork in Kullu, or from the comparison with Haryana. While this interpretation is 
certainly not the last word on the subject, and may need to be qualified or modified in the 
light of further research, it is highly consistent with available evidence. 
 
The main contribution of this thesis is to use the Himachal story to emphasize the critical 
role of social equality in the development process. The critical importance of social 
equality it is argued relates not just to interaction between citizens but also between the 
state and its citizens. The latter, not only enables social demands to be represented as 
state objectives but also enables state action to further the goals of development. 
Therefore a careful look at elements of social equality in terms of caste and gender has 
been a particular endeavour of this thesis.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Fieldwork 
 
3.1 The Case Study  
Following on the nature of enquiry discussed in the previous chapter, it may be pertinent 
to say a few words on the sources of data and information, including the field data, that 
inform the analysis presented in this study. While secondary sources of data for Himachal 
and Haryana relate to the state level, primary sources pertain to one district each in the 
two states, namely Kullu in Himachal and Faridabad in Haryana. Secondary sources 
provided the broad parameters for the two states and field data from Kullu and Faridabad 
provided the details that support or qualify the aggregate picture. 
 
The main sources of secondary data used by me are the Census of India, 2001 and the 
National Family Health Survey-2 (1998-9) and National Family Health Survey -3 (2005-
6). Wherever possible I have updated from NFHS-3, but State Reports for Himachal and 
Haryana are still not available, and I have had to rely on NFHS-2 in several places. 
 
For data on public finance I have used Reserve Bank of India Bulletins and the North 
India Human Development Report (2003), brought out by National Council of Applied 
Economic Research. 
 
For education data, All India Education Surveys brought out by the National Council of 
Education Research and Training (NCERT); Special Education Statistics, annually 
published by the Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development 
and the PROBE (1999) survey.  
 
A look at the secondary data for the two states provides a fairly good picture of what has 
happened in these states as far as development outcomes are concerned. One way of 
approaching the study could thus have been to do a statistical analysis of this data 
relating, for instance, income growth to literacy rates or investment in education to 
education outcomes. One could also, conceivably, assemble data on various aspects of 
social equality (say, at the village level), and scrutinise the relationship between social 
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equality and social development (e.g. the progress of education) using formal statistical 
techniques. There is some recent research along these lines, which could possibly be 
extended to this particular topic (Banerjee and Somanathan, 2005, 2001) This, however, 
would be a very different sort of enquiry, and it is not clear whether it would be feasible 
at all (with existing data sets), given the difficulties involved in measuring social equality 
and state intervention, not to speak of the interaction between the two. Therefore, such 
quantitative approaches are bound to have serious limitations. For instance, the culture of 
participation that marks Himachali society or the ‘mixed’ picture that caste presents in 
Himachal would have been missed, resulting in a rather bland analysis of facts. Much of 
the understanding in social science lies in the nuanced view of reality, captured only from 
field experience. A study of real-life situations provides not just the context for analyzing 
the statistics it also provides a wealth of details that bring the figures alive. The multiple 
layers in which social relations are embedded and the interaction with state structures 
which is an important part of the study could be captured only through field experience.  
While a more quantitative approach has dominated research for long periods and even 
been ‘imposed’ to some extent on social science research, more recent explorations 
(Eckstein 1975; Flyvbjerb 2006; Campbell 1975) have questioned this domination. This 
new thinking highlights the importance of qualitative, textured information that may not 
necessarily lend itself to formal testing methods and theorizing by “proving” anything, 
but which they argue, certainly leads to more “learning” and greater understanding 
(Campbell, 1975). Besides, as Flyvbjerg (2006) says: “proof is hard to come by in social 
science because of the absence of hard theory, whereas learning is certainly possible” 
(:224)37 Learning in my case involved collecting qualitative data from the field on a range 
of issues relating to social relations; schooling decisions; village associations and their 
functioning; local structures of the state and their functioning; etc.,  Semi-structured 
interviews, participant-observations and informal conversations have all contributed to 
understanding the ground reality. Anecdotes, quotes and other micro-level data thus form 
an important part of the knowledge acquired from the field adding to the richness of 
analysis. 
 
                                                          
37 See also Ragin and Becker, 1992 for similar views on case knowledge. 
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Collecting qualitative information is, however, an extremely time consuming and 
resource intensive exercise and constraints on both counts did not permit an extensive 
enterprise covering all districts. Therefore, there was no alternative to making a selection 
of districts, and adopting - as far as the field survey is concerned - a “case study” 
approach. 
  
The case study method is often criticized for its limitations in being able to provide 
generalizable information on the basis of the cases chosen. As Eysenck (1976) remarked: 
“case studies are nothing but a method of producing anecdotes”. This sort of criticism has 
tended to come from natural scientists or economists who favour theory-driven, ‘context-
independent’ research from which predictions can more easily be made. In the same vein, 
it is alleged that case studies are more suited to generating hypotheses rather than to 
testing them. Further, case studies tend to be biased toward verification. As Diamond 
(1996) observed, “case studies suffer from a crippling drawback” as they do not curb 
“one’s tendencies to stamp one’s pre-existing interpretations on data as they accumulate” 
(:6). According to Flyvbjerg (2006) among others, however, not only can case studies be 
used to generalize depending on the case selected, “generalizations are over-valued as a 
source of developing knowledge and the ‘force of example’ underestimated”.  
 
Having said that though a lot depends on what the research question is and how the cases 
are selected. In this instance the validity and usefulness of the case study rest on two 
points. First, the case study is part of a larger investigation that also draws on secondary 
data, literature review, historical enquiry and related material. The conclusions reflect the 
combined insights from these different sources, and do not rely on the case study alone. 
Second, both Haryana and Himachal are small states with relatively few intra-state 
disparities, at least in matters that are relevant to this thesis.  
 
Within Himachal, there are three ecological zones – the lower, middle and higher 
Himalayan regions. The lower regions have greater access to towns of the plain areas of 
Punjab and Haryana and thus to job markets as well as other cultural influences. The 
higher regions are more isolated with higher proportion of tribal and Buddhist 
  51
populations. Their socio-cultural ethos thus reflects those influences. The middle region, 
of which Kullu district is a part and which constitutes the largest section of the state (7 of 
the 12 districts fall in this region) in some sense is perhaps the most representative of 
Himachal. Within that region different districts have much in common and Kullu can be 
considered as reasonably representative of it. It is true that were I doing an 
anthropological analysis these inter-district differences would count for a lot, but my 
focus is on social equality, state action and state-society relations and these factors do not 
show substantial variation across districts or even regions. Social equality may be some 
what higher in the tribal and Buddhist regions and somewhat lower in the areas bordering 
the plains, but these are differences are only a matter of degree. Haryana, on the other 
hand, is culturally and ethnically even more homogenous than Himachal. Faridabad, like 
Kullu, was selected at random as the focus district for my field survey.  
  
3.2 Himachal Pradesh: Kullu District 
Located at 7000ft above sea level, Kullu is a beautiful high-altitude valley of the river 
Beas. One of the three large mid-Himalayan districts, Kullu lies north of the Dhauladhar 
range, which marks a natural boundary with the cis-Dhauladhar districts. Kullu is one of 
12 districts in Himachal Pradesh, and among its largest. It has a population of about 0.4 
million and a literacy rate of 73.4 per cent (Census of India 2001). Administratively it is 
divided into 6 blocks. Of these blocks I randomly chose Naggar and Kullu blocks for my 
survey. Kullu is further divided into Kullu-I and Kullu-II for purposes of education 
administration only. I visited both Kullu blocks for my field survey.  
 
As the terrain is hilly, agricultural potential has always been limited and is restricted to a 
few areas, mostly around the river Beas which runs through the Kullu valley. At high 
altitude and with severe winters, the agricultural season is short and the range of crops 
that can survive the severe winters small, being limited to potatoes, maize and some 
wheat and rice. In the days of British rule, tea was tried in an effort to replicate the 
success of the northeast, but it did not do well. Tobacco has also been tried with some 
success, as has poppy. On the whole agriculture has been for subsistence, with a net 
inflow of grain in most areas. In the 1980s the advent of horticulture, and particularly 
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apples in Kullu, helped to change the nature of the rural economy from one of 
subsistence, bringing greater prosperity and a resumed interest in the local economy. It is 
important to note that government investments in seed development and subsidies and an 
actively pursued programme for spreading awareness and knowledge have brought 
success to the region’s agriculture. Large tracts of land have been converted to apple 
orchards, and now other fruits such as plum and kiwi are also being introduced. In 
addition, of course, the rural infrastructure already in place provides access to markets.38 
Due to the persistent effort of the farmers combined with technical and financial support 
from the government, the farm economy of the state has adapted by diversifying into 
activities outside the traditional subsistence production of cereals and pulses. The 
remittance economy plays an important role, as not all households have been able to take 
advantage of the horticultural revolution.  
 
Since agriculture has been mostly of the subsistence variety, large scale out-migration for 
work is common. The army in particular has absorbed a large number of Himachali men. 
However, given the perceived risky nature of urban jobs, most families choose to keep 
their small landholdings in the village as security and return to them on retirement (Parry 
1979). These, then, are invariably managed by the women of the household, resulting in a 
large proportion of female-headed households. I also came across several retired army 
personnel who had returned to their villages to work on their land or even to do other 
work such as run a school or an enterprise. Narayan (1997) noticed in Kangra, her field 
area, that “many men retired from the armed forces early bringing a pension with them, 
to join the government schools as teachers” (Narayan, 1997). 
 
3.3 Haryana: Faridabad District 
Haryana is a broad plain situated between the basins of the rivers Indus and Ganges and 
bounded by the Shivalik mountains in the north and the river Yamuna in the east. While 
much of the plain is formed of rich alluvial soil, its southwestern part is mostly desert, 
                                                          
38 This is in sharp contrast to Uttarakhand, for instance, where 1) the people are still struggling to grow 
wheat and rice as a hangover from the early days of the green revolution and are clearly not progressing; 
and 2) the absence of roads (and associated transport facilities) in large areas, which makes it difficult for 
villagers to connect with the larger economy. As a result this area lags far behind in terms of development.  
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and its southernmost part is included in the Aravalli hills. At the time of Separation it was 
considered the least fertile and most backward part of Punjab, but it has since 
substantially improved its position in agricultural as well as overall economic terms.  
 
Faridabad district is situated in southeastern Haryana, about 30 kms from the city of 
Delhi. It was formed in 1979 as the twelfth district of the state, and has a population of 
nearly 2.2 million and a literacy rate of 70.79. It is the most densely populated district of 
Haryana, ethnically dominated by Jats and Gujars, with Scheduled Castes constituting 
about 16 per cent of the total district population. Administratively it is divided into 6 
blocks, of which I randomly chose two (Ballabhgarh and Faridabad) for my survey. 
Faridabad is Haryana’s most industrialised district with more than 2400 registered 
factories and 36% of the state’s industrial working force. The district’s major industrial 
production is in tractors, and agricultural implements. The district headquarters, 
Faridabad City, is the most highly populated as well as the most industrialized part of the 
district. It contains big manufacturing industries including motor cars, industrial parts and 
other hi-tech industries.  
 
Food grains occupy 75 per cent of the total area under cultivation, with the remaining 
area mostly under commercial crops such as sugar cane. Wheat is the main crop grown, 
followed by paddy. Dairy farming has also emerged as an important source of income in 
this region.  
 
3.4 Sample Design and Field Work 
Within each district of the two districts (Kullu and Faridabad) I selected six villages, and 
15-18 households from each village. The districts and villages were randomly selected 
from the Census of India (1991) list of districts and villages in each state. The households 
were selected at random from electoral rolls, where these existed. Where electoral rolls 
were unavailable I conducted a household census and then a random selection of every 
fifth household. I was able to use 90 of the household questionnaires filled in Himachal 
Pradesh and 70 in Haryana.   
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The fieldwork at the village level consisted of: 
(1) A household survey using an extensive questionnaire; 
(2) A survey of government schooling facilities in the village (with a total of 10 
government schools surveyed). 
(3) Interviews with (a) Sarpanch or Pradhan; (b) at least one other panchayat member; (c) 
members of village level associations such as the Mahila Mandal and Yuva Mandal, 
where these existed. These were semi-structured interviews. In Himachal I found 4 
villages (out of 6 ) which had Yuva Mandals and so I was able to interview a member 
from these, but in Haryana I did not find any. Similarly with Mahila Mandals: all the 6 
villages in Himachal had a Mahila Mandal and some had more than one, but in Haryana 
there were none.  
 
At the block level I interviewed the Block Education Officer (BEO) and the Block 
Development Officer (BDO), and at district level, District Education Officers (DEO) and 
the District Collector (DC). Finally, in the state capitals I held discussions with 
government officials in the education, finance and rural development ministries. 
3.5 Field Experiences 
I conducted my fieldwork first in Himachal and then in Haryana, and my experiences in 
the two states were vastly different.  
 
In Himachal the environment was welcoming and friendly, and I did not encounter any 
resistance to my presence or to my work. While the people were curious about me, there 
was no suspicion of my motives. A high level of trust was a striking feature of the field 
area in general. I was always invited inside people’s homes and invariably asked to return 
so that they could be ‘properly’ hospitable by preparing a meal for me. These invitations 
were hard to resist, and I had many wonderful meals sitting on beautiful wooden 
balconies looking out at the vast expanse of the Dhauladhar range of the Himalayas.39  
 
Another striking feature of Himachal was the high level of trust in government, including 
                                                          
39 In traditional Himachali homes the ground floor is used as storage space for corn, fodder, wood, coal etc. 
for the winter months, and the living area is above, usually surrounded by exquisite carved balconies.  
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the Panchayat. In general the sort of mistrust of government personnel and acceptance of 
corruption in public institutions that exists amongst people elsewhere in India (I include 
myself in that group) is surprisingly absent in Himachal. My questions about 
transparency in particular met with surprised responses. My hesitation about getting 
information from the Pradhan, fearing that it would be doctored, would surprise the 
people, who could think of no reason why that would be the case. Panchayat records for 
instance, were not just fairly up to date they were also readily available for scrutiny. 
Corruption charges were also not forthcoming in the way one expects (as was the case in 
Haryana, for instance). People were very careful about alleging corruption against 
anyone. While preferential treatment in favour of people that were known or related to 
government officials (“embedded particularism” as Herring, 1999 has described it), was 
cited as a form of corruption, exchange of money rarely was.   
 
Another aspect of government that stood out in Himachal was that it was generally 
helpful, friendly and accessible. Unlike Haryana where I dreaded the days I had to visit 
government offices, in Himachal it was never a problem. I was treated in a civil fashion, 
not dismissed and told to return some other day, and when I had to wait to see someone, I 
was not questioned by just about everyone who happened to pass by, as was the case in 
Haryana. What was worse was that these questions were probing, often personal and 
usually ended with advice that implied that I was largely wasting my time and would not 
find much information in those offices. In Himachal by contrast, I did not encounter these 
problems and often got more information than I expected to get.  
 
What was also noticeable was the difference in the quality of interaction between 
officials of different ‘rank’. In Himachal, persons lower down the hierarchy did not 
behave in the sort of subservient manner that they did in Haryana with persons senior to 
them. For instance, when called into the office of a senior they behaved like colleagues, 
offering opinions and engaging in discussions freely. On one occasion when my meeting 
with the Director at the education department went on till lunch time I was taken aback to 
find his colleagues coming in with lunch boxes reminding him that it was time to take a 
break. Quite naturally they invited me to join them and I discovered that this was a ritual 
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in that office – all of them would bring their lunch and sit and eat together in the 
Director’s office sharing each other’s food. The conversation which revolved around 
education issues was interspersed by light banter often regarding the food habits of one or 
the other. Needless, I thoroughly enjoyed the lunch and being participant-observer to this 
interaction.  
  
 In Haryana, on the other hand, such a scenario is hard to imagine. Most often junior 
officers would enter the rooms of seniors almost bowing and scraping, hesitate to offer an 
opinion, prefer to keep standing, and leave as soon as they could. In general the 
atmosphere in Haryana is decidedly oppressive in terms of hierarchy and gender.         
  
My experiences in the field reflected these sharp social differences between the two 
states, on several fronts. Gender in particular presented the sharpest contrast. In Himachal 
while I often found only the women at home, whenever the men were present 
conversations took place with both together. Women were never in purdah (veiled) and 
appeared free to speak openly and frankly. In fact on several occasions the women were 
far more vocal and would be urging the men to speak up. I also noticed several instances 
during my field work of men assisting women in ‘household’ chores such as washing 
clothes or tending to infants. I was quite struck by the lack of male embarrassment at 
being found doing such tasks. It seemed a fairly routine and acceptable practice. Women 
certainly appear to be the ‘busier’ of the two: if they are not organizing the household 
they are dashing out to do various other things – attending mahila mandal meetings, 
visiting relatives (including natal family), going to the markets, schools, post-offices, 
panchayat offices etc. Men, on the other hand, when at home seem to be at a loose end 
and tend to be allotted tasks which could well include baby-sitting or other household 
chores. I was particularly impressed by the ease with which women felt they could 
approach the Pradhan of their village. I noticed this again in my last visit (in December 
2007) when women on getting new information about the National Employment 
Guarantee Scheme almost immediately after the meeting began to discuss amongst 
themselves and plan a collective visit to the Pradhan and question him about their 
entitlements.  
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The same was true of young girls – the confidence and poise shown by young teenage 
girls (many of who went to school in nearby towns) for instance, was striking. In one of 
the Panchayats in my sample I also came across a very young girl who had been Pradhan 
in her village, at that time elected on a reserved seat. When I met her however, she said 
she wanted to contest the Panchayat elections again and that this time she would do it on 
an open ticket. I was amazed at her level of knowledge of rural development issues and 
the confidence she displayed in her ability to make a real contribution as the Pradhan. In 
fact she said, “during my first term I was very young, but I really learned a lot. Now I 
could do much better justice to the job and would like the opportunity to do so”. 
 
On the whole, the beautiful surroundings, the easy pace of life, the trusting nature of the 
people, the amazing presence of women and the refreshing lack of a dominating male 
ethos, all combined to make my field work in Himachal not just relatively easy but 
thoroughly enjoyable too.  
 
After Himachal, field work in Haryana was a true contrast. The general environment was 
unfriendly and in some cases even hostile. I could not assume the cooperation of the 
people and often had to give detailed explanations of where I had come from and what I 
was doing. People were not easily willing to talk to me unless I confirmed that I had met 
with the Sarpanch (Head of the Panchayat) and informed him of my presence and 
purpose in the village. The kind of easy, friendly conversations that would spontaneously 
take place in Himachal were few and far between in Haryana. The tone of voice, body 
language and demeanor of the people were strikingly different and more aggressive in 
nature. In particular I was quite taken aback by the liberal use of abusive language in the 
public domain. People routinely and almost nonchalantly prefix names even of their 
family members, irrespective of age or gender, with pejorative titles.  
 
The most striking difference, between the two states, however, was related to gender. In 
Himachal, I was not particularly conscious of being female, but in Haryana there was no 
getting away from it. The general lack of safety for women was a constant theme in my 
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conversations. The men in particular seemed to be alerting me to the perils of wandering 
about alone. In a couple of cases I was plainly told that it was not socially acceptable for 
unveiled and unescorted women to work on their own in the village. I often had groups of 
young men and boys following me, and if I tried making conversation with them the only 
thing they wanted to discuss was the gender issue and how men got away with so much 
aggression against the women in their region. Rape, domestic violence and the lack of 
punitive action against the perpetrators were recurrent themes.     
 
Even within their homes it was not easy to invite women to talk. The men invariably 
came forward and dominated the conversation. Often I would have to either insist on 
hearing the woman’s opinion or go inside to talk with her. One of my most sobering 
experiences was the discovery that the Sarpanchs I had been speaking to were in fact the 
male relatives of the actual Sarpanch. Whenever I reached a village I would ask to meet 
the Sarpanch and would be taken to meet him. I conducted several conversations and 
interviews with such persons only to find out much later that they were in fact the 
husband (or in one case, the father-in-law) of the elected women. Unfortunately when I 
went back and insisted on speaking to the women I found that they themselves were 
reluctant to talk to me, claiming not to know anything and insisting that my purpose 
would be better served by speaking to the men. What was shocking to me was the 
legitimacy that this system enjoys amongst the people. There is even a term for these 
proxy Sarpanchs – they are called Sarpanch-patis (Sarpanch-husbands) - and are an 
accepted part of the Panchayat system. In fact the Sarpanch-patis quite readily introduce 
themselves as such. In Himachal this system not only does not exist, women Pradhans 
(Himachal word for Sarpanch) take their jobs very seriously (see Chapter 5). 
 
The spatial segregation of households was also more pronounced in Haryana. Invariably 
Dalit neighbourhoods were located at one end of the village and poorly serviced by basic 
amenities – water and electricity supply was limited and local schools and anganwadi 
centres were never situated within these parts. They had many more kuccha houses and 
open drains with kuccha roads leading to houses overlaid with dirty water and garbage. 
The general picture one faced there was of poverty and gross neglect. Many homes that I 
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visited presented depressing sights – dark, with the barest of materials, a couple of pots at 
most, a thread bare mat on the floor, often only a cloth covering at the entrance, the 
inhabitants looking distinctly under-nourished, under-clad and with little hope in their 
voices.  
  
In Himachal I never encountered poverty and despair of this kind. Even the Dalit homes, 
which were on average smaller than the Rajput homes (there were exceptions though as 
mentioned in Chapter 6) did not lack human dignity. They may have had smaller grain 
storage areas, fewer or no cattle, no water source in their front yard or no toilets, but the 
inhabitants were not on the edges of humanity. Also, spatial segregation was not as 
complete as it is in Haryana. In fact every village I visited had clusters of Dalit homes in 
the midst of upper caste homes. It is true that in most cases there was at least one cluster 
that was a little removed from the rest – a little further down the hill – but this hamlet was 
not very different from the rest of the village. As Vasan (2007) in her study also based in 
Kullu found, even ‘Harijan’ (Dalit) homes have on average more than 5 rooms and 17 per 
cent Harijans and 50 per cent Kolis (also Dalits) owned more than one building. 
 
While my field experiences threw up many interesting and unexpected issues, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter and explored further on, what is striking is that my 
field data so closely corresponds with secondary data, as will be seen throughout the 
thesis. Whether it relates to education achievements, status of women, lack of violence, 
relatively equal distribution of development progress across social groups etc., I was able 
to corroborate all of these features in the field. What is missing in the secondary data are 
the nuances – the dichotomous face of caste, the extent of gender parity, the lack of social 
distance between people and the government, the ‘culture of transparency’ in public 
institutions and the level of participation in social as well as institutions of state. It is the 
consistency and complementarity between secondary data and the field survey that makes 
it possible to venture generalizations from this “case study”. 
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Chapter Four 
Social Equality and Community Action 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will explore the social history of Himachal, for a better understanding of 
the context within which the state functioned especially after it became independent in 
1971. I begin by taking a closer look at the nature of society in Himachal, the historical 
basis of its social relations and the processes of participation and community action that it 
has given rise to. In the latter part of the chapter I look at community action in Himachal, 
arguing that the nature of social organization has facilitated cooperation within the 
community across a range of activities.   
 
India is widely considered as a highly hierarchical and divided society, to the extent that 
its people have been described as “homo hierarchicus” (Dumont, 1980). While some 
social divisions are also found in Himachal, the hierarchies that exist have been tempered 
in several ways. First, Himachal has a distinct cultural history including egalitarian 
influences such as the Buddhist tradition and tribal social organization which have left 
their mark among sections of the population. While I do not examine these directly the 
history of the region (discussed below) suggests that society in Himachal has benefited 
from cultural exchanges of various kinds. Second, the absence of rigid orthodoxy has 
blunted patriarchal norms and caste divisions. Third, there is a long history of economic 
interdependence at the village level based on reciprocal exchange (in contrast with 
hierarchical relations of the jajmani type that are typical of other regions of India)40. Its 
economic interdependence derives in part from the ecology of the region and in part from 
the nature of social organization typical to Himachal (discussed below). Fourth, relatively 
equitable land distribution in Himachal has added another basis to reciprocal and 
cooperative relations across social groups. Finally, these aspects of its social structure 
have contributed to the people of Himachal forging a common regional identity which 
                                                          
40 The jajmani system as described by Beidelman (1959): “ a feudalistic system of prescribed hereditary 
obligations of payment and of occupational and ceremonial duties between two or more specific families of 
different castes in the same locality”. The key stone of the system was the jajman (patron) belonging to the 
dominant caste and invariably a landowner. All other castes were his economic dependents.  
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often overrides the divisions of class and caste – a feature that is well reflected in the 
history of cooperation at the village level that not only extends across social groups but 
encompasses issues ranging from political resistance and exchange labour to solidarity at 
weddings and funerals. As we will see below, Himachal’s socio-political organization has 
also enabled somewhat less conflictual relations between the people and the state. 
Therefore, with the emergence of the modern state this ethos of cooperation facilitated 
the development of constructive state-society relations and a more participatory form of 
democracy. 
 
4.2 Social History of Himachal 
4.2.1 Distinct Social Organization  
Himachal has had a chequered history with waves of cultural influences both from the 
north and the south. Its political boundaries have also been drawn and redrawn as part of 
different political configurations. Originally a conglomeration of roughly 30 princely 
states, it became part of the state of Punjab at the time of independence from British rule. 
The linguistic reorganization of states in the 1960s led to the bifurcation of Punjab into 
Punjab and Haryana, with the hill districts remaining with Punjab. What followed was a 
movement for self determination in the hill districts based on cultural and political 
differences with Punjab, which finally led to the carving out of the independent state of 
Himachal in 1971. However, even as its political identity evolved through these changes 
it retained a distinct cultural and regional identity that has survived these vicissitudes of 
political change.  
 
According to historians, the hills of northwest India, of which Himachal Pradesh is a part, 
have been the ‘corridors of communication’ for years of cultural migration into the Indian 
sub-continent (Thapar 2002). While the social and political organisation of this area 
(which comprises Kashmir, Himachal and Uttarakhand) cannot be known with certainty, 
what can be culled from various accounts of the region is that the entire area was 
probably inhabited by polyandrous ‘tribes’. With the advent of the so-called Aryans came 
polygamy, a different set of gods and a social organisation based on hereditary 
occupational categories which later solidified as the more stringent caste system. Possibly 
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because of the more difficult climatic and living conditions in the hills the settlers kept 
moving south, though not without leaving their mark on the hill populations. As a result 
an amalgamation of local customs with the foreign culture took place. By the first 
millennium AD, adventurers from the plains had started making inroads into the 
mountainous northern regions seeking to establish new kingdoms there.41 Hence the 
north-western Himalayas were home to waves of migrants, arriving not just from Central 
Asia through the passes in the hills but also from the plain areas of north India (such as 
Uttar Pradesh) via the more easily accessed foothills. This led to a great deal of cultural 
intermingling, the result of which is probably very different to the social structures 
belonging to the remote past.  
 
The influence of Buddhism was added to this mixture through the efforts of the Buddhist 
kingdom of Asoka, which had spread in the north-westerly direction. Evidence in the 
form of stone scriptures found in Garhwal, part of the north-western Himalayan region 
show that Asoka’s efforts to spread Buddhism had reached the hills by the third century 
BC. The writings of the Chinese traveller Hiuen Tsang from around the seventh century 
AD reveal that Buddhism and Hinduism co-existed side by side in these hill areas. 
Apparently Buddhism and the amalgamated system of the Indo-Aryans co-existed for a 
while, even mutually influencing each other; for example, Hindu rituals of animal 
sacrifice were adopted in Buddhism. However, as the Indo-Aryan speaking kingdoms and 
the Brahmanical order became stronger and more orthodox in the rest of India, their 
influence began to be felt in this region as well, eventually leading to the demise of 
Buddhism in most of north India. While Buddhism has been effectively rooted out of the 
north-western Himalayan region, a few pockets remain in the higher reaches of 
Himachal.  
 
The propagators of orthodox Hinduism called the region an ‘abode of the Gods’ and 
declared it a holy site of pilgrimage. This led to an influx of Brahmin pilgrims, changing 
its cultural tone altogether (Oakley, 1905). However there was considerable resistance to 
                                                          
41 The Chand Rajas of Kumaon, for instance, are believed to have originated from Jhusi, near Allahabad 
(Oakley 1905). 
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the imposition of a rigid form of Hinduism, and to this day it remains differentiated from 
the more orthodox system in the plains. Physical isolation, among other possible factors, 
appears to have insulated the area from the forces of a strict Brahmanical social order 
with its strong caste and patriarchal bias. As a result, present-day Himachal contains a 
mix of Brahmanical and local religious influences.  
 
While the region itself, as the abode of the Hindu gods, is regarded as sacred and 
pilgrimage spots abound, village life revolves around local deities. The local devta (deity) 
is regarded as the focal point not just for all religious activities but it is also central to 
other aspects of everyday life such as resolution of disputes. Before the advent of modern 
institutions of the state the devta was widely considered as the final authority to which 
even the Ranas (rulers) were subordinate. According to popular belief, since the devta 
was the guardian of the village, the Rana who ruled on his behalf, could take no action 
that was not in favour of the people. As a result, perceived injustices regularly invoked 
protests by the people (Mandi State Gazetteer, 1920). Interestingly these were directed 
against the administrators of the Rana, rather than the Rana himself, who being part of 
the religio-political system found it difficult to ignore or crush these protests easily (see 
section 4.5.1 below). This form of theocracy thus played an important role in mediating 
the relationship between the Ranas and the people and is possibly one of the factors 
responsible for laying the basis for a more direct democracy in Himachal. Even today 
access of the people to high levels of authority is relatively easy (Chapter 7). 
 
The absence of Brahmanical dominance is seen in other aspects of religious and social 
life in Himachal as well. For instance, the central role of the Brahmin priests in religious 
customs, including their appeasement, does not figure in the rituals in Himachal. What 
does figure prominently though is the presence of women. Pilgrimages, which are a 
major form of religious activity, are not complete without the involvement of women at 
crucial points on the journey. In this respect Himachal is akin to other hill societies at 
least in North India. While women are traditionally seen as the torch-bearers of religious 
custom, the difference between what can be oppressive adherence to orthodox religiosity 
and the system in the hills is that in the latter, the roles ascribed to women are based on 
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the recognition of a separate identity and place for women. For instance, the Nanda Devi 
pilgrimage documented by Sax (1991) cannot begin without married women of the 
village returning to their natal homes to start it off. In fact he found that in some places a 
tax is imposed on those who do not return to participate! The fact that a woman retains an 
identity apart from the one imposed by marriage represents a change from the dominant 
system in most of North India where once a woman is married she completely adopts the 
identity of her marital home. In general religious observances in Himachal are fairly 
flexible and do not impose oppressive burdens on women. 
 
4.2.2. Absence of Strict Orthodoxy 
Gender 
The absence of rigid orthodoxy in Himachal applies in particular to gender relations. 
Noteworthy aspects of gender relations in Himachal include the absence of seclusion 
practices; greater freedom of movement for women; active participation of women in the 
economic and social life; enduring links between married women and their natal homes; 
history of bride price as opposed to dowry; lack of son-preference among others. In the 
personal realm, divorce by mutual consent, widow and divorcee remarriages, and greater 
intermingling of the sexes including women’s singing and dancing during festivals also 
take place. These and related features of gender relations of Himachal are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5.  
 
What is perhaps worth mentioning in this chapter are the links between less orthodox 
gender relations in Himachal and their impact on community action. The fact that women 
are able to hold their own at home and represent themselves or their families within the 
community allows them to participate in a range of activities at the community level. 
Their involvement in pilgrimages, mentioned above is one such example. Another 
example of women’s engagement in community action is their involvement in 
environment related activities -for instance, the well-documented Chipko movement, 
which is known as much for the active participation of women as it is for its 
achievements in saving the environment.42 This movement, which started in Chamoli 
                                                          
42 Vandana Shiva and J. Bandhopadhyay (1986). 
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district of Uttar Pradesh in 1973, to save trees from indiscriminate commercial felling 
spread rapidly through the Himalayas, due in large part to the mass participation of 
women. Connecting easily to the issue of deforestation as they saw it threatening not just 
their means of subsistence but their whole communities, women responded 
spontaneously to the protests and quickly took ownership of the movement. In fact 
environmental issues form an important component of Mahila Mandal activities even 
today (Chapter 5). 
 
However, women’s participation extends to several other spheres as well. For instance, 
Mother Teacher Associations (MTAs) are active in Himachal. It is worth noting that 
PTAs have also had a good track record in Himachal (Chapter 8). Although, since there 
are a significant number of female-headed households in Himachal (due to high out-
migration of men), PTA meetings tend to be attended mostly by mothers. Similarly, 
Mahila Mandals as we will see in Chapter 5 have been particularly successful in 
Himachal. They are engaged in a variety of activities including village cleaning drives, 
environment training, local manufacture of soap and other household goods, protesting 
the entry of ‘video parlours’ in the village, controlling illicit production of liquor and a 
host of issues related to schooling. Women are also active participants in Gram Sabhas 
and Panchayats and other interactions with government officials.  
 
Caste 
Recent research suggests that until the eighteenth century caste as generally understood in 
India (varna and jati) was not the dominant system of social organisation in Himachal. In 
fact, caste and tribe are used interchangeably in historical records (Kanwar 2002). It was 
only in the early nineteenth century with the onset of census operations that caste began 
to appear in documents.43 As Ibbetson wrote in the preface to the first census report in 
1881: “In the hills…from top to bottom of the social scale no single line can be drawn, 
which shall precisely mark off any one caste or grade from the one below it. Each one 
takes its wives from and eats with the one immediately below it, and members can and 
                                                          
43 Although there are copperplate inscriptions from Chamba and Kangra that do mention the varna, in 
particular the Brahmanas. While there are no details of the others, there is a fair amount of information 
about the Brahmanas (see: Kaul Deambi 2002).  
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occasionally do, rise to the one immediately above it” (Ibbetson, 1916, reprinted 1993: 
16). It has been suggested by Kanwar (2002) that census enumerators “tried to 
pigeonhole and categorize the local population of the Himachal Himalaya into the 
innumerable water-tight castes that were perceived as castes in the plains. Every 
individual became marked with caste and every local social arrangement became 
endowed with the logic of the caste system” (2002:121). The colonial construction of 
caste identity in India has been commented on by historians and social scientists for 
several decades and does not relate to Himachal alone.44 Nevertheless in Himachal, 
distinct cultural traditions (discussed earlier) had strong roots and survived in substantial 
measure, the imposition of caste hierarchies. 
   
In Haryana on the other hand, the emergence of Jat identity has stronger origins in 
colonial influences, although it was properly cemented in the post-colonial period. The 
settlement of the Jats on agricultural land by the British began the process by which the 
community started to acquire characteristics of settled communities, including a place 
within the caste hierarchy. By the late nineteenth century they had dropped some of their 
more eclectic features and allowed local religious and cultural influences to cement an 
exclusivist Jat identity within the caste Hindu fold (Datta, 1999).  
 
Himachal, on the other hand, saw the emergence of a strong regional identity that has 
helped in creating a feeling of community overcoming other, more divisive identities 
such as those of caste. Several scholars (Berreman, 1972; Newell, 1970; Parry, 1979; 
Sax, 1991, among others) have stressed the importance of the Pahari (of the hills) 
identity as distinct from non-Pahari or ‘plains’ identity. The Pahari area is sharply defined 
geographically (consisting essentially of what is presently Himachal Pradesh and 
Uttarakhand), and the people consider themselves culturally distinct. While they share 
many of the traditions of north Indian Hindu culture, there are several distinguishing 
Pahari characteristics that stand out: a) the range of castes is small, with most of the 
population falling into a few major groups (such as Brahmin, Rajput and Dalit) instead of 
the complex and finely graded categories of mainstream Hindu society; b) occupational 
                                                          
44 Sarkar Sumit (1993); Inden, R (1990), Gyan Pandey (1990); Sandra Freitag (1989); Thapar R. (1989).  
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diversity and mobility within each of these caste groups is considerable; c) many of the 
religious ceremonies and life-cycle rituals are different; d) kinship norms and other 
gender-related practices are quite different. 
 
The relative cultural homogeneity across caste lines (relating for instance to dietary 
habits, clothing and ornamentation), further contributed to the sense of shared identity in 
this region. As stated by Berreman (1970): a Pahari will seek Pahari solidarity against 
non-Pahari irrespective of caste. Further, he claims that a lower caste person will have 
greater interaction with a higher caste person from his own village than with a same caste 
person of another village. In all these respects Pahari society is quite different from the 
mainstream Hindu society where caste identity has an overwhelming influence.45 One 
factor that has probably facilitated the development of a regional identity in Himachal is 
the geographical and political isolation of the region. The relative isolation imposed by 
geography allowed the state to retain its Pahari culture. In the pre-independence period 
the Himachal region remained fairly isolated from external political influences as well. 
The region was organized politically as small principalities, ruled by Rajput Rajas or 
Ranas. Successive dynasties (pre-Mughal and Mughal) in Delhi made revenue and 
military arrangements with the Ranas while leaving the social order well alone. This 
period of marginality from the plains and central authorities helped cement its community 
or regional identity. But there were other features of Himachali society that also fostered 
a distinct sense of regional identity. For instance, limited land resources, spread relatively 
equally among the population as well as the hilly terrain made it imperative for 
communities to rely on each other for resources, fostering a sense of cohesion and shared 
identity.  
 
4.2.3. Ecology and Interdependence 
Himachal’s unique and difficult terrain has also led to the evolution of a social system 
geared towards overcoming the challenges imposed by the ecology. Two features of this 
system stand out. One, that is has led to an understanding of the need for community 
                                                          
45 It has been argued by several anthropologists, that the village community in India has little significance 
as a sociological entity in India given that most people identify primarily with their caste (Dumont, 1980). 
This view does not apply in Himachal Pradesh. 
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cooperation across a range of economic activities. For instance, use of mountain 
resources, involving extraction and transportation of stones or timber, is impossible for a 
single peasant family to organize. Similarly coordinating the work on fields with the care 
of animals, often involving translocation, has been dependent on larger community 
cooperation (Saberwal, 1999, Singh 1998). In addition, the lack of a large pool of 
landless labour has increased the burden on family labour for agricultural work, leading 
to greater reliance among peasant households for help and cooperation. Exchange labour 
has thus been an important component of economic organization in Himachal.  
 
The pervasive importance of mutual help and cooperation is linked in another way to the 
ecology of the region as the isolated and dispersed nature of its resources and settlements 
have created a much stronger sense of common property resources than is found in other 
societies. Further, the understanding that natural resources are the common property of all 
does not allow the kind of appropriation and concentration of wealth that is possible in 
situations of private control of natural resources. This has led to the second feature i.e., 
that economic inequalities are relatively limited in Himachal. This has also facilitated 
reciprocal interactions between people and fostered a spirit of cooperation among 
communities.   
 
In this section I will look at two striking examples of this collaboration as seen in 
community management of forests and community management of pastoral lands, as a 
way of highlighting a) the links between ecology and interdependence, and b) the 
extension of community networks to impact state structures. It is worth elaborating the 
features of these systems and how they have altered since the establishment of more 
formal state-controlled regulatory structures as they illustrate collaboration between 
people as well as between state and society. The continued use of local institutions to 
circumvent or undermine the restrictions imposed by the State Forest Department, for 
instance, is testimony not just to the hold of local institutions but also of the ability of 
communities to engage the political establishment to its advantage. I will return to this 
feature of Himachal’s state-society relationship in the next chapter, but suffice it to say 
here that relatively easy access to the political class is a unique aspect of Himachal’s 
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social structure. It too has roots in the past as we will see later in this chapter.   
 
Pastoral Politics: Foraging for Rights46  
Shepherding is a key feature of the economic landscape of several districts in Himachal, 
including Kullu. The commercial gains from herding which include milk, meat and wool 
are large, making it an important economic activity in the land-poor region of Himachal 
(Saberwal, 1999). But access to grazing, crucial to herding, has not been easy to come by, 
even though historically grazing rights have been de-linked from proprietory rights in 
forests or grasslands. They have involved a complex process of negotiation on the part of 
the herders with the establishment (earlier the Raja and later the state government, i.e., 
the Forest Department), with the villagers and also with fellow herders. While grazing 
rights in forests were granted by the Raja, on payment of a tax, grazing in village 
commons and grasslands did not require permission.47 Even in the case of privately 
owned grasslands, once the grass was cut they became part of the village commons with 
open access to all. This meant that a cultivator in the village could invite a herder in 
return for the herder to pen his animals in his fields for a couple of nights. The cultivator 
was expected to provide food and fuel to the herder for the duration of the stay. As 
Saberwal (1999) has shown, access to these grasslands was the result of various 
arrangements and negotiations, involving the use of personal networks, including kin ties, 
hiring out of family labour and monetary transactions. In some cases, the Gaddis (herder 
communities) and the Kanets (peasants) were even found to be involved in highly 
personalized relationships. For instance, it was not uncommon to find herders with a 
dharam bhai or behen (brother or sister) in the cultivator family which allowed them to 
return to the same family year after year. However, there was also a lot of flexibility in 
the system that allowed herders to adjust their requirements with other herders. If the 
number of animals increased herders could shift grazing areas, trading their access to one 
area with those of another.    
  
                                                          
46 This section is based partly on conversations with the respondents in my survey and partly on the work of 
Saberwal (1999) and Singh (1998) cited in the text above.   
47 This was before timber became commercially viable and thus this tax was the economic earning from 
forests. 
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With the takeover of forests by the government and the establishment of the Forest 
Department, this system was put under considerable strain, particularly for the herders.48 
What is remarkable though is how the herders have negotiated and circumvented the 
rules of the Forest Department especially “through their ability to communicate with the 
highest authority, much as their representatives meet with the Chief Minister of Himachal 
Pradesh even today, bypassing in the process, the entire FD (Forest Department) 
machinery that ostensibly controls access to and use of Himachal’s forest lands” 
(Saberwal, 1999). This access to the ‘highest authority’ mentioned above is a special 
feature of state-society relations in Himachal and evident in several areas of interaction. I 
will comment on this in the chapter on state action (Chapter 7) later, but suffice it to say 
here that turning to political powers for relief has deep roots in Himachal’s history and 
gives its society and polity a distinctly democratic character. The herders managed this by 
organizing themselves politically and forming a union - the Himachal Gaddi Union, 
1967- which they used to lobby with elected representatives, even making herder rights 
an election issue. In turn the politicians too have served the shepherds well. Charges 
imposed on herders per animal grazed were dropped; and so was the ban on herder 
movement making spring and autumn migration much easier. The remarkable access that 
ordinary people have to politicians, and the faith that they have that their demands will be 
addressed has encouraged communities and groups to articulate and lobby for their 
interests. Political power responding in a more practical and immediate fashion to 
collective groups has also helped develop this mode of political negotiation. A 
democratic culture has developed that has not allowed bureaucratic red tape to interfere 
in their relationship with the political leadership, and ensured far greater direct 
accountability of the political class.     
 
Forest Management 
In a somewhat different way forest management in Himachal also shows the influence of 
community pressures or interests on state policy. In fact the history of Himachal’s forest 
management has been cited as a model in participatory forest management from which 
                                                          
48 Chemical fertilizers have displaced natural ones so cultivators have been able to manage better although 
many still prefer organic manure. No substitute for grazing yet. 
  71
many lessons can be learned for other regions of India. In particular, according to Vasan 
(2002) the Forest Settlements in Himachal have ensured more forest rights to the people 
than anywhere else in India. These settlements, made almost a century ago, but still the 
legal framework for forest management today, provide villagers with extensive rights to 
graze and collect fuel-wood and other non-timber products for their personal use. 
Villagers also have the right to ‘harvest’ a couple of trees every five years for house 
construction! Thus even though all forests belong to the state, villagers enjoy extensive 
rights of use in Himachal.  
 
Villagers also protect the forests. The Chipko movement was not an isolated case of 
communities demonstrating their symbiotic relationship with the environment. Forests 
not only provide fuel and fodder, but also help preserve top soil, prevent land slides, and 
perpetuate an eco system on which rural communities depend. Therefore forests are not 
seen just as a source of revenue or income – their continued health and existence is 
closely linked to the future of communities. In Himachal the Forest Department and its 
links with commercial interests, often illegal, has made people wary of the Forest 
Department and reinforced the importance of people’s involvement in control of forests. 
During my field survey, the one area of government that elicited the most negative 
response (particularly with respect to corruption) was the Forest Department. It was 
striking as corruption is not otherwise a huge concern in Himachal. As a result, people 
have used the spaces created, such as Joint Forest Management, Van Panchayats etc., to 
regain some of the ground lost to the Forest Department. For instance, in some parts of 
Himachal, the system of rakha, who is a forest guard jointly employed by the Forest 
Department and the local people has been retained. The rakha not only acts as a link 
between the department and the village, he is also responsible to both, thus ensuring joint 
management and more direct accountability to the people. 
 
In many areas, Village Forest Committees also exist. For example in Janed Panchayat in 
my sample, I found one such functioning committee that was formed after excessive de-
forestation had begun to result in loosening of the top soil. The Committee was set up to 
assist the forest guard, but because the guard himself was corrupt the villagers have 
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decided to keep an eye on the forest themselves and report wrong doings to the 
department directly. In a study of timber access also based in Kullu, Vasan (2007) 
however found that corruption and bribery were probably not very prevalent. For 
instance, her respondents denied having to bribe the forest guard, claiming that they did 
not need to, because access to timber was their right. She does comment though that 
because “boundaries between the official and the personal, public and private are often 
blurred in socially embedded bureaucracies” such as Himachal’s, networks of 
relationships have a premium over cash transfers (Vasan, 2002). As a result, people or 
groups of people with better social access to the bureaucracy may get preferential 
treatment in terms of greater and more frequent access to timber. 
  
4.2.4. Economic Relationships and Social Equality  
The cooperative and reciprocal nature of many economic institutions in Himachal is 
particularly interesting in contrast with the hierarchical nature of economic relations 
elsewhere in India. For instance, the jajmani system which is often seen as the foundation 
of economic and social life in Indian villages is a fundamentally hierarchical system 
where the clients are subordinate to the patrons.49 In Himachal, however, even in the 
reign of the feudal Ranas, the relationship between the people and the rulers, or the 
patrons and the clients, was tempered in many ways. For instance, when begar or forced 
labour was practiced, it had a much milder form and protests by people to bring about 
changes in it were largely successful (Negi 2002, Mandi State Gazette, 1920). 
Administrative systems of revenue assessment and collection, or systems of labour 
management were also less oppressive and yielded to collective action (Singh 1998). 
Greater occupational mobility among castes as well as less economic disparity between 
castes makes the construction of social hierarchies in Himachal also deviate from the 
pattern of feudal jajmani systems found in most of North India.  
 
Two features of Himachal’s economic and social organization, that have contributed to 
                                                          
49 Some recent scholarship (Osella and Osella, 2000) has contested the negative implications of these 
relationships suggesting that a political reading of the patron-client relationships could allow the clients to 
structure the relationships in their favour. For instance, politicians as patrons could be pressured to act in 
the interests of the people, their clients.  
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creating economic institutions with more symmetrical and reciprocal structures are a) the 
lack of importance given to land as a symbol of economic status and b) common access 
to natural resources such as forests and grasslands. As mentioned in section 4.2.3 above, 
the two are related, as given the important role of common access resources such as in 
forests and pastures in the hill economy, inequalities of private land ownership have 
played a less important role in Himachal than elsewhere. Further, as noted by Singh, the 
scarcity of agriculture labour has made the management of large farms a more expensive 
and difficult proposition. Hence, farm lands have tended to be kept at sizes that could be 
managed by families. Hence, large disparities in land have not traditionally existed in 
Himachal. As one observer noted at the beginning of the nineteenth century: “There are 
no men of wealth, property or influence, excepting those attached to chiefs by title or 
services; and there is an equality of people and property to a degree greater than is to be 
found in any portion of India...” (Dr. JG Gerard to Capt. CP Kennedy in the Report on the 
Protected Hill States, 1824). 
 
The relative social and economic equality has given rise to relationships of 
reciprocity across a range of economic activities particularly related to the 
management of labour. For instance, the institution of exchange labour or ‘jowary’ 
(whereby people take turns in working in each other’s fields on an equal basis) 
dates back to much earlier times but is in use even today. Further, this reciprocal 
exchange often cuts across caste lines as discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
What is also worth noting is that the relatively egalitarian nature of class, caste and 
gender relations in Himachal tend to sustain each other. For example, the fact that 
disadvantaged castes have access to common resources gives them some protection from 
economic exploitation on the part of the higher castes.  
 
The relatively equal ownership of land and mutual cooperation among people are also 
obviously related. For instance, it is clear that a system of exchange labour cannot exist 
between the landed and the landless and that the prevalence of exchange labour in 
Himachal reflects the relatively equal distribution of land.  
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4.3 Comparison with Haryana 
4.3.1 Economic History 
As mentioned earlier the districts that formed Haryana, were not the most fertile and 
productive regions of Punjab. They comprised a dry and arid plain which in the colonial 
period was used largely for cattle-breeding as its physical features constituted an ideal 
breeding ground for cattle. In fact, by 1939 it had acquired a near monopoly on the cattle 
trade, even exporting to countries such as Java.50 In terms of agriculture it remained 
backward, partly because of the lack of irrigation facilities and partly, as noted by some 
historians, by design. According to Chowdhry (2004), for instance, British officials, in 
order to maintain the important economic activity of cattle breeding and trading, 
deliberately did not invest in irrigation or other agricultural development activities. 
Hence, unlike other parts of Punjab, the Haryana region continued to grow low value 
food-cum-fodder crops meant only for household consumption and the subsistence of 
cattle. The region being earmarked for cattle supply and animal husbandry, 
diversification into commercial crops was also discouraged.  
 
The post-independent state and its package of agrarian strategies has no doubt 
transformed Haryana from a pastoral and subsistence level rural economy to a major 
grain producing surplus state. However, the state’s package of policies, which included a 
set of land reforms and provision of basic infrastructure, strengthened the rich peasantry 
and laid the foundation for the adoption of a capitalist economy in agriculture. As 
described in Chapter 7, loopholes in land reform legislation and implementation allowed 
medium to big landowners not only to retain much of their land but in many cases to 
increase their holdings, as beneficiaries were compelled to sell back land they were 
unable to keep productively. This process of sales increased with the intensification of the 
green revolution, which was biased towards large holdings and large investments with 
which smaller and marginal farmers could not compete. The highly capital-intensive 
green revolution technology required investment not just in machines but also in 
irrigation and pesticides. Hence the so-called agrarian revolution, facilitated by state 
policy in Haryana, increased inequalities across class and region - well-endowed and 
                                                          
50 A.M. Stowe (1910). 
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irrigated regions having a distinct advantage in the adoption of the new technology. 
Simultaneously it also led to a sharp rise in the proportion of landlessness as well as 
agricultural labourer households in Haryana (Bhalla, 1993).   
 
Even today, Haryana’s economy continues to be predominantly driven by agriculture, 
dairy and animal husbandry, of which agriculture contributes nearly 50 per cent to the net 
state domestic product. Interestingly the recent and growing shift towards industry retains 
the tendency to cater to the higher-end of the spectrum. Hence the focus of Haryana’s 
industrial policy is on hi-tech and high value industries involving foreign collaboration 
and investment. Multi-national corporations are being wooed by the state government 
with offers of discounted land to set up factories and offices and labour legislation in 
favour of employers. The sharp disparities in the agriculture sector are thus getting 
mirrored in the industrial sector where the gaps between the salaries and life styles of the 
multinational employees sit uncomfortably with the terms and conditions available to the 
workers.  
 
4.3.2 Social History: Caste and Gender   
The relative poverty of the region (within Punjab) and the growing dissatisfaction of the 
majority community (Jats) with the dominant castes as well as with the British who 
aligned with the dominant castes, led to a consolidation of Jat identity across the northern 
region in the first few decades of the twentieth century. The Jats, an itinerant community 
with a nebulous caste status, spread across parts of Uttar Pradesh (UP), Rajasthan and 
Punjab, had begun to settle and look towards agriculture as their mainstay. In the 
Bharatpur region of former UP where they became fairly powerful they even led an 
armed rebellion against the British (Habib, 1976). To deal with the growing restlessness 
and militaristic tendencies of the Jats, the British adopted a two-pronged policy in 
Haryana: on the one hand they encouraged them to adopt a settled existence by giving 
them land and developing agriculture and on the other hand they recruited them into the 
army. Known for their martial traits, the Jats made ideal candidates for the armed forces 
and even formed a separate regiment. According to Chowdhry (2004:35), the British 
“emphasis on race, physique, martial qualities, exclusivity, along with the so-called 
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peasant virtues of fearlessness went a long way in strengthening the cult of a virile male” 
in Haryana. This characterization appears to have set the tone for much of the gender 
disparity that marks the social ethos of the state even today. The emerging Jat 
consciousness as a martial community was further reinforced by the advent of the Arya 
Samaj (society of Aryans!) in Haryana, which provided the community’s ideological 
basis and consolidated its masculine character.51  
 
The Arya Samaj (a reform movement) in Haryana played a particular role in giving the 
Jats a Hindu identity with specific caste connotations. Raising the social status of the Jats, 
who did not have a distinct place in the Hindu caste hierarchy and were therefore 
ascribed low status, was the primary goal of the community in its settled phase. The Arya 
Samaj movement, thus focussed on some obvious markers of high caste Hinduism to help 
elevate Jat status. These included wearing the janeo (sacred thread) and protecting the 
cow. In addition a moral code was laid down which included a mix of reformist ideas 
(such as reduced expenditure on weddings and ceremonial displays, no consumption of 
alcohol, reduced ritual dependence on Brahmins) and exclusivist ideas (such as no 
dealings with the ‘outcastes’).  
 
The strictures laid down for women were notably restrictive focussing on the ‘ideals of 
womanhood’ as defined by her role as mother and householder.52 Women were 
discouraged from visiting the bazaar, not allowed to play musical instruments, sing at 
weddings, dance, ‘wail’ (believed to contain an aspect of ‘sensuality’), wear only long 
sleeved shirts and cover their midriffs. In particular they were to be protected from the 
‘evil eye’ of the lower castes (Datta 1999). Constraints on their sexuality were needless to 
say numerous. Dayanand Saraswati, one of the founders of the movement, described the 
female body as “lustful” and full of “foul secretions and excretion”. 53 According to him 
the only way to control women was to channelize their “libidinous character” into 
                                                          
51 This movement is believed to have started in the late nineteenth century in the region Haryana. It most 
famous founder Dayanand Saraswati gave the movement its first ‘converts’ around 1879 in Punjab, setting 
up a branch of the Arya Samaj in Hissar in 1890 and a temple in 1893 (Juneja 1989, Joshi ed., 1965). 
52 A Jat Panchayat held in Barauna in 1911 evolved these strictures. 
53 See Satyartha Prakash, for more on Dayananda’s writings on women. 
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motherhood” for the perpetuation of the Arya race.54 
 
While other agricultural castes (Ahirs, Rajputs, Gujjars) also existed along with non-
agricultural castes (Banias, Brahmins, Chamars), the Jats were numerically the single 
largest caste group and owned the bulk of the agricultural land. In an area where 
agriculture was the main economic activity, ownership of much of the land thus 
established the Jats as the region’s dominant caste. What is interesting about the Punjab-
Haryana region is the absence of the Brahmin from the dominant caste hierarchy. Two 
factors have contributed to this unique situation. First, the Jats became the economically 
strongest group by virtue of being the largest landowners besides being the numerically 
largest group. Second, the Arya Samaj movement reduced the ritual importance of the 
Brahmins in the region. The importance of Sikhism, with Jat Sikhs turning to the Sikh 
priest for ritual purposes, had already reduced the moral authority of the Brahmin, and the 
Arya Samaj movement added another blow. Hence their traditional power bases were 
much reduced in Haryana. As a result, Brahmanical Hinduism does not dominate in this 
region.  
 
While this is a common feature with Himachal, where strict Brahmanical Hinduism has 
also been modified, as described earlier, there are sharp distinctions between the two 
states in terms of the variants adopted. While in Himachal the variations have resulted in 
greater flexibility in caste and gender relations as a more inclusive regional identity 
dominated, in Haryana the opposite took place as the Jats become the major reference 
group and Jat identity became the dominant identity. “The ubiquitous domination by a 
single caste (Jats) set the tone and shaped the customs and attitudes of rural Haryana” 
(Chowdhry 2004:44). And as noted by Datta (1999) in her important work on formation 
of Jat identity in Haryana: The essence of Jat identity included ownership of land and 
rested on “masculinity, territoriality, aggression and exclusivism”.    
 
                                                          
54 It is interesting to note that education was also given a lot of importance in the Arya Samaj creed and 
Arya Samaj schools continue to exist even today. However, in these schools girls are still being groomed to 
be the producers of Arya putras (sons), as told to me by a person involved in  study of Haryana schools 
from the NCERT.  
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4.4 Importance of a Public Identity in Himachal 
The construction of public identities based on a common good rather than the good of 
any particular group is of great relevance to the study of democracies, especially those in 
transition, as it helps to maintain a framework of “general” interests over which particular 
interests do not dominate (Calhoun, 1993). In inegalitarian societies, interests based on 
caste and class can divert public institutions towards sectional rather than collective 
gains. In the case of Himachal, a developed sense of regional identity played an important 
part not only in helping the state acquire the status of separate state but also in 
determining the character of the state subsequently. This broader public identity allowed 
Himachali society to develop an ideology where the overall development of the state, 
including that of women and lower castes, was given priority. At the same time it allowed 
society to use the public space more equitably.  
 
In Haryana self-determination was based on Jat identity and hence the dominant public 
identity turned out to be a more exclusive one. One result of this was that since the bulk 
of the Jats are land owners, the predominant focus of the state was on agricultural growth. 
In the case of Himachal, wider notions of identity that go beyond the ascriptive ones of 
gender, caste and class have contributed to make the public space more egalitarian, and 
conducive to the participation of all including women and lower castes. This feature of 
the legitimacy of public spaces determines not just the nature of issues that arise but also 
the kind of public action that takes place. For instance, unequal participation of women 
could lead to less than symmetric representation of their issues. In Himachal, patriarchal 
norms of visibility and mobility do not constrain women and they are able to freely 
express their opinion and participate in public life. The tradition of accepting women as 
part of the public sphere is important from the point of view of women’s agency. 
 
Further, the public space is seen as the space for collective decisions and actions affecting 
the public at large. Hence collective institutions are recognized as being for the public at 
large and not to be appropriated by private interests. In Haryana, by contrast, the 
dominant public identity is caste-based and hence the public space, including collective 
institutions, represents the interests of the dominant Jat community, which is also the 
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most powerful social group. Hence institutions have functioned not democratically, but in 
the interests of the powerful Jats, who as mentioned above had a highly exclusive sense 
of identity, resulting in the neglect of traditionally marginalized groups.  
 
The setting up of the democratic state in India created a set of new institutions such as the 
electoral system, the schooling system, the Panchayati Raj institutions, the development 
bureaucracy and other organs of the modern developmental state. As we will see in 
subsequent chapters these institutions function quite well in Himachal unlike much of the 
rest of India (including Haryana) where these institutions have often been captured by 
vested interests. This is unsurprising and consistent with the discussion of public identity 
above as it reinforces the idea of the Himachali people’s sense of the “public” which 
allows them to interact in public spaces without discrimination or favour. Thus the 
Sayana system (see below) has more smoothly given way to the Gram Panchayat, while 
Jati Panchayats in Haryana continue to be a force to reckon with and undermine the 
powers of the Gram Panchayat. It would be fair to say that Himachal’s favourable social 
context has made it possible to achieve such a public identity allowing collective 
institutions to take root and function in the larger interests of people.  
 
The formation of the independent state in 1971 also created new spaces for the expression 
of their public identity. Independent statehood for Himachal meant that the state got its 
own legislative assembly and closer proximity to elected representatives. It also enabled 
the state to formulate its own laws in conformity with its objectives which as we have 
already seen were far more egalitarian and participatory in nature. The laws and the 
programmes that the Himachal government formulated gave space to collective voices to 
function as partners in the development framework. 
 
4.5 Community Action in Himachal 
 In Himachal a tradition of community action and collective decision-making has also 
helped in the establishing and shaping of institutions and their democratic functioning. 
The basis of collective action lies in the egalitarian features of Himachali society, as well 
as in the ecology of the region that has fostered economic interdependence and social 
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solidarity. According to historian Chetan Singh (1998), the need to make the best use of 
the highly dispersed mountain resources made collaboration within and across 
communities, key to survival. Since landholdings were small, terrain was difficult and 
common property resources had to be preserved and managed to the benefit of all 
communities, it was necessary to develop a social organization based on mutual help and 
cooperation. This led to economic interdependence between communities and developed 
a culture of collective participation across communities irrespective of caste and gender. 
 
Patterns of reciprocity and collaboration among the people have long existed in this 
region. One example of this, already mentioned, is the practice of exchange labour or 
jowary as it is called in Kullu (or daruch, thela or buara in other districts). This system is 
used primarily for help in fields but also in other areas of domestic assitance as well, such 
as carrying heavy materials up from the road and construction of houses (see Table 4.1 
below). This tradition which includes all castes builds on and sustains a sense of 
interdependence and cohesion within the village.  
 
Another form of community labour common in Himachal is shram daan (labour 
donation) used for public works. Fixing of roads, repair or cleaning of canals, building of 
schools, Panchayat Bhavans and other community structures are areas where shram daan 
continues to be used even today. It was frequently mentioned in my survey and all the 
villages I visited had some public works (mostly related to schools and cleaning of water 
channels) that had used community labour. What struck me was the wide spread 
acceptance of this practice. In a later visit (December 2007), however, I found that it is 
getting increasingly difficult to organize labour collectively for village tasks, especially 
cleaning of water channels (called kuhls). As a result this task has joined the category of 
‘public works’ being undertaken under the National Employment Guarantee Scheme.         
 
Many other forms of collaboration and collective decision-making have paved the way 
for associational life as well as the effective functioning of democratic institutions in 
Himachal. A few examples follow. 
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4.5.1. Dhoom 
The tradition of collective action born out of economic interdependence has found many 
expressions extending beyond the purely economic domain. Singh, for instance, argues 
that community cohesion and economic interdependence gave the people the strength to 
resist attempts at suppressing them. Popular social and protest movements were a 
common occurrence. The protests were usually “expressed in forms rooted in local 
tradition, and strongly supported by the social structure” (Singh, 1998:109). One of the 
most popular forms of protest was the ‘Dhoom’ (a form of non-cooperation) which has 
been described in the Mandi State Gazette (1920:68) as follows55: 
 
The dum is one manifestation of the democratic spirit found amongst the 
peasantry of the hills and in several respects bears a resemblance to the modern 
forms of labour combination. Its effective weapon is the general strike, the 
malcontents attempting to achieve their objects by bringing the ordinary affairs of 
government to a standstill. A dum is not usually undertaken lightly, but when a 
decision has been reached its execution is prompt. A gathering is proclaimed by 
the beating of drums and the rebels, or reformers as they regard themselves collect 
together at some appointed spot… and swear in the name of god not to obey the 
chief or official, to whose methods they object… 
 
The cohesiveness of the communities and the system of social decision-making allowed 
them to come together very quickly in protest against perceived injustices. From the 
documented instances of dhoom it is clear that this form of protest was commonly used 
against abuses such as extortionate land revenue assessment, official corruption and 
forced labour (Begar).56 Dhoom was used by the peasantry (Kanets) to ‘retain some 
control over their rulers’. As the evidence suggests these rebellions were often successful 
in the sense that the main demands were met. This as mentioned above was partly due the 
theocratic system prevalent in Himachal where the Ranas were under moral obligation to 
do justice to the people. But it is also due to the fact that communities were successfully 
able to mobilize and put collective pressure through these ‘general strikes’ or ‘revolutions 
                                                          
55 In Tehri Garhwal (UP), similar rebellions were called “Dhandak” and have been extensively documented 
by Guha (1989) 
56 Some documented Dhooms: Cash assessment of land revenue (1859 in Bashahar district); Removal of 
unpopular vakil from office (1859); Encroachment of rights and imposition of begar (1893, Mandi) 
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as they have been referred to in various District Gazetteers.57   
 
General strikes seem to continue to hold a place in the collective consciousness of the 
people, taking somewhat different forms. For instance, during my survey in Kullu 
district, I came across a village that had refused to vote, en mass, in the election prior to 
my visit.   
 
4.5.2. Self Determination 
In the more recent past the demand for a separate state also saw similar collaboration 
among the people. The strong sense of regional identity and recognition of a separate 
social order, which fuelled the demand for a separate state, had the support of all sections 
of the population. It is worth pointing out that Pahari identity in Himachal has a history of 
translating to community action. It is not confined to just cultural affinities among the 
people, but extends to pride in their region and its people as well as a desire to take them 
forward. The demand for Himachal as a separate state reflected that pride. 
 
The writings of YS Parmar, chief campaigner, indicate that popular protests were 
widespread and took many different forms. No occasion involving the visit of an official 
from Punjab or Delhi was spared a demonstration or a boycott or some other show of 
discontent.58 Hence, despite a great deal of hesitation within official circles with respect 
to granting independent status to this area, largely because of its weak economic status, 
Himachal Pradesh was given independent status in 1971. It would be hard to deny that 
widespread pressure from the population played an important role in this decision.  
  
4.5.3 Jowary or Exchange Labour 
In some ways, the tradition of mutual cooperation and reciprocal exchange has been 
affected by recent economic and social developments. For instance, economic 
interdependence at the village level is less important today than in the past, given the 
closer integration of the village economy with the outside world (including the growth of 
labour migration). Similarly, new sources of economic inequality have emerged, such as 
                                                          
57 Mandi State Gazetteer, 1920, Simla Hill States Gazetteer, 1910. 
58 Letters written by Parmar to the States Re-organization Commission.  
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unequal access to public sector employment. Nevertheless, the tradition of mutual 
cooperation and reciprocal exchange is still alive, and it was certainly evident in my 
survey villages. For instance, a majority of households were involved in exchange labour, 
known as “jowary” (see Table 4.1). Further, the level of involvement in jowary was 
similar among different castes, and exchange labour was often practiced across caste 
lines. In Haryana, by contrast, exchange labour was less common, and it was practiced 
mainly by the Jats and other land-owning castes. Also interesting is the perception of this 
institution among different social groups. In the Himachal villages, jowary was 
considered both ‘successful’ and ‘fair’ by a majority of respondents, irrespective of caste. 
In Haryana, by contrast, exchange labour is largely seen as a defunct institution, 
especially by the lower castes. 
 
Table 4.1: Involvement in Jowary (Exchange Labour) 
(% of households) 
 
Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
SC Others Total SC Others Total
Jowary Participation 59 59 59 13 48 29 
Participating HHs considering it successful 47 68 61 0 17 13 
Participating HHs considering it fair 41 51 48 0 8 6 
Source: Author’s field survey. 
 
 
4.5.4 Dispute Resolution 
My field data also show some interesting differences between the two states in terms of 
community life and crisis management at the village level. For instance, the resolution of 
disputes in Himachal tends to take place more frequently within the Gram Panchayats 
than through the police and courts, unlike in Haryana (see Table 4.2).  
 
One incident that took place in Shird Panchayat during my field work is illustrative of the 
way disputes are handled in Himachal. In this case, two ‘lumpen’ sons of one of the 
better-off families of the village got drunk and misbehaved with some women at a 
wedding. Shamsher, husband of one of the women asked them to stop and got into a 
verbal duel that soon deteriorated into fisticuffs. Peace was brokered and the women went 
home. But a little later, the drunks returned to Shamsher’s house and insisted on talking 
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to him. When his wife told him he had not yet returned from the wedding they pulled out 
a gun and threatened her. Neighbours intervened and the boys were sent home. Next 
morning Shamsher registered a complaint with the police adding the unlicensed gun in 
his complaint. The parents of the boys came begging and crying to Shamsher to withdraw 
the case. They also appealed to the Pradhan to intervene, offering to get the boys to 
apologize and promise to behave in future. At first Shamsher refused to budge. Only after 
the Pradhan’s father (an old ‘Sayana’ of the village and a much respected person) came 
twice to Shamsher to personally appeal to give the boys one last chance, did Shamsher 
relent. After this incident however, the family of the boys was ‘black-listed’ and not 
welcomed in most of the homes of the village. Their mother, who was the Pradhan of the 
Mahila Mandal, was also asked to resign. 
 
Table 4.2: Dispute Resolution 
(No. of cases) 
 Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
By Gram Panchayat 14 1 
By Caste Panchayat NA 2 
By Court 8 10 
By Police 1 11 
By Mutual Agreement 1 1 
Source: Author’s field survey. NA: not applicable (no caste panchayats in the Himachal 
villages) 
 
Table 4.2 provides evidence from my field data of the ability of the village as a 
community to resolve disputes without having to go to the police. A majority of the cases 
around the time of my field work had been dealt with by the Panchayat in Himachal, 
unlike Haryana where the Gram Panchayat had barely any success, either in attracting or 
being able to resolve the matter. In Himachal, it is mostly property related issues that 
went to court.  
 
4.5.5. ‘Sayana’ System vs the Jati Panchayat 
A contrast between the traditional systems of ‘governance’ and dispute resolution in 
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Haryana and Himachal is a good example of differences in social structures and 
community action in the two states. While Himachal had what was called the ‘Sayana’ or 
village elder arbitrating disputes and functioning as the focal point for most community 
matters across castes, Haryana, like many other states, had the Jati Panchayat. Jati 
Panchayats, as the name implies, are local caste councils overseeing matters related to 
people of a particular jati or caste. They tend to be extremely rigid forms of social control 
with the primary mandate of preserving a separate identity for the concerned caste. By 
enforcing stringent rules of caste behaviour that reinforce the exclusivity of the caste 
group they play a role in keeping castes divided. This is quite different from the Sayana 
who is conceptualized for the village as a group and is known to arbitrate for all castes. 
What is true however is that the Sayana was not likely to belong to a Dalit group and 
most often would have been a Brahmin. Nevertheless, the Sayana comes into the picture 
only to offer advice, sought by all sides when people are unable to resolve a dispute 
elsewhere (as in the case described above).         
 
4.5.6 Generalized Reciprocity in Village Communities 
There are other interesting contrasts between Himachal and Haryana in terms of the 
frequency and nature of informal collective action. I found that in Haryana people cite 
festivals as the most common occasion for getting together at the village level. However, 
even then there is little interaction across castes as villages are spatially divided on the 
basis of caste. In fact, to many upper caste groups even the idea of “the village” does not 
extend to the area (mohalla) where Dalit communities live. When asked about the village 
getting together the respondents tended to exclude those parts inhabited by the lower 
castes.  In Himachal, there are several occasions when the whole village gets together for 
community activities including fund raising (chanda) as seen in Table 4.4, below. 
Community action for schooling is particularly striking: 53 per cent of the households in 
Himachal had contributed to a chanda to help the local schools, compared with only 13 
per cent in Haryana. In Haryana, temple building and festivals were the main fundraising 
occasions. 
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Table 4.3: Civic Cooperation-I 
(Occasions when village gets together) 
 Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
Festival 56 65 
Pilgrimage 11 12 
Elections / voting 1 48 
Other 67 15 
Source: Author’s field survey. Figures in percentage of respondent households that felt 
that the village gets together for the specified occasion. 
 
While Table 4.3 shows, some similarities between Haryana and Himachal in public 
perceptions of occasions when people get together, there are also interesting 
differences e.g. when it comes to the question of elections and voting. In Himachal, 
voting is obviously considered an individual exercise. Even though people line up to 
vote and the turn-outs are generally higher in Himachal than in Haryana, people do 
not see casting the vote as a collective civic activity. In Haryana on the other hand, 
the preponderance of vote bank politics seems to have converted voting itself into a 
collective exercise where people are brought together in groups with an expectation 
that they will vote as one block.  
 
In the “other” community activities Himachal respondents named a variety of 
occasions where social gatherings took place from life-cycle occasions to festivals 
and other celebrations to common get-togethers with people from all parts of the 
village joining in. In Haryana on the other hand, there was an absence of community 
activity of this kind. As a result of which the family and the caste related occasions 
were the only times when people got together for social interactions. 
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Table 4.4: Civic Cooperation-II 
(Occasions when village collects chanda) 
 Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
Disaster relief 13 8 
Festival 14 20 
Temple building 47 74 
Road building 16 5 
School-related 53 13 
Source: Author’s field survey. Figures in percentages of respondent households that had 
contributed to a chanda of the specified variety. 
 
The question relating to public contributions (chanda) was included in the survey because 
it seemed like the best way to relate personal priorities to public interests. Chanda in 
various parts of India has its own importance but has traditionally been restricted to 
purposes of religion. The survey results show Haryana conforming to this norm. 
However, Himachal shows a marked difference in the recognition amongst people that 
development activities like road building and schools are priorities they must push as 
well not just by putting pressure on government, but also by contributing personally.   
 
4.5.7. Village Associations 
A similar contrast arises when one looks at people’s participation in different kinds of 
associations at the village level (see Table 4.5 below). If the propensity to form 
associations was an indicator of democracy, in the Tocquevillian or even Putnam sense, 
Himachal would win hands down. Villages are replete with associations of all kinds: 
Devta or Temple Committees; Bhajan Mandlis (choir groups), Festival Committees; 
Village Committees; Yuva Mandals (Youth Clubs); Mahila Mandals (women’s groups); 
Forest Committees; Village Education Committees, PTAs and Mother Teacher 
Associations. And all of these are usually functional in some form or the other, with 
perhaps the “Village Committee” (separate from the Panchayat) and the Mahila Mandals 
the most common and most active associations across villages. Some of them have paid 
memberships, like the Devta Committee, which excludes Dalits from membership, 
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although Dalits are included in the celebrations organized by it on payment of a 
temporary fee. But in most others membership is not exclusive and office bearers are 
typically elected. 
 
Involvement in institutions such as Gram Panchayats and Mahila Mandals is much higher 
in Himachal than in Haryana, and does not vary much between different caste groups 
(e.g. Dalits are as involved in the Gram Panchayat as other castes). Given the history of 
associational life in Himachal Pradesh which survives to date, it is not surprising that 
democratic institutions set up by the government in the post-independence period have 
taken better root here than in many other states.  
 
Table 4.5: Membership of Associations 
 
 Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
 SC Other Total SC Other Total 
Gram Panchayat 44 49 48 3 8 5 
Mahila Mandal 36 57 49 6 8 7 
Youth Club 6 8 7 0 4 2 
Labour Exchange 59 59 59 13 48 29 
Temple/Mosque Committee 22 9 15 0 0 0 
Political Party 6 9 8 0 0 0 
Other 56 60 60 19 12 16 
Membership of any Association   83   15 
Source: Author’s field survey. Figures refer to proportion of respondents who are 
members of different kinds of associations, or have been in the recent past. 
 
4.6. Summing Up  
The social history of Himachal is marked by continuity and change at many different 
levels. While it steadfastly holds on to its ‘pahari’ (hill peoples) identity, the hold of caste 
on its social consciousness is fast declining. In urban centres in particular caste identities 
are noticeably dwindling. Migrants, for instance, commonly seek out and get support 
from fellow-villagers across castes. While they admit that back in their villages they may 
not be able to eat together, many of the older practices of segregation and discrimination 
are fading away. Similarly, even as it has shed some of the older systems of community 
management such as the Sayana (village elder) who was the final authority on local 
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matters, and adopted ‘modern’ institutions of governance such as the Panchayats, 
traditional systems of reciprocity and interdependence such as exchange labour still 
survive. While these may be seen as adjustments in a more desirable direction, other not-
so desirable changes have also taken place, especially in terms of the status of women 
and girls. For instance, bride price has given way to dowry and in some districts 
(especially bordering Punjab) rapidly declining sex-ratios, have raised concerns about 
female foeticide. Nevertheless, gender relations remain far more favourable in Himachal 
compared with most other parts of India. Especially in terms of a gender gap in literacy, 
health indicators and violence against women.  
 
To sum up, economic interdependence, a developed sense of regional (pahari) identity 
and relative social equality have contributed to a more inclusive public identity and a 
social context more conducive to collection action and participation in Himachal.  
 
In Haryana on the other hand, it becomes clear how the economic and social history of 
the state and its people have led to narrower identities of caste, restricted role for women 
coupled with an enhanced masculine identity and therefore community action that has 
been heavily influenced by this larger social ethos.  
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Chapter Five 
Gender Relations and Women’s Agency 
 
5.1. Introduction 
An important aspect of social equality, discussed in Chapter 1, relates to gender and the 
agency of women. As mentioned in that chapter, the role of women in the success of 
Himachal’s human development has been crucial. In particular their participation in the 
public space distinguishes Himachali women from their counterparts in Haryana. It has 
allowed them not only to take advantage of opportunities provided by the state, such as 
education, but also to be active participants in the social and political life of the 
community. In particular, the comparison serves to highlight the links between gender 
equity and women’s agency. It shows how the comprehensive subjugation of women in 
Haryana has affected not just the status of women but other spheres of social and political 
life as well. As noted by Dreze and Sen (2002), “the social ramifications of gender 
inequality are potentially very wide and extend beyond issues of child survival, nutrition, 
health and education…”. The comparison with Haryana provides evidence of these wide 
ranging links between gender equity and social development.  
 
In this chapter perhaps more than in others, I have made intensive use of the comparative 
framework. The reason is that the contrast between Himachal and Haryana is particularly 
sharp with regard to gender relations and also because women’s agency has played a 
critical role in Himachal’s success story. While gender relations are unequal in many 
respects in Himachal too with women having less access to power and resources than 
their male counterparts, relative to Haryana, women in Himachal fare dramatically better. 
The broad ramifications of gender equity and women’s agency thus come across most 
sharply when compared to the situation of women in Haryana. 
 
5.2. Gender Relations in the Domestic Sphere  
5.2.1 The Girl Child 
In most of rural India the attitude to gender is dramatically illustrated at the time of birth. 
Overt public expressions to the news of the birth of a girl or boy child, which have taken 
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on the form of social customs, have reinforced these gender preferences. For instance, the 
birth of a daughter in many parts of north India is marked by loud crying and beating of 
the chest (chhati peetna), much as it is when someone dies, whereas in contrast the birth 
of a son is celebrated with the sounds of  cymbals clashing and other joyful expressions. 
 
In Himachal women are not considered a burden, and the birth of a girl is not generally 
greeted with such sadness and gloom.59 In many cases I was told that even though they 
would like to have a son they felt it was also important to have a girl. According to the 
National Family Health Survey (NFHS-III, 2005-06), the ideal number of sons reported 
by married women in the age group 15-49 years in Himachal is 0.8, compared with 0.7 
for daughters. Although this indicates some preference for boys, the gap is small, while in 
Haryana the corresponding figures are 1.1 and 0.8 (see Table 5.1). While 93 per cent of 
the men in my Himachal sample said that they were not disappointed by the birth of a 
daughter, only 72 per cent of those in Haryana claimed the same. Chowdhry (2004) notes 
several local sayings that decry the birth of daughters and glorify the birth of sons in the 
folklore of Haryana.60 What is interesting is her observation that while a few decades ago 
some of the proverbs gave daughters some importance, now those proverbs seem to have 
disappeared from popular use and only the ones that emphasise the importance of sons 
and the burden of having daughters remain in use.  
 
Table 5.1: Sex Ratios and Preference for Sons 
 
 Sex Ratio 
(female/male) 
Sex Ratio 
(age 0-6 years) 
Mean ideal number of 
children 
Sons Daughters 
Himachal  970 (991) 897 (900) 0.8 0.7 
Haryana 861 (867) 820 (824) 1.1 0.8 
     
Source: Census of India 2001; NFHS-III (IIPS, 2007).  
Figures in brackets are for rural areas. 
In Himachal there is a tradition-based desire for a son, but not necessarily to the 
                                                          
59 However in the registration of births, which is done by the Gram Panchayats it costs more to register a 
boy than a girl!  
60 Some proverbs quoted by Chowdhry (2004) in her book: “One who has no sons knows no prosperity”; 
“When sons grow up sorrows depart”; “The son of an unfortunate dies and the daughter of a fortunate 
dies”. 
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exclusion of daughters, as in Haryana. There is far greater recognition of the worth of a 
daughter in Himachal. As discussed later, the burden of the dowry is also much less 
debilitating in Himachal than in Haryana.  
 
In the parental home, discrimination between sons and daughters is considered non-
existent in Himachal, judging from the responses in my field survey. It certainly does not 
exist to any significant extent in terms of education, at least up to high school level. In 
terms of food and medical care, too, it is claimed that there is no discrimination. The 
health statistics, especially the gender-specific mortality rates, corroborate this. In 
Haryana, preferential treatment of the male child in terms of food is a well-accepted 
practice. “Gradually throughout her childhood the girl is brought up to believe that in the 
organisation of serving and distribution of food within the household, the leftovers are to 
be eaten by the female and not by the male members” (Chowdhry 2004: 234). Monica 
Das Gupta’s 1971 study, which looks at the allocation of food among boys and girls in 
Punjab, also shows that while girls are given more cereals, boys are given more milk and 
fat with their cereals.61 These valued and expensive food items with high nutritional 
content are reserved for the male child. The health statistics (see 5.3.7) testify to the 
detrimental effects of neglect and malnutrition on the mortality of the girl child in 
Haryana. 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.1, Himachal has a much better sex ratio than Haryana. It is 
believed that strong son preference in Haryana has led to the ghastly practice of female 
foeticide. While none of the respondents in my sample confessed to actually resorting to 
it themselves, they universally admitted to the use of foeticide by families in their 
village.62 Importantly, all the women said that they believed it to be a ghastly act but were 
unable to exercise their will. What is particularly telling of the cultural view of women 
and the importance of male progeny is the fact that for a long time the Haryana 
government refused to ban sex-selection tests, thus lending tacit support to female 
foeticide. In Himachal, son preference appears to be fairly moderate, although there are 
                                                          
61 Monica Das Gupta (1971).  
62 In some areas of Haryana foeticide is openly advertised by clinics. Hoardings say ‘Spend Rs.1000, now 
and save Rs.100, 000 later’, the latter figure referring to expenditure on the wedding and dowry of a girl.  
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signs that the situation is changing as indicated by the decline in the sex ratio in the age 
group 0-6 years in some districts, as discussed later in this chapter. 
 
5.2.2 Marriage and Kinship Systems  
Marriage customs in Himachal are not as patriarchal as in many other parts of north 
India. While patrilocal exogamy is more or less the norm, marriages within the village 
can also take place without social censure. Similarly, while most marriages are arranged 
by parents or elders, choosing one’s own partner is not unheard of or frowned upon as 
long as it is within the outer boundaries of caste (varna, not necessarily jati)63. In some of 
the villages, in fact, choice-marriage is the norm. This is a good example of the social 
status a woman enjoys in Himachal in contrast with other parts of North India. A 
woman’s choice is often recognised and accepted as much as that of a man. My fieldwork 
shows that in answer to a question on what was the most important consideration in 
deciding a girl’s marriage the most frequently cited answer in Himachal, after caste, was 
the girl’s choice. This is in stark contrast to Haryana, where the girl’s preference is not 
considered − it is taken for granted that the parent’s choice should be acceptable to her. In 
my sample, 60 per cent of respondents (and 44 per cent of female respondents) reported 
marrying their own choice of husband in Himachal, but the corresponding figures in 
Haryana were 14 per cent of all respondents and 14 per cent of female respondents (see 
Table 5.2).  
 
Women in Himachal tend to marry later than women elsewhere in the country. One 
possible reason for this could be the higher level of education for girls. According to 
NFHS III (2005-06), Himachal has the lowest proportion (14 per cent) of women aged 
18-29 years who were married before the age of 18. For Haryana, the corresponding 
figure is 41 per cent.  
 
Most people in Himachal are aware that it is illegal to marry their daughters before the 
age of eighteen, and my sample has no instance of recent marriage below that age, let 
                                                          
63 Interestingly jati seems to matter more the lower down the caste hierarchy one goes. 
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alone child marriage.64 Parents seemed to want their girls to be mature enough to handle 
the responsibilities of marriage and home management. By contrast, in Haryana, even 
where there is awareness about the legal age of marriage I found that local customs 
favouring early marriage prevailed. The predominant notion regarding the marriage of a 
daughter in Haryana is that the earlier she is married the easier it will be for her to adjust 
to her marital home.  The table below further illustrates these and other contrasts in 
marriage customs in Himachal and Haryana.  
  
Table 5.2: Marriage and Related Customs 
(% of Respondents) 
 
Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
 Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Married own choice of spouse   64 44 60 14 14 14 
Practice dowry / bride price   84   84 
Married in own natal village 30 12 26 5 0 2 
Educated girl implies higher dowry 7 0 5 50 38 41 
- lower dowry 8 18 11 6 6 6 
- same dowry 85 82 84 44 56 53 
Encourage widow remarriage 61 61 61 71 67 68 
- within the community only 27 22 25 94 93 94 
- outside the community 73 78 75 6 7 6 
Support daughter in marriage distress    75   17 
Gender based restrictions on eating
together*     5   65 
Source: Author’s field survey. * For instance daughters in law cannot eat in the presence of father-
in-law. 
 
In Himachal, frequent and long visits by women to their parents’ home after marriage is 
common, although the woman’s parents will rarely visit her in her marital home.65 In 
                                                          
64 Very recently the Supreme Court has made the registration of all marriages compulsory in order to 
improve records and also as a check on child marriages. While this is a very recent move, Himachal is one 
of only three states that have already enforced the registration of marriages in their states. The others are 
Maharashtra and Gujarat.  
65 In Kangra, if the parents of a woman accept tea in her marital home they pay for it. This has been related 
by anthropologists (Parry, 1979 and Narayan 1997) to the traditions of ‘gift-giving’ and ‘gift-taking’ during 
weddings, with the girl’s family being the givers (including primarily the ‘gift of a virgin’) and the boy’s 
family the gift-takers. This tradition that starts with the wedding establishes the pattern of behaviour for the 
future. Hence the girl’s family being gift-givers cannot and must not accept any gifts from the boy’s family 
- the gift-takers.  In my research area I did not come across such customs, and in this respect, Kangra 
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Haryana, especially in traditional Hindu households, once a woman leaves for her 
husband’s home her contact with her parents’ home is all but severed. Much of the 
trauma of marriage and leaving the home of her parents is associated with a fear that she 
may not be allowed to return. In Himachal, however, I found that a married woman tends 
to retain substantial and enduring links with their parental home, especially with her 
brother and his wife, so that after her father’s death she can continue to keep up her 
association with her natal home. According to a Pahari saying it is evil to stop a woman 
from going to her mait (natal place) – seen as the place of her origin (root). The 
persistence of such links in hill societies has been particularly noted by anthropologists, 
such as Berreman (1962) and Sax (1991). For instance, Sax’s research in the UP hills 
shows that the complete transformation in primary kin relationships and social 
obligations that is expected of a woman when she moves into her affinal home is belied 
in social customs of the Garhwal hills. Here the importance of the woman’s presence in 
her mait during key religious events (such as the Nanda Devi procession) as well as 
several other contexts suggests an “alternative female model of place and person”. (: 115)   
 
The knowledge that the parental home is accessible to her goes a long way in giving 
confidence to the married woman in her marital home. I came across some cases where 
women did fall back on their parents in times of marital distress. While the parents found 
this a financial strain, there was no doubt in their minds that they had to extend their 
support to their daughter in her time of need. They also expressed a desire to try and 
promote the couple’s reconciliation, even if some compromise was required on the part of 
the girl. But this was never an enforced unilateral decision, and there was no sense of the 
woman being abandoned and left to deal with her kismet on her own, as so often the case 
elsewhere in India. In Haryana the corresponding attitudes and practices follow the more 
typical North Indian patterns, with parents of girls believing that once the girl is married 
she becomes part of her husband’s lineage and must learn to adjust in her new home 
                                                                                                                                                                             
appears to be atypical of Himachal. Parry and Narayan both worked in Kangra and have reported practices 
that differ from other parts of Himachal. Another striking example of this difference is veiling among 
women, which is also prevalent in Kangra but not elsewhere. In Kullu, where my fieldwork was based, 
people often referred to Kangra as the place where stronger patriarchal norms were practiced than in their 
area. There may be some link here between the proximity and influence of the Punjab plains,area, known 
for its more patriarchal practices. Kangra has had greater influence of the Punjab plains than most other 
parts of Himachal. 
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whatever the circumstances. While in Himachal 75 per cent of my respondents claimed 
that they would support their daughter in times of marital distress, in Haryana the 
corresponding figure was only 17 per cent (Table 5.2). 
 
In Himachal, the remarriage of widows across castes is encouraged, especially if the 
woman is young. Levirate (re-marriage with a brother of the deceased husband) does not 
appear to be very common any more, although researchers working in the area a few 
decades ago have reported levirate as the norm (Berreman 1972). I did come across some 
instances where older widows with children were discouraged from remarrying because 
of concerns about the readjustment of their children, although fear of losing their 
inheritance may also have figured in their decision not to remarry.  
 
Inheritance in Himachal follows the patrilineal system (see below), but a woman retains a 
claim on her father’s resources even after marriage and it appears to be fairly common for 
the brother to continue playing his father’s role as supporter after the latter’s death. Some 
rights to movable property continue to accrue to the married woman. For instance, 
Himachali women often collect some grain from their parental home after the harvest. 
However, a great deal depends on the relationship a woman maintains with her brother 
and his wife, and soured relationships could result in her being cut off. 
  
In Haryana, while widow remarriage is encouraged it is strictly within the family (more 
than 90 per cent of respondents said that a widow could marry only within the family – 
Table 5.2). The practice of karewa (cohabitation of a widow within the family 
tantamount to marriage) has been in existence in Haryana for a long time.66 Feminists 
argue that far from being liberating for women it has been designed to safeguard the land 
and keep it within the family and clan as well as availing the family of the additional 
benefit of female labour. 
  
Dowry has become an accepted practice in Himachal, but it takes a different and less 
                                                          
66 More recently with the rise of the Arya Samaj movement in Haryana karewa has been changed to niyog, 
which apparently has Vedic roots and thus greater religious sanction. In practice the two are the same. 
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harmful form than elsewhere in north India. Whenever a girl gets married the entire 
village contributes to her dowry, making this much less debilitating for her parents. 
Everyone invited to the wedding, which often includes the entire village, brings a gift that 
becomes part of the dowry. Furthermore, the groom’s family does not generally make 
dowry demands either at the time of the wedding or afterwards. According to my 
respondents, no such demands would be entertained anyway. From what I was told, the 
dowry consists largely of clothes, some gold for the bride (if family resources allow) and 
household implements, mostly pots and pans. In Haryana, by contrast, the amount of 
dowry a woman brings often determines her status in her marital home, even though she 
has no control over it, and it often sets the precedent for a host of other expectations from 
her natal home throughout her life that subject her and her family to the constant pressure 
of demands.  
 
My assessment of the situation is that there may be a link between the less burdensome 
practice of dowry and the acknowledgement of the economic and social value of women 
in Himachal. The constant reference to the hard work they do in the fields and at home 
gave me the sense that in Himachal they are regarded as an asset and not a liability. So 
the boys’ families do not want to risk breaking off a proposal by their greed for dowry. At 
the same time, the girl’s family also realises the worth of a daughter as an extra pair of 
hands in the family and also in other ways. Unlike in other parts of north India, the 
parents of girls in Himachal do not feel pressured to get their daughters married off as 
soon as possible. This sense of the woman as a burden to be offloaded onto another 
family and the willingness to pay for this in the form of a dowry does not exist here; 
another reason for the relatively late marriage age of women.   
 
Finally it must also be noted that dowry appears to be of relatively recent origin in 
Himachal. Bride price used to be the traditional practice, which still exists in many areas. 
It is unfortunate that dowry is fast replacing bride price with the latter strongly frowned 
upon and associated with people of ‘lesser origin’ and not strictly within the Hindu fold.  
Like the recent decline in the sex ratio among children in Himachal, this is another 
indication that not all recent changes in gender relations in Himachal have been in the 
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direction of greater equality.  
 
The greater independence that a woman appears to have in Himachal has an obvious 
impact on her participation in the public space. For instance, the freedom to travel on a 
regular basis to her natal home also implies, amongst other things, greater mobility and 
the confidence of being able to get into a bus or other form of transport and negotiate 
perhaps a difficult journey through the hills. Greater mobility also implies that interaction 
with the market place is possible. These and other simple freedoms often form the first  
  
5.2.3 Gender Segregation in the Family 
Women in Himachal are not oppressed in their marital home in the way they are in 
Haryana, where they are constantly under pressure to conform to various rules about their 
appearance and behaviour. In Haryana women eat separately and only after the men have 
finished. Sixty-five per cent of my respondents testified to this practice (in Himachal the 
corresponding figure was five per cent; see Table 5.2). Married women in Haryana can 
never show their faces to the older men of the household and can only appear before them 
with their faces fully covered. While they do all the work in the home as well as in the 
fields they have little say or control over any decisions. Production of a male heir is of 
primary importance in determining a woman’s status in her marital home.  
 
By contrast, there are few seclusion practices in Himachal. While the daughter-in-law 
serves food to everyone they all eat together. Women do not cover their faces or their 
heads for anyone and they participate actively in household decisions. To questions 
ranging from schooling to marriage decisions I was told that the parents took all decisions 
together.67 The NFHS-II (1998-99) found that “virtually all (99 per cent) women are 
involved in decision-making on at least one of four selected topics”: 81 per cent take 
decisions about their own health; 66 per cent do not need permission to go to the market 
or visit a friend; 60 per cent can decide independently how to spend the money they earn. 
The fact that Himachali women have a voice within the family, and are not relegated to 
                                                          
67 Guha makes similar observations in the context of Uttaranchal: “In the orbit of the household women 
often take decisions which are rarely challenged by the men” (1989:175). 
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subordinate roles, is an important part of the social context that has made it possible for 
them to play an active role outside the domestic sphere as well.  
 
5.3. Gender Relations in the Social Sphere 
5.3.1 Caste, Class and Gender 
In Himachal caste does not appear to affect gender relations as significantly as in some 
other parts of the country. For instance, in many parts of the country it is often found that 
women of the upper castes are unable to take part in various activities due to caste taboos 
such as seclusion practices, which do not apply to lower caste women.68 Hence in such 
instances upper caste women find themselves constrained compared to their lower caste 
counterparts, as in Haryana. But in Himachal such practices exist only minimally or not 
at all and hence have less effect on the overall freedom available to a woman. In other 
words, the ritual difference between the castes does not impose extra restrictions on upper 
caste women in Himachal. 
 
Class makes a greater difference if any, especially as it affects workforce participation. 
The economic status of lower caste households makes it imperative in most cases for 
women to seek employment, increasing their economic independence relative to upper 
caste women.  But since economic disparities are narrower in Himachal, the effects of 
class difference on the status of women are also correspondingly less extreme.  
 
However, there is segregation among women of different castes at the village level. 
Women of upper castes do not socialise with women of lower castes. Restrictions on 
inter-dining prevent any close interaction. This is noticeable in the segregation between 
women in the Mahila Mandals. Typically the Mandals tend to be dominated by upper 
caste women who, even while unable to exclude lower caste women from membership, 
prefer to keep them on the fringes. Many scheduled caste women complained about how 
they would not be allowed to share the same mat as an upper caste woman − having to sit 
on the bare floor at the edge of the room − and would not be offered the refreshments 
                                                          
68 Reporting from Kangra, Narayan (1997) does note that for upper caste women a great deal of time is 
spent in the ‘service of gods’ i.e., in religious rituals, which rituals are not observed by lower caste women.  
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which the upper caste women enjoyed. Such practices, which they found humiliating, 
have led many lower caste women to drop out of the Mahila Mandals.  Interestingly in a 
majority of these cases (in five out of six villages) I found that the lower caste women 
had formed their own Mahila Mandal. I deal with this issue in more detail in Section 5.4, 
but suffice it to say here that this example of lower caste Mahila Mandals indicates that 
while caste plays a role in their social life, it is not altogether restrictive. In fact, the 
ability of lower-caste women to set up their own Mahila Mandal reflects their power to 
carve out a political space for themselves. On the one hand women have taken to Mahila 
Mandals more than any in other state, but within it some inequalities continue to impinge. 
However, Dalit women rather than get totally suppressed by the discrimination have 
rejected the discriminatory space. In fact, they have used the very identity of exclusion to 
organize themselves and stake a claim to equality and self respect.  
 
However, this separation does mean that women of both caste groups are unable to share 
each other’s spaces, which would greatly expand the horizons of both. Narayan (1997) 
reports that women often (jokingly) referred to 'the woman’s caste', signifying solidarity 
among women across castes. It is unfortunate that this solidarity is reduced by the 
separate social spaces engendered by caste differences.  
 
Having said that though the double and triple disadvantage that class and caste impose, 
on gender are much less in Himachal. This is particularly noticeable, as we will see 
below, in the spheres of education and health where the gender gaps for Dalit girls and 
women are not significantly greater than for women of upper castes. In Haryana, the 
problem of multiple disadvantages is much more apparent. 
 
5.3.2 Ownership and Control of Land 
In Himachal, as elsewhere in north India, women generally have no ownership of land or 
immovable property. Even in the absence of institutional or legal obstacles to the 
ownership of land, women are rarely found to be independent property holders. As 
mentioned earlier, women in Himachal do retain access to their father’s and later their 
brother’s property even after marriage. As long ago as 1952, Newell reported from 
  101
Chamba that after marriage women retained a sort of residual membership to their gotras, 
the ultimate land distribution units.69 However the ideological priority given to women’s 
relationship of dependence on brothers and husbands has prevented them from becoming 
independent owners of land. There are certain circumstances under which they may hold 
land in their name but this is usually nominal; for instance land may be registered in 
woman’s name but managed by the men, or the registration is provisional until a male 
heir is produced or reaches maturity (Sharma: 1980).  
 
This is not to say that women are completely marginalised from the land, as the division 
of labour is such that men are found in paid employment while women work on the land. 
In hill economies like Himachal, since the entire population is unable to sustain itself on 
agricultural land the out-migration of men is common and women often find themselves 
managing the land entirely on their own. In such cases they have virtual control over the 
land, even though its ownership is not in their name. Of all the states in India, Himachal 
has the highest percentage of women cultivators − 86.2% as a proportion of total workers 
(Census of India 2001).  
 
In Haryana, a society dominated by large landowners, women’s access to and control of 
land is highly restricted. Practices such as strict patrilocal exogamy for women and 
widow remarriage (karewa as discussed in Section 5.3.2) are also based on considerations 
of retaining ownership and access to land to the male heirs. Unlike in Himachal, while 
women in Haryana also work long hours on the land they have little or no control over it. 
What is particularly disturbing was the fact that I often found women putting in longer 
hours of manual labour on farm or farm-based activities than the men but with no 
acknowledgement or recognition, let alone control. It was clearly taken for granted that 
they contribute to the household economy without expecting anything in return. The 
cultural ethos surrounding a woman’s place within the household remains unchanged 
when extended to the economic domain of the household. Links In Himachal women 
almost co-owners – management decisions; all have some land; this affects public 
dealings basically for women of all social groups. 
                                                          
69 Newell, William.H. (1972).  
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5.3.3  Education and Schooling 
In Himachal, unlike in many North Indian states including Haryana, schooling for girls 
has become a social norm. Hence physical access does not deter school participation. 
Schools here tend to be located at the top of hills, the climb to which is physically hard, 
and they are isolated. But this does not prevent girls from attending, because it is a 
socially accepted fact that they will go to school. Similarly, the regularity with which 
they attend high school, usually located some distance from their homes, also belies the 
notion that physical access is the stumbling block. Even a casual visitor cannot fail to 
notice the many groups of girls making their way to school every morning. Equally 
commendable is the fact that not only is the education of girl children an accepted 
practice but there appears to be less discrimination against them in terms of educational 
aspirations. Sending a girl a fair distance (for instance, to a neighbouring town) to high 
school is common practice.70 In Kullu district, my field area, there was unanimous 
support for the education of girls and I did not come across a single household with girls 
who were not attending school. This is consistent with PROBE (1999), which also found 
a high level of acceptance and motivation for girls’ education in Himachal. 
 
In Haryana, the education of girls is still not as widely accepted as in Himachal. At least, 
it is given less priority, as reflected in the reluctance to spend the larger sums required to 
send girls to private schools − the growing norm in Haryana. Patriarchal norms also 
impinge on girls’ mobility and make it harder for them to travel any distance away from 
home to attend school. According to Chowdhry (2004) one reason for the low value 
given to women’s schooling in Haryana is the high value attached to their labour in 
agriculture. It is popularly believed that education would destroy the concept of 
agricultural work being a woman’s moral duty. In Himachal, by contrast, an important 
motivation for sending girls to school is that it improves their employment and income 
opportunities, as the tables below illustrate. It is also interesting to note that in Himachal 
female education is perceived as improving marriage prospects, while in Haryana it is 
considered a liability in this respect (see Table 5.3). A majority of respondents in 
                                                          
70 While the older age group was not strictly part of my sample my informal interaction with them was 
instructive. The level of confidence and poise they displayed was very impressive. 
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Himachal, both male and female, also value girls education from the point of view of 
improving work opportunities; in Haryana by contrast the employment value of girls 
education gets little recognition especially by female respondents.Tables 5.3 and 5.4 
below look at household responses to the importance of education for both boys and girls.  
 
Table 5.3: Perceived Importance of Girls’ Education in Himachal and Haryana 
(% of respondents) 
 
Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
 Male Female Male Female 
1     Improves employment opportunities  64 52 38 14 
2     Increases income  42 30 38 14 
3     Improves social status 12 0 14 14 
4     Improves self-confidence 3 4 5 14 
5     Leads to greater independence 3 0 10 14 
6     Helps in writing letters/ keeping accounts 6 4 19 19 
7     Helps in teaching own children 42 48 24 28 
8     Improves marriage prospects 66 70 14 31 
9     Other 21 26 19 14 
Source: Author’s field survey. 
 
Table 5.4: Perceived Importance of Boys’ Education in Himachal and Haryana 
(% of respondents) 
 Kullu (Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
 Male Female Male Female 
1     Improves employment opportunities 79 74 86 83 
2     Increases income 69 57 76 69 
3     Improves social status 36 26 19 17 
4     Improves self-confidence 15 9 14 0 
5     Leads to greater independence 6 9 14 6 
6     Helps w writing letters/ keeping accounts 9 4 5 3 
7     Helps in teaching own children 12 9 0 0 
8     Improves marriage prospects 46 35 14 8 
9     Other 24 26 0 8 
Source: Author’s field survey. 
 
The role of elementary education in Himachal Pradesh’s development experience, both as 
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an aspect of its social achievements and as a driving force behind many of these 
achievements is discussed in further detail in Chapter 8. The rapid spread of girls’ 
education since independence is a particularly remarkable aspect of this story. As 
discussed in that chapter state intervention in education has played a major role in making 
schooling facilities of reasonable quality accessible to all. This is one example of the 
constructive role of the state in consolidating Himachal’s heritage of relatively egalitarian 
gender relations.  
 
5.3.4. Health 
Health data provide further indications of the comparative status of women in Himachal 
and Haryana. As Table 5.5 illustrates, women’s health achievements are generally better 
in Himachal, in spite of the fact that per capita incomes are no higher than in Haryana. 
This is reflected not only the better state of public health services discussed in the 
preceding chapter, but also the greater importance attached to women’s health. In 
Haryana, on the other hand, “the discrimination faced from infancy onwards in all 
matters including food, nutrition and use of medical facilities, combined with a heavy 
workload – both productive and reproductive – is responsible for [women’s] poor health” 
(Prem Chowdhry 2004:2).  
 
 
Table 5.5: Select Health Indicators for Women in Himachal and Haryana 
 
 Himachal Haryana 
Total Fertility Rate  
(children per woman) 
1.94 2.69 
Current Use of Contraception 
(any method) 
72.6 63.4 
Ante-Natal Care  
(at least 3 visits) 62.6 58.8 
Have heard of AIDS 78.9 60.0 
Anaemia 40.9 56.5 
Source: NFHS-III (2005-6). Figures in % of ever-married women in the age group of 15-
49 years (except fertility rate).  
 
 
The figures for infant and child mortality rates are particularly revealing of the gender 
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discrimination in Haryana (see Table 5.6). In Himachal the survival rates of children are 
no lower for girls than for boys; if anything it seems to be the reverse. At the infancy 
level females are known to have a biological advantage over males and that is reflected in 
the Himachal figures. That advantage starts to dissipate soon after and both sexes move 
into a more equitable position vis-à-vis each –again reflected in the Himachal figures. In 
Haryana, however, the situation is quite the reverse. Male infants appear to have better 
survival chances than females, with the difference between the two increasing 
dramatically as they move out of infancy. The female child mortality rate in Haryana 
being more than twice as high as the male child mortality rate suggests that whatever 
advantage the female infant had is quickly lost due to the high levels of neglect in 
subsequent years. This is perhaps the most disturbing statistic from Haryana and very 
telling of the kind of gender discrimination prevalent there in terms of nutrition and 
health. 
 
 
Table 5.6: Mortality Rates and Life Expectancy of Women 
 
 Himachal 
 
Haryana 
 
 Male Female Male Female 
Infant mortality 44.8 33.8 52.9 66.0 
Child mortality 9.0 9.3 13.8 30.2 
Under five mortality 53.4 42.8 66.0 94.2 
Life expectancy at birth, 2005 64.6 65.2 63.7 64.6 
Source: NFHS-II, 1998-99 and Sample Registration System, 2005. Except for “life expectancy”, 
the reference year is 1998-99. 
 
 
5.3.5  Safety and Crime 
Another important aspect of gender relations relates to violence, crime and the safety of 
women. Here again Himachal Pradesh appears in a relatively favourable light. For 
instance, it has the second lowest homicide rate among all major states. Similarly, 
Himachal Pradesh also has lower levels of domestic violence than any other state whether 
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one looks at physical, sexual or emotional violence.71  
 
The safety issue is crucial to the physical access of women to public spaces, as it is often 
the fear of being assaulted or even harassed that keeps women hidden − either behind 
doors or behind the veil. In fact safety is often cited as an important issue in sending girls, 
especially post-pubertal girls, to school, and in many areas of Haryana it was often cited 
as a constraint to this. In Himachal this is another obstacle that does not appear to exist. 
The general level of safety for women is fairly high, as indicated by the ease with which 
they are able to travel in and outside their village. They are able to use public transport or 
walk quite freely, either on their own or in small groups, even to places outside their 
village. The presence of women on the road and at various offices confirms this 
observation. Without exception they claimed that they did not feel afraid to go out alone. 
They were able to move around in their own villages at any time of day or night (Table 
5.7). 
 
Table 5.7: Perceptions of Fear and Safety 
(% of female respondents) 
 Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
Women not allowed to move around freely 0 49 
Feel unsafe in village (female respondents only) 0 8 
Source: Author’s field survey. 
 
 
To be able to walk on the roads without fear of being harassed or worse is no simple 
matter in north India, where even in a city like Delhi women are not always safe from 
gender-based attack, be this verbal, visual or physical. In my Himachal survey I was told 
of just one case of a dowry death and one of rape in my entire sample spanning two 
generations. In both cases not only the guilty person (husband and rapist respectively) but 
also their entire families were completely ostracized. Contrast this with my sample from 
Haryana, where there were several references to rape cases (most involving upper caste 
men and lower caste women, although a couple were intra-family/incest cases as well), 
all of which were hushed up.  
                                                          
71 NFHS-III, 2005-06 and Crime in India (several years). 
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In my fieldwork I was also struck by the comparative absence of fear in the lives of 
Himachali women. Even the manner in which men and women communicate conveys an 
acknowledgment of women as human beings in their own right. The level and tone of 
voice often used with women in north India, signifying their lesser place in all things, is 
rarely heard in Himachal. One does not hear that rebuking dismissing voice signalling a 
woman to keep to her place, whether in at home or in a government office. Similarly the 
sexually aggressive demeanour of men, which often keeps women away from public life, 
appeared to be absent. The women confirmed this themselves and it is reflected in the 
level of safety they feel. As a female researcher I too can say that, unlike in Haryana, I 
never felt in any way constrained or conscious of my gender at any stage of my field 
work in Himachal − whether in the villages going from household to household or at the 
district government offices. I could also clearly see that the women working in these 
offices felt completely at ease with their colleagues. The men may be resentful about 
women taking their place in areas such as the panchayats but they do not fight it in any 
aggressive way.  
 
5.4 Gender Equality and Social Development 
Egalitarian gender relations can contribute to social development in several ways. Some 
of these links have been widely discussed in the literature on women and development 
others are still in the process of being understood One of the best documented links is 
women’s education; gender equity facilitates the participation of girls in schooling and 
this in turn has wide ranging social benefits. For example, many studies bring out the role 
of women’s education in improving child health and child nutrition, reducing mortality 
rates and achieving the demographic transition.72 Table 5.8 and 5.9 illustrate this and 
other positive associations between women’s education and quality of life. 
                                                          
72 See for instance, Caldwell (1986); Murthi et al., (1995); Dreze and Murthi (2001); Dreze and Sen (1995) 
AK Sen (2001), Behrman and Wolfe (1984, 1987), among others. 
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Table 5.8.: Women’s Education and Selected Indicators of Social Development 
(1998-99) 
 Himachal Pradesh Haryana 
 Illiterate High school 
educated 
Illiterate High school 
educated 
Not regularly exposed to any 
media 
32.7 0.5 51.1 3.9 
Have access to money 70.0 92.8 65.4 86.9 
Involved in any decision-making 78.3 83.6 68.8 68.9 
Beaten or physically abused since 
age 15 
6.9 2.6 15.2 6.6 
Total Fertility Rate 2.9 2.0 3.5 2.1 
Aware of AIDS 27.1 96.8 20.2 94.9 
No ante-natal check-up 33.0 2.8 57.5 15.0 
Place of delivery: public health 
facility 
9.0 49.2 2.6 13.7 
Source: NFHS-II, 1998-99. Figures refer to percentage of women in the age group 15-49 years. 
 
 
Table 5.9: Women’s Education and Child Health (1998-99) 
 Himachal Haryana 
 Illiterate High school 
educated 
Illiterate High school 
educated 
Post-neonatal mortality rate 19.9 7.0 31.6 16.7 
Infant Mortality Rate 39.9 33.5 70.3 39.8 
BCG vaccination* 82.0 98.7 77.6 98.6 
At least one dose of Vitamin 
A* 
43.4 82.5 40.0 55.9 
Source: NFHS-II, 1998-99.  
* percentage of children the age group 12-35 months. 
 
 
Other authors have emphasized the social role of female autonomy and women’s 
empowerment whether or not it comes from education. There is some debate on whether 
schooling per se is empowering for women. One counter argument is that the schooling 
system reproduces gender inequality by imparting, instead of challenging, patriarchal 
norms (Jeffrey et. al., 1998, 2004, 2005, Jeffrey and Basu 1996, Chanana, 1988). What 
this debate often overlooks is that the empowerment value of education is also affected 
by the social context. In an environment where there is some social acceptance and space 
for women’s agency, education is likely to open up many new opportunities as seems to 
have happened in Himachal Pradesh. This is not to deny that schooling has its limitations 
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as a means of empowerment and many other aspects of gender relations, such as property 
rights, kinship systems etc., are also important. In these respects too as discussed in the 
previous section, Himachal society is relatively progressive. The power that women have 
as a result within the family facilitates their agency roles in many different spheres. It is 
also worth remembering that empowerment has value in itself; having greater freedom of 
mobility, expression and decision-making is an important aspect of quality of life –this is 
not the least important link between women’s empowerment and social development. 
 
Another potential link operates through women’s participation in the work force, 
especially through paid employment.  Here again there is some debate about the positive 
and negative effects of women’s work. Some authors have emphasized the empowerment 
value of women’s work outside the household, for instance as a means of economic 
independence. (Srivastava, 1999, Bhatty, 2008.). Others have argued that the 
empowerment value of women’s work could be quite limited if it is associated with 
exploitative conditions and the double burden domestic and paid work. (Banerjee, 1998). 
In this context it is important to distinguish between the individual effects of women’s 
work and the social effects. Even if women’s work does not lead to much individual 
empowerment, in a patriarchal society social effects of a general increase in women’s 
work participation may be quite significant and may help to challenge patriarchal norms.  
For instance to the extent that work participation is an entry point to social and political 
life, a society with higher levels of women’s work force participation would also benefit 
from women’s agency in various public domains. This is an important aspect of 
Himachal’s experience and is discussed in the following section. 
 
5.5. Women’s Participation in Public and Political Life 
5.5.1 Workforce Participation 
According to the 2001 census, the rural female work participation rate in Himachal is 44 
per cent, whereas in Haryana it is 27 per cent (see Table 5.8). From my own interviews in 
Himachal and Haryana it appears that women work outside the house for about six hours 
a day, mostly in the fields as family labour. The rest of the time they are involved with 
household work which includes collection of water, fuel and the care of cattle in addition 
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to the domestic chores of cooking and cleaning. In Haryana, care of cattle is especially 
important, as dairy farming is a major economic activity demanding much of a woman’s 
time to care for milch animals.  
 
 
Table 5.8: Female Work Participation Rates in Himachal and Haryana 
 
 FWPR Main Workers in 
Female Population 
(%) 
Cultivators in 
Female Population 
(%) 
Agri. Labourers in 
Female Population 
(%) 
Himachal  43.7 21.1 86.2 2.9 
Haryana 27.3 13.4 44.0 21.2 
Source: Census of India 2001. 
 
 
Table 5.9: Women and Work in Himachal and Haryana 
(% of women respondents) 
Type of work done by women  
Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
Family fields 48 36 
Agricultural wage labour 35 28 
Non-farm labour 4 0 
Trade (shop etc.,) 4 0 
No outside work 17 19 
   Source: Author’s field survey. 
 
 
There are two further points to be noted with regard to female labour force participation 
in Himachal and Haryana. Firstly, in Haryana, while working on family farms is an 
accepted and even expected part of the social culture, a sharp distinction is made between 
working on family-owned land and working on others’ land. The latter is strongly 
frowned upon if not forbidden. Hence women’s work participation remains confined to 
family farms, managed and run by the men of the family who retain economic control 
while women do the supplementary work. By contrast, in Himachal, social denigration of 
women’s work outside the household sphere is not evident. Women are freer to work for 
wages (even moving to places away from their homes to take up employment). There can 
be no doubt that the greater mobility that women enjoy in Himachal relative to women in 
Haryana has made it possible for women to seek wage employment without social 
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disapproval. 
 
Secondly, the gender division of labour is far more rigid in Haryana than in Himachal. In 
Haryana, female family labour has always played an important role in agriculture. In fact 
as noted by Chowdhry, “the importance of women in the agrarian economy made 
marriage an acknowledged ‘economic necessity’” (2004:63). So much so that popular 
sayings attribute a man’s misfortune to his single status. However, the tasks performed in 
agricultural activities are highly gender differentiated. Traditionally, certain tasks such as 
weeding and all activities related to animal husbandry have been assigned to women. In 
fact, the segmentation and hierarchy of tasks is such that men do the ‘more important’ 
mechanised work while women do the ‘supplementary’ manual labour. Men also do all 
the market-related work, which gives them direct control over finances.73 
 
Chowdhury also argues that the green revolution and its emphasis on mechanisation, 
alongside the intensification of the so-called ‘white (dairy) revolution’ increased the 
workload of women without a corresponding increase in their economic worth. The tasks 
performed by men such as ploughing are now done by machines (operated by men), but 
the tasks performed by women such as hoeing, weeding, harvesting, and transplanting, 
continue to a large extent to be carried out manually. In fact, the white revolution has 
changed the pattern of female labour force participation from income-earning activities 
(such as ghee production) to un-remunerated activities such as increased care of milch 
animals. Ghee production has declined as milk is all sold – but market-based activities 
are all organized and controlled by men, hence women’s economic worth has decreased. 
 
In Himachal there is less gender differentiation of tasks. Women are involved in all 
agricultural activities alongside the men. In fact, the large-scale out-migration of men has 
meant that women in Himachal often manage the land and market related activities 
entirely on their own. This has given them a much greater measure of economic control 
than their counterparts in Haryana. It has also increased their confidence outside the 
                                                          
73 Dung work for instance, retained solely for the women. Men would not even consider handling it. See 
Roger Jeffery, Patricia Jeffery and Andrew Lyn (1989).   
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domestic sphere as they deal with different aspects of the public sphere, be it purchasing 
or selling, managing bills, ration cards, banking etc., 
 
In short, while women make important contributions to the household and agrarian 
economies in both states, in Himachal this gives them greater economic control and 
empowerment, even if it is through their work on family farms.  
 
Moreover, in Himachal agricultural income is often supplemented by both men and 
women working for wages. There is pressure on women to earn money if they are 
sufficiently qualified and if not, to work as agricultural labour or as labour on 
construction sites. The notion of women working for wages or salaries (naukri) is 
common. It is also not unusual for a professional woman to take up work as a teacher or 
social worker away from home, living separately from her husband during her service 
(Sharma: 1980). In answer to a question on the benefits of education, the overwhelmingly 
cited response is ‘opportunities for employment’, even for girls (see Chapter 8). 
 
According to the NFHS-II (1998-99), 21 per cent of women in Himachal do work other 
than housework, and 46 per cent of these work for cash. Further, 62 per cent of working 
women reported that their earnings constitute at least half the total family income, and 28 
per cent of these reported that their family was entirely dependent on them.  
 
While the widening of the economic space to include greater paid employment for 
women has been heralded as a positive move, many feminists point to a corresponding 
disadvantage in terms of their increased burden of work. Since women are still expected 
to fulfil their domestic responsibilities, working women find themselves in a double bind. 
This is truer of Haryana than Himachal, where the work contribution of women is not 
even acknowledged. However, to the extent that the enhanced role of women as 
economic agents increases their status within the household and their ability to participate 
in public life, it does contribute to gender equity and women’s empowerment.74 Even, in 
                                                          
74 Some observers have pointed out that the increase in incomes that horticulture development has enabled 
has resulted in women being withdrawn from the labour force. This is being noted as a detrimental 
development, as women are now leading lives more in conformity with patriarchal norms in accordance 
  113
Haryana, it would be fair to say that if the women were completely confined to their 
homes not work on family land either, their situation would probably be worse. 
 
The comparatively egalitarian nature of gender relations in Himachal discussed in the 
previous section has facilitated their participation in public life. Some specific aspects of 
women’s involvement in public life are examined in this section.  
 
5.5.2 Panchayats  
The 73rd amendment to the Indian constitution granted a 33 per cent reservation of 
Panchayat seats (including that of the Sarpanch − head of the council) for women. As a 
result I came across several women Panchs (members) and one sarpanch in my sample 
villages. Further, I found that these women were active Panchayat members, in contrast 
with other parts of the country where women candidates are typically put up by their 
male relatives as proxy candidates to satisfy the quota requirements and end up having 
practically no involvement in the Panchayat at all (even the meetings are attended by 
their male relatives). The single female sarpanch in my sample that I interviewed was 
very involved in her work, held strong opinions about what she wanted to achieve in her 
area, conducted meetings, visited district offices trying to get funds and generally took 
her job very seriously.75 At the same time she admitted that there was opposition to her 
position and she sometimes found it difficult to get the support of other male Panchs in 
the Panchayat who resented her higher position in the hierarchy. On their part, they 
claimed that she was incompetent and that it was next to impossible for a woman to rise 
to the challenges of a Sarpanch’s job, especially with regard to fundraising, and that it 
needed a man to get things done.  
 
In general there is fairly strong male opposition to reservation for women, especially for 
the post of sarpanch, for the following reasons: a) women make poor fund-raisers − an 
important requirement; b) they are unable to deal with district administration; c) women 
                                                                                                                                                                             
with the process of female 'sanskritisation' mentioned by Berreman (1972) and others.  
75 While my sample of 10 villages had only one woman Sarpanch at the time of my field work, in several 
villages the next round of elections would have more as the post of the sarpanch in those areas came under 
the reserved category.    
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do not command the respect of the general population in the same way as a man; d) they 
are divided between household chores and their job as sarpanch, with the latter invariably 
suffering. However, the women themselves did not seem to regard these obstacles as 
insurmountable. In this case we see how an increase in women’s space threatens men’s 
space and causes resentment. This is an expected reaction. However despite this 
opposition, unlike in Haryana the men in Himachal are unable to keep the women away 
and in most cases give them the support they need, however grudgingly. There is a 
certain level of acceptance of women in this space, indicating the first steps towards 
equality in this sphere.   
 
In Haryana I met only male Sarpanchs and Panchs, only to discover later that some of 
these were in fact the male relatives of the official female Panchayat members. In all 
cases, no one in the village even thought it necessary to inform me of this fact. It was 
taken for granted that the men would be the respondents in my survey. What is tragic is 
that when I insisted on meeting the women, they themselves were highly reluctant and 
insisted that they knew nothing of their job and that my purpose would be better served 
by talking to their male counterparts76. This, in a district bordering New Delhi, the capital 
of the country, and barely an hour’s drive away from it, is startling when compared with 
the Himachal districts hundreds of difficult miles away in the relative isolation of the 
hills.     
 
In a study of participation of women in Panchayati Raj Institutions in Haryana, Kerala 
and Tamil Nadu, EK Santha (1999) found that a majority of elected women in Haryana 
were above the age of 40 and married, with 75 per cent living within joint families, 
reflecting the belief that young unmarried women should not appear in the public sphere 
and should certainly not be exposed to politics.77 This statistic contrasts with Kerala, 
where ten per cent of the elected women were unmarried, five per cent were widows and 
one was divorced. Further, only 30 per cent lived within joint families.  Santha goes on to 
say that, “the stranglehold of social and other customs in the joint family system seems to 
                                                          
76 These proxy Sarpanches are locally known as Sarpanch-Patis (pati means husband in Hindi). The term 
has even acquired a semi-official connotation as has the role and functions of these proxy Sarpanchs 
77 EK Santha (1999). 
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be acting as an obstacle to the emancipation of women… as patriarchal structures rule the 
roost and their unwritten guidelines are strictly observed” (1999:41-42).  In addition 
Santha found that in Haryana two-thirds of the women Panchs were illiterate and none 
had any prior experience in politics. 
  
Most Panchayat meetings in Himachal revolve around rather mundane clerical tasks, such 
as those related to applications for schemes, compensation, land-related cases, and Below 
Poverty Line (BPL) certificates − work done by the secretary of the Panchayat. Unless 
there is some special issue the meetings are conducted in a routine manner. The active 
participation of all members is therefore limited. In the Panchayat meetings I attended, 
the women sat together as a group at one end of the room while the men sat at the other. 
The women’s participation was very limited. Nevertheless all women Panchayat 
members were present, and most were aware of the agenda and procedures for the 
meeting. More importantly, they were aware of their position as Panchayat members and 
gave their opinion and advice as and when they got an opportunity or considered it 
appropriate to intervene. Needless to say some members were more forthcoming and 
others were more diffident, looking to their male or more vocal female counterparts for 
cues but still keen to be involved. The fact that they got out of their homes and came to 
the meetings without male escorts and felt, even if in small measure, a part of the 
Panchayat process is a huge step. In the meantime it seems that they treat the meetings as 
an outing where they get together with the other women members and spend time 
discussing their personal problems. But this must not be dismissed as insignificant, as the 
chance for a break from their domestic travails to simply socialise or unburden 
themselves of their many personal troubles help to give women a sense of themselves as 
individuals and is a positive step in their struggle for self-esteem and emancipation. 
Decision making in the Panchayat does get affected by greater women participation as 
issues of schooling, ecology, and other quality of life issues get better represented. The 
Chipko movement discussed in chapter three is a particularly good example of the 
achievements of women’s leadership in community life. 
 
5.5.3 Government Offices  
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Another area where I noticed the strong presence of women was in the District 
Collector’s (DC) office, where throughout the day groups of people come with problems 
and petitions of various kinds. I was surprised to find that these groups often consisted of 
women with a token man amongst them. Whether the issue was a rigged panchayat 
election, a dispute over water or land, or a demand for an extra schoolteacher, it was 
represented overwhelmingly by women who seemed to hold their own with the DC. This 
is a good example of the Himachali women’s progress in confidence and self-assertion.  
 
Easy access to the DC’s office may seem like a trivial issue but it can matter a great deal 
for ordinary citizens. In most states getting anywhere close to the DC is an intimidating 
and frustrating experience. The fact that government officials are relatively easily 
accessible to the people, including women, is an important part of the Himachal story. I 
noticed this in almost all the government offices that I visited throughout the district − 
whether it was the district education offices, the block development offices, even the 
statistical offices − access was open and free of harassment.  
 
5.5.4 Mahila Mandals  
Mahila Mandals were started by a Central government initiative to give women an 
opportunity to organise themselves and address issues of concern to them, such as 
reproductive health, hygiene, cleanliness, and the education of their children78 In many 
cases income-generating activities were also developed. To begin with, district 
government employees acted as facilitators who would come and set up the mandal and 
provide basic skills like record-keeping and accounts, maintaining a register, holding an 
election and appointing a head. In addition they set the group off by discussing health and 
hygiene issues and teaching the women (rather stereotypically) how to make pickles and 
jam as a means of income generation. Sharma (1980) notes that in general women’s 
relationships among themselves are so dominated by the private familial sphere that often 
they find it difficult to transform these into relationships of cooperation in the public 
sphere. However, the relative success of Mahila Mandals in Himachal is an interesting 
counter example.  
                                                          
78 They were set up under the Panchayati Raj Act of 1968. 
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Table 5.10: Mahila Mandals in Himachal and Haryana 
(% of female respondents) 
 
Kullu 
(Himachal)
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
Aware of MM 100 22 
Member of MM 49 7 
My voice is heard 41 3 
Lower caste women participate 32 4 
Primary education is sometimes discussed 48 * 
MM is useful (all respondents) 40 5 
Source: Author’s field survey.* insufficient data.MM: Mahila Mandals  
 
In Haryana there was no functioning Mahila Mandal or its equivalent, though seven per 
cent of my sample claimed membership. Only 32 per cent of households had heard of 
Mahila Mandals, and about 18 per cent of households reported that a Mahila Mandal had 
once been started. In Himachal, by contrast, all women I interviewed were aware of a 
functioning Mahila Mandal in their village (see Table 5.10).  
 
By the time I did my fieldwork the Mandals in Kullu district were operating 
independently, without external facilitation. The women were holding meetings on their 
own, maintaining registers of attendance, accounts and minutes (albeit rudimentary) of 
each meeting. The proposed income-generating projects seemed to have been jettisoned 
and health and hygiene issues were also in the background as the women seemed quite 
aware of the basics and the health centres were doing their job. Essentially these meetings 
had evolved into a social gathering for the women where they discussed mostly personal 
and domestic problems with a view to providing help wherever they could. In some cases 
they served as counselling sessions for women with particular needs and older women 
were often called upon to mediate in domestic disputes. Another common role of Mahila 
Mandals is to arrange for collective facilities such as shared ownership of utensils for 
marriage ceremonies and other social functions.  
 
In one instance where alcoholism was a problem for a majority of the women in the 
village, the Mahila Mandal decided to tackle it collectively. While their modus operandi 
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of setting up a clandestine operation to discover the source of the alcohol, which they 
believed to be an inexpensive home brew and expose its operation, may seem unrealistic, 
their belief that they could handle the problem collectively is remarkable. The women 
had clearly given the matter thought in their meetings and decided that while agitating for 
prohibition would not be a realistic strategy in their area they needed to control and 
restrict the production of alcohol. Since the home brewed liquor was cheaper and more 
easily available than the commercial variety, which was obtainable only from the town 
and far more expensive, they felt that they could make a dent in its consumption by 
cutting off the supply. Not only did they have their strategy in place; they were quite 
confident that they would succeed in taking the issue to the Panchayat and winning its 
support. 
 
Mahila Mandals are also involved in village cleanliness drives (use of toilets), 
environmental issues such as teaching women to pick dry leaves only and not pluck new 
green plants, spreading awareness about polio eradication and birth control, and acting as 
pressure groups for school-related issues. Most of the school-related problems centred on 
asking for extra rooms for the school and the appointment of additional teachers.   
 
Other researchers have written about the vitality of the Mahila Mandals in different parts 
of Himachal. For instance, Mehrotra (1995) found that Mahila Mandals in Sirmaur 
district functioned as an avenue for airing problems with the education system. Hence 
they agitated against the introduction of uniforms, as the costs of schooling would 
increase; vetoed the election of a woman who had embezzled funds from an anganwadi; 
asked for a bridge over a river that was preventing children from accessing the school, 
and so on. In one instance in Kinnaur, Mahila Mandals agitated against the setting up of a 
video parlour, which they felt would be a distraction for the children and therefore 
interfere with their education (Chakrabarti and Banerjea 1999). In Hamirpur district, 
Sharma (1980) found that Mahila Mandals were successful where they provided 
opportunities to either earn income or save money. One such Mandal flourished when 
women started to produce and then market their own soap through a modest cooperative. 
In another they formed a consumer’s cooperative to buy items such as cloth, children’s 
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school books, soap and so on, which tend to be expensive in isolated villages, in bulk.79   
 
5.5.5 An Illustrative Anecdote 
The active role of women in public life in Himachal including through institutions such 
as PRIs, government offices and Mahila Mandals is well illustrated in a recent story 
narrated by CP Sujaya (2006). 
 
The story explains how women in a village in HP organized to rescue an anganwadi after 
the departure of the anganwadi worker. It begins with active but unsuccessful efforts on 
the part of the anganwadi helper (illiterate woman from the Dalit community) to get a 
new anganwadi worker appointed through the ICDS bureaucracy. 
 
The supervisor told her to approach the Mahila Mandal for a willing worker.  The 
Mahila Mandal members…convened a formal MM meeting, discussed the issue 
threadbare and passed a resolution recommending that ‘A’ of the same village 
(married, passed matriculate examination on her own initiative after marriage, 
highly motivated, Dalit…) carry on the work of the worker on a purely honorary 
basis. ‘A’ was the unanimous choice of the MM. The resolution was drafted, 
signed, dated and entered into the register. The MM then took up the issue in the 
next Gram Sabha meeting, where a large number of women were present. ..The 
matter was raised, explained and approved by all those present. A formal 
resolution was drafted, read out, passed and recorded in the minutes by the 
Panchayat secretary. The resolution said that whenever an appointment is to be 
made for an anganwadi worker, ‘A’ should be appointed. The MM pulled together 
all the documents – copies of their own resolution, copies of the Gram Sabha 
resolution, as well as the scheduled certificate the IRDP certificate, the 
matriculation certificate and other personal data of ‘A’ and sent the whole sheaf to 
the CDPO. The department then advertised for a vacancy for an anganwadi 
worker and ‘A’ has put in her application. The MM is clear they want their 
candidate to be selected otherwise they have formulated their own plans and 
                                                          
79 Sharma Ursula (1980). 
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strategies for ensuring it gets done. Meanwhile ‘A’ has been carrying out her 
work effectively, and without any honorarium for the last eight months. (Sujaya, 
2006) 
 
This brief story may be a little unusual even in Himachal Pradesh, but it does illustrate in 
a vivid way many facets of Himachal’s experience that have been highlighted in this 
chapter and elsewhere in this thesis: women play an important role in public life; they are 
relatively empowered and self-confident; the PRIs (including Gram Sabhas) and other 
public institutions are functioning and inclusive; women are able to engage with 
government structures; the Mahila Mandals are active and interact with other institutions 
of local governance; local public services are a matter of common concern; there is social 
acceptance of women having paid jobs (or even studying) after marriage; village 
communities are able to cooperate; Dalit women have significant opportunities to study, 
work and participate in public life; and last but not least, Himachal Pradesh is now a 
highly literate society where the use of written media has become part of daily life.  
 
5.6. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have scrutinized the status of women in Himachali society and their role 
in public life. Clearly, gender relations in Himachal Pradesh are much less unequal than 
in Haryana or for that matter in most of north India. This contrast emerges quite sharply 
whether we look at sex ratios, marriage practices, school attendance, health indicators, 
participation in the workforce or exposure to violence and crime. This feature of gender 
relations in Himachal Pradesh has contributed to the social development of the state in 
many different ways, but especially through the active and informed agency of women in 
public life.  
 
The relatively egalitarian nature of gender relations in Himachal Pradesh can be traced 
partly to the social history of the state. For instance, historical evidence suggests that 
women’s seclusion (purdah) has never existed in this region. However, while history 
certainly matters it cannot fully explain the gender relations in Himachal. State initiatives 
have also played an important role, for instance in the form of reservation of seats for 
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women in the Panchayats, the creation of Mahila Mandals and the active promotion of 
female education. This is yet another aspect of the complementarity between social 
equality and constructive state action as discussed elsewhere in this thesis. 
 
Finally, two qualifications are in order. First, the fact that gender relations in Himachal 
Pradesh are less unequal than elsewhere in north India does not imply that there is no 
gender inequality. As we saw, major inequalities remain, related for instance to land 
ownership, the burden of work and political participation. Second, in some respects there 
have been disquieting signs of growing gender inequality in recent years. The most 
disturbing trend is the sharp decline in child gender ratios in some parts of Himachal 
Pradesh.  This is also linked to larger questions about the sustainability of social equality 
in Himachal Pradesh. I return to this in the last chapter. 
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Chapter Six 
Caste in Himachal Pradesh : Overcoming Social Exclusion 
  
Caste has killed public spirit. Caste has destroyed the sense of public charity. Caste has 
made public opinion impossible. A Hindu’s public is his caste. His responsibility is only 
to his caste. His loyalty is restricted only to his caste. Virtue has become caste-ridden and 
morality has become caste-bound. There is no sympathy to the deserving. There is no 
appreciation of the meritorious. There is charity but it begins and ends with the caste. 
There is sympathy but not for men of other castes. 
 (Dr. Ambedkar, The Annihilation of Caste, 1990, pp 63-64)80 
 
6.1. Introduction 
A unique feature of social inequality in Indian society is its caste system, which places 
restrictions on every aspect of human interactions. The ideological crux of the caste 
system is the concept of ‘purity-pollution’, which is expressed through rules of 
commensality, marriage and occupation and segregates people by placing them in 
hierarchically arranged caste groups. The barriers that these rules set up between people 
prevent them from forming larger, inclusive public identities that foster community 
engagement across castes. Instead, the caste identity becomes paramount, and security, 
solidarity and trust are sought exclusively within the caste group. As a consequence, 
accountability and responsibility also remain restricted to a person’s caste members. The 
hierarchy of occupations and identification of caste with occupation is a particularly 
restrictive factor, as it implies rigidity with little possibility of change. These barriers 
prevent people not only from eating together and marrying one another but also from 
participating in public life in a symmetric manner. These asymmetries inevitably act as 
barriers to democratic progress.   
 
This is not to say that the institutions and values of the caste system have remained 
unchanged over the years. Social standing today is no longer determined by ritual status. 
Economic means and political power, both of which have become available to the lower 
castes in relatively greater measure in the last fifty years or so, have acquired increasing 
importance in determining social standing (Shah, 2002). It is probably fair to say that 
changes in the caste system started to take effect during the colonial period when forces 
                                                          
80 Ambedkar (1990). 
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for modernisation, secularisation and urbanisation began to influence rural socio-
economic structures (Sheth 2002). The move from traditional feudal society to modern 
capitalist society which occurred with the opening up of the village economy meant that 
employment opportunities extended beyond village boundaries, and hence traditional 
caste-based occupations were no longer binding. The newly created possibilities for 
occupational mobility toppled an important pillar of caste society. Traditional patterns of 
authority based on ritual and landowning dominance also began to disintegrate as the 
economy expanded outwards and the village was no longer the sole arena of employment. 
This process received a further boost at Independence with the nationalist elite ‘de-
recognising’ caste and establishing special privileges for the lower castes in order to help 
them overcome their historical handicap and join the mainstream of development. 
Affirmative action, in the form of reservation of seats for lower caste members in local 
government bodies as well as in public sector employment and economic redistribution 
through land reforms, have been the hallmark of government policy to correct the 
imbalances of a historically caste-based society.  
 
But the ideological and political commitment to establish a casteless society has resulted 
in a dichotomy between the public and the personal spheres. While the role of caste has 
been reduced in the public sphere, this is not the case in the personal sphere, where it 
continues to exercise a strong influence on people’s relationships. At the same time, 
changes within the public sphere have not been uniform across the country. While caste-
based discrimination has been formally removed from public institutions, Dalits (or 
Scheduled Castes (SCs)) continue to be marginalised from the gains of development. For 
instance, very poor quality public schooling, the only financially affordable option for 
most Dalit families, continues to limit their opportunities; deplorable implementation of 
government schemes that benefit the poor, of which a large proportion are Dalit, 
continues to deprive them of their due benefits; use of violence against assertions by the 
Dalits continues to keep them oppressed; non-implementation of reservation in local 
government continues to keep political power concentrated in the hands of the upper 
castes; and the mixed record of land reforms continues to deprive the landless, of whom 
the majority are Dalits, of the economic gains that they expected from redistribution. 
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These factors have slowed down the integration of the lower castes into the mainstream 
of economic and political life.  
 
6.2. Caste in Himachal Pradesh  
Caste inequalities persist to varying degrees across India, including in Himachal. This is 
evident, for instance, in personal interactions. There are strong restrictions on inter-dining 
and inter-marriage, and derogatory prejudices based on stereotypical notions about the 
lower castes abound in the popular imagination. As will be seen later, I observed many 
types of caste discrimination during my fieldwork.  
 
Having said this, in some important respects caste inequalities in Himachal are less 
severe than in Haryana, or for that matter much of north India. First, traditional caste 
relations are somewhat less unequal and less rigid in Himachal than in Haryana. In fact, 
caste identities in Himachal appear to be of relatively recent origin and coexist with other 
identities, such as the regional Pahari (hill) identity, that are often more important.  
 
Second, caste distinctions in Himachal have not prevented village communities from 
being relatively well integrated. There is a strong tradition of inter-caste cooperation as 
well as of cooperation at the village level. This is evident in systems of mutual aid that 
override caste at the village level, allowing common problems to be dealt with 
collectively. For instance, caste divisions are set aside when the community comes 
together to build a school or a road or repair an irrigation channel. Cooperative behaviour 
across castes is the accepted norm. As observed by Singh (2002), in Himachal “a 
combination of village level co-operation and community-consciousness is probably the 
organising principle of rural life” (2002:108). Thus, at least in the public domain, the 
segregating effects of caste are less visible. 
 
Third, the overlap between caste and class is not strong. For instance, land ownership is 
not concentrated among the upper castes, being similar among the lower and upper 
castes. This is in sharp contrast with Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, where inequalities of 
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caste and class reinforce each other in a very decisive and oppressive way.81  
 
Fourth, caste-based violence is comparatively uncommon in Himachal. All groups take 
pride in the unity in their villages, and tensions related to caste are relatively few as long 
as they do not impinge on the personal sphere. Even then, as with inter-caste marriages 
social sanctions are resorted to rather than violence and killing. In such cases 
communication with the families concerned is cut off, but the couple is not publicly 
humiliated, beaten or killed, unlike in Haryana where extreme forms of violence, 
including death, sometimes even by decapitation, are regularly used as sanctions against 
couples marrying across castes (Kapadia, 2003, UNICEF 2008) 
 
Last but not least, state action in Himachal, particularly the widespread provision of basic 
services such as education and health as well as affirmative action to enable Dalits to use 
these services, has enabled Dalits to overcome the disadvantages of caste in many 
important fields and to develop their human resources.  As we will see later, caste 
disadvantages in access to basic education and health services have virtually disappeared 
in Himachal Pradesh. This low level of caste inequality, combined with the relatively 
high quality of public services, means that Dalits in Himachal are not only much better 
off than Dalits in Haryana in terms of access to health and education; they are also much 
better off than the others in Haryana, in these respects, despite being poorer in economic 
terms. In other words, state action has enabled Dalits in Himachal to overcome not only 
the barriers of caste but also the combined disadvantages of caste and class – in some 
important fields at least. This is a clear indication of social equality – not just a goal in 
itself but also a means to the overall goal of widespread and inclusive development. 
 
6.3. Caste in the Personal Sphere 
The caste hierarchy in Himachal Pradesh is less complicated than in other parts of North 
India.82 Essentially there are three basic caste groups - the Brahmans, the Rajputs and the 
                                                          
81 See e.g. Drèze and Gazdar (1996) with reference to Uttar Pradesh, where they say that, “the conjunction 
of temporal power and ritual authority in Uttar Pradesh has made it that much harder to challenge the 
prevailing inequalities of caste and class.” 
82 Non-Hindu communities account for a very small proportion of the population in Himachal Pradesh 
  126
generically named Harijans (SCs or Dalits). Castes and sub-castes among the Brahmans 
and Rajputs are not very distinct and rarely referred to. Sub-castes within the Dalits, 
however, are careful to point out their differences to other sub-castes placed ritually 
below them in the hierarchy. While there are only three basic caste groups the 
distinctions between them are marked. This is especially so of the distinction between the 
upper castes (i.e. Brahmans and Rajputs) and the Dalits.  
 
In terms of rituals and religious observances the lower castes have historically played a 
vital role as providers of music. While they are denied access to the temple their 
participation is not altogether shunned. All castes generally attend religious ceremonies in 
the villages. For instance, as observed by Sax (1991): “Pilgrims on Nanda Devi’s annual 
‘jat’ [pilgrimage] make a collective offering in which…the distinctions of caste and 
gender are not observed” (: 103).  Lyall, in the Kangra Settlement Report 1872, describes 
the temples in Kullu:  
 
The feature which distinguishes these temples from those in other…Hindu countries 
is this: that most of them are village institutions, in a way owned, served and 
managed by the men of one or more hamlets or the men of a part or the whole of a 
kothi. Instead of a brahman family or a succession of Sadhs eating up the 
proceeds,…the men who cultivate the lands, which pay the rent to the temples 
are...the only men entitled to share in the feasts at the temple expense. 
 
Ritual pollution does not extend to people as it does elsewhere; an object such as a utensil 
may become polluted but not the person who uses it (Berreman, 1952). This leads to 
greater interaction and social mingling between castes. For instance, drinking together 
with members of all castes is an accepted practice, albeit within limits. If the drinking 
party is in an upper caste person’s house it is held in the outer courtyard to allow for the 
participation of lower caste persons, who are not allowed to enter the interior of upper 
caste houses. If the party is in the house of a lower caste person it can be held inside, as 
the upper caste person can enter a lower caste home to have a drink (in a glass kept 
separately for use by upper castes only). Similarly, eating meat is not taboo among the 
upper castes, including the Brahmans. Newell (1970) describes wedding parties that he 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(there were none in my sample) and are not discussed in this chapter. 
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attended in the Chamba area, where goat meat and local intoxicants were served and in 
which both Brahmans and Gaddis (lower caste) participated. As Parry (1979) describes, 
in Kangra the Brahmans explained their lapse from orthodoxy by reference to the 
weather. Meat being a ‘hot’ food, they claimed that it produced the much-needed warmth 
in the body to withstand the cold climate. 
 
While the villages are not spatially divided along caste lines, and nor are the fields or 
even water sources segregated for separate castes, lower castes are not allowed inside 
upper caste homes and must maintain a respectful distance from higher castes in public.83 
For instance, at upper caste weddings when Dalits are invited they are provided with food 
that has been separately cooked for them and which they must consume apart from the 
rest of the wedding party. At weddings, in scheduled caste families, the food is cooked by 
upper caste cooks to allow for upper caste participation. Similarly, Dalit women can 
attend Mahila Mandal meetings but cannot sit on the durrie (mat) used by the others, and 
are thus relegated to the edges of the room or even outside it. Since inter-dining is strictly 
prohibited they cannot share in the tea or other refreshments that form part of the 
proceedings.  
 
The need to maintain the ritual status in the presence or knowledge of village elders was 
often mentioned in my field survey. The younger people were clearly not in favour of 
strict segregation in dining, and stated categorically that they only adhered to it within the 
confines of the village. For instance, there are no restrictions in restaurants and hotels, 
where the caste of the cook is not known. Exposure and difficulties in the way of 
maintaining such boundaries have certainly slackened the hold of caste on personal 
practices.  
 
In Haryana, the spatial segregation of castes is more evident. It appears to be related as 
much to economic disparities as to ritual differences. The more prosperous parts of the 
villages with pucca houses are inhabited by the higher castes, usually at the centre of the 
                                                          
83 Other researchers have told me that this may not be the case in all parts of Himachal. Apparently spatial 
segregation may be more common than I found it to be.  In my research area, while Dalit homes were 
found clustered together these clusters were distributed all over the village. 
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village, whereas the lower castes live in distinctly run-down areas at the edge of the 
village, with a greater predominance of kuccha dwellings, open drains and fewer civic 
amenities. Restrictions on inter-dining follow a similar pattern to those in Himachal. 
  
Caste endogamy is staunchly adhered to in Himachal, and exposure to the world outside 
has not affected it appreciably. In fact inter-caste marriage is likely to lead to 
ostracization from the caste and village, not just of the couple but also of their immediate 
families. So strong is the social sanction and so effective the deterrent that I came across 
only one such case, and as expected the village had not heard of the couple since. As a 
respondent said; “How will we survive if all communication with us within the village is 
stopped? We have to oppose such marriages”. The government has set up an award for 
inter-caste marriages to discourage the practice of strict caste endogamy and promote 
social mingling, but I did not come across even a single case where the award was 
claimed. In all likelihood either it is not widely advertised or it is simply ignored.  
 
While caste endogamy is now the accepted norm, it has not always been adhered to so 
strictly. It appears rather to have been the exception in Himachal, as mentioned by 
Ghurye (2002), according to whom; “In some parts of Punjab, especially the hills, a man 
of a higher caste can take to wife a girl from one of the lower castes” (2002:53). It is 
equally common for upper castes, especially Brahmans, to marry Buddhists living in the 
higher tribal regions, and my survey includes a couple of such cases. Newell (1970) 
reported from a village in Chamba that Brahmans and Gaddis (a lower, nomadic caste) 
freely intermarried, with the exception of a small number of pujaris (priests) from the 
state shrine. He also found that in Kangra district Rajputs and Khatris intermarry, quite in 
contrast to the plains of Punjab, which this area borders. In light of my fieldwork findings 
the practice of strict caste endogamy has clearly increased over the years. Newell and 
others working in the 1970s noted that with the increase in interaction with people from 
the plains, local practices, notably ones such as strict caste endogamy, were being 
submerged by influences from the plains.   
 
Caste endogamy is practised in both states. However, it is more rigidly adhered to in 
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Haryana. Sub-caste endogamy is also stronger in Haryana. In Himachal, while endogamy 
within the caste was the main concern of my respondents, in Haryana the sub-caste was 
always mentioned as the appropriate category. In this respect there appears to be some 
difference between the two states, but I do not have enough data to probe this. Another 
difference is that caste endogamy is more brutally enforced in Haryana than in Himachal. 
 
Modes of expressing respect when addressing members of an upper caste must be 
observed, and this is common to both Himachal and Haryana. I was told on many 
occasions that while the Dalits have to refer to even the children of upper castes with 
respect, adding the deferential suffix ‘ji’ to their names, the upper castes, children 
included, can address even the elders of the lower castes directly by name. While there is 
some resentment among the lower castes in Himachal about this disrespect for their 
elders, in Haryana they are more resigned to it.  
 
In general, perceptions about the lower castes by others are not complimentary in either 
state. The established upper caste view of Dalits is that they are good-for-nothing. They 
are commonly described as being lazy and given to drinking: “they sell their land and 
squander all their money” was a common refrain and seems to be related to bitterness 
associated with land reforms through which land has been allotted to Dalit households. I 
was repeatedly told that despite all the help they have received from the government in 
the form of land reforms, reservations and so on their condition has remained much the 
same as before. Polygamy, considered a less acceptable social practice is also associated 
with the Dalits (mostly wrongly). However, those who expressed these views in 
Himachal were clearly reflecting the personal prejudices of the upper castes, because 
when probed further they were unable to substantiate their claims; in fact on several 
occasions they admitted to the achievements of local Dalits. In one of my sample villages 
the largest house belonged to a Dalit family who had two sons, both successful lawyers in 
Manali town. In Haryana, on the other hand, the marginalization of the lower castes is 
more striking and similar examples are difficult to find.  
 
Many other forms of social discrimination have faded away in Himachal, such as lower 
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castes not being allowed to wear a new cap; or having to make do with hand-me-downs 
from the upper castes; or having to travel great distances to get water as local sources 
were denied to them; or, of course, not being allowed to participate in the political life of 
the village. 
 
To sum up, there is no major contrast between Himachal and Haryana in the way caste is 
practiced at the personal level. However, substantial differences appear beyond the 
personal realm, where these exclusionary practices begin to fade away in Himachal, as 
we see in the following sections.  
 
6.4. Caste in the Public Sphere 
6.4.1 Community Consciousness 
Despite the somewhat mixed picture of the role of caste in the personal sphere, the 
diminished importance of caste in the public sphere in Himachal presents a more 
encouraging picture, particularly in the village as a community. I found strong evidence 
of unity and solidarity, which cuts across caste lines within the village in several spheres 
of day-to-day life. A striking example of this was the statement of a respondent when 
asked about the village primary school. His unprompted response was: “Children are not 
yours or mine; they are common to the community and hence the entire community has to 
take care of their future.” The situation in schools has changed drastically over the last 
few decades (see Chapter 6). While in the past children of the lower castes were openly 
discriminated against in schools and often denied admission, this is no longer the case. 
However, even though the children do not face overt discrimination, the Brahman teacher 
will sometimes not accept a glass of water from a Harijan child or colleague. But the 
limit to this kind of discrimination was clearly laid down, as I discovered from a story I 
was told about the ill-treatment of a Dalit boy and its repercussions. An upper caste 
teacher beat a Harijan boy so badly that he had to be hospitalised. The entire village, 
including the upper castes, took the matter up to the highest level and had the teacher 
transferred. As a Dalit family related this incident to me it is unlikely to have been told 
simply for effect.  
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It would be no exaggeration to say that in Haryana, the sense of community is altogether 
absent. There are deep and mutually reinforcing divisions across caste, class and gender. 
There is no overt discrimination in government schools, which are used largely by the 
lower castes. Yet I have instances in my survey of the few upper caste children that do 
attend bullying lower caste children while teachers simply look on. In some cases parents 
have had to withdraw their child because of the violence. Caste-based violence in general 
is fairly prevalent in Haryana, unlike in Himachal. For instance, stories of the sexual 
exploitation of lower caste women were common in Haryana but not in Himachal. 
Haryana has also been witness to some of the most gruesome caste-related crimes in 
recent years. In one case four Dalit men were lynched to death by a mob for apparently 
skinning a dead cow; in another, the houses belonging to Dalits in a village were burned 
down for daring to assert economic self-reliance.  
 
In Himachal the community’s sense of responsibility towards its members is also 
manifest in other areas, overriding caste considerations. For instance, when there is a 
death in a village everyone, irrespective of caste visits the bereaved to commiserate, 
leaving behind a little money for the funeral expenses. Similarly at the time of a girl’s 
marriage the entire village, again irrespective of caste, contributes to her dowry and 
wedding expenses. All the households in my sample accepted this as a universal practice. 
In Haryana there is little if any social interaction across castes. Lower castes, especially 
Dalits, are unlikely to participate in the wedding celebrations of the upper castes or to 
commiserate with their bereaved families, and vice versa. In my field survey I have no 
examples of either.    
 
While in Himachal there are several occasions during the year when the entire village 
gets together, in Haryana these are limited to elections and polio vaccine camps. 
Himachal respondents mentioned festivals, fairs, pilgrimages and other occasions when 
the entire village would gather together. While 67 per cent of my respondents reported 
participating in these community events in Himachal, in Haryana only 15 per cent gave a 
similar response.  
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Another practice that reflects the Himachalis’ sense of responsibility towards the 
community is the frequently reported instance of retired army personnel returning to their 
villages to set up schools. I came across several such cases during my fieldwork, and 
Narayan (1997) notes similar cases in her field area (Kangra). She found that “many men 
retired from the armed forces early bringing a pension with them, to join the government 
schools as teachers” (1997:15)84   
  
The system of exchange labour is another binding factor in Himachal. Most people 
participate in this jowary, as they call it, and it works well. Mainly employed during 
harvesting and threshing in the fields, it can extend to help with the construction of a 
house or with carrying heavy objects such as construction materials or sacks of grain 
from the road up to the village; with preparations for a wedding, cutting grass or 
collecting firewood. However, this system of mutual help is not entirely free of the 
dividing lines of ritually defined caste distinctions. The way the system works is that the 
person who has asked for help or jowary, for instance on his field, will provide food that 
day for the people who help him. However since inter-dining between higher and lower 
castes is taboo he cannot do this with the lower castes, so they are given dry rations to 
take away, instead. Conversely, when lower castes call for jowary they hire Brahmin 
cooks to cook for the upper castes. My respondents reaffirmed the usefulness of the 
system and I was repeatedly told that no one refuses to go for jowary.  
 
Over the years this system, too, has undergone changes. For instance, lower castes 
regularly used to be asked to show up on the fields of the upper castes with no discussion 
of remuneration, which depended entirely on the discretion of the employer, and the 
lower castes dared not refuse (begar). Now such a thing would not happen. There is no 
compulsion to follow the system, which is based entirely on reciprocity and functions 
rather well. Similarly the system of voluntary labour or shram dan for public works such 
as the construction of village paths, schools or Panchayat bhavan (building), the 
maintainence of kuhls (irrigation canals) and village cleanliness drives indicate the strong 
sense of community within the village. Another common practice across castes that was 
                                                          
84 Narayan Kirin (1997). 
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cited by several of my respondents was of taking seeds from each other.  
  
As seen in Chapter 4 (Table 4.1), participation in exchange labour is common and 
symmetrical in Himachal, whereas in Haryana it is concentrated among the higher castes. 
In Haryana I came across only a few instances of exchange labour, mainly among the 
upper castes, and there are no instances in my survey of the community participating in 
other forms of collective activity. Responsibility in Haryana extends mainly to the family 
or biradari (sub-caste), at most to other caste members. Problems of cleanliness, village 
roads or schools are dealt with individually. If a person can afford to make the area 
around his premises clean he will do so privately, just as he will opt to send his children 
to the private school. Any issue that cannot be handled privately, such as the maintenance 
of roads, is simply ignored.  
 
6.4.2. Community Engagement 
Accompanying the relatively evolved community consciousness in Himachal is an active 
engagement with the public space and community institutions as the proper site for 
locating and resolving collective problems. This engagement happens both informally, as 
in the system of exchange labour, shram daan (voluntary labour) or other community-
based activities discussed above, and formally, within organised groups or associations 
such as the Mahila Mandals, PTAs, and other village-level associations. In my sample in 
Himachal 51 per cent of the women were part of a functioning Mahila Mandal, while in 
Haryana only 7 per cent had ever been part of one. At the time of my research there were 
no functioning Mahila Mandals in Haryana. Similarly, while 15 per cent of my 
respondents were members of a parent-teacher association in Himachal, in Haryana none 
of the parents in my sample were involved in one. Overall, eighty-three per cent of my 
respondents in Himachal claimed to be members of some association in their village, 
while only 15 per cent in Haryana could claim the same (see Table 6.1).  
 
As can be seen in Table 6.1, not only are there more associations in Himachal, but also 
Dalits and higher castes are fairly equally represented in them. Community participation 
in school-related activities is particularly striking in Himachal (more on this in Chapter 
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8). The somewhat larger difference in castes represented in Mahila Mandals could be 
because of the setting up of alternative Mahila Mandals by some Dalit women, as 
discussed in the previous chapter.    
 
 
Table 6.1: Membership of Associations in Himachal and Haryana 
(% of hhlds) 
 
Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
 SC Others SC Others 
Village council - Gram Panchayat 44 49 6 8 
Women’s Association - Mahila Mandal 36 57 12 8 
Participation in school activities 63 66 24 33 
Youth club 6 8 0 0 
Labour exchange programme 59 59 24 67 
Temple Mosque Committee 22 9 0 0 
Political parties 6 9 0 0 
Other 56 60 35 17 
Source: Author’s field survey. 
 
Another manifestation of this engagement with collective institutions is the high degree 
of expectation from the public space, particularly the government (see Table 6.2). This 
confidence in the public domain translates into collective action, making it possible for 
communities to work together at the local level and to exert pressure on central 
government to provide quality public services. For instance, my survey shows that while 
31 per cent of people in Himachal believe that the Gram Panchayat can influence 
schooling in their villages, only 7 per cent in Haryana thought the same. Further, 59 per 
cent of Himachali parents had been asked by the school for help, of which 79 per cent 
had given it; in Haryana only 11 per cent were approached for help and 50 per cent had 
complied.  
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Table 6.2: Expectations from Gram Panchayats 
(% of households) 
 
Kullu   
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
 SC Others SC Others 
Faith in Gram Panchayat 59 62 24 67 
Sarpanch is honest 81 77 57 83 
Sarpanch is reliable 63 70 35 83 
Elect Sarpanch again 63 47 29 75 
Source: Author’s field survey. 
 
What is particularly unique about this engagement with the public sphere in Himachal is 
that it is shared with the lower castes. Hence the lower castes are also engaged in 
community activities and have equal expectations from government services. In Haryana, 
on the other hand, the Dalits are rarely part of a larger collective that includes upper 
castes, and they have the least expectations of government. For instance, I found in 
Himachal that faith in the Gram Panchayat was similar across the caste divide: 59 per 
cent of the SC and STs and 62 per cent of the upper castes had faith in the Gram 
Panchayat (see Table 6.2). However, in Haryana while 67 per cent of the upper castes had 
faith in the Gram Panchayat, only 24 per cent of the SCs did. Similarly, in Himachal, 81 
per cent and 77 per cent of SCs and upper castes respectively believed the Sarpanch to be 
honest, but in Haryana the corresponding figures were 35 and 83 per cent − a glaring 
difference again.  
 
These findings, based on my field survey, are consistent with secondary data. For 
instance, a recent CSDS poll survey (2003) found that nearly 86 per cent of voters in 
Himachal believed that their vote had an effect on how the country is governed, while in 
Haryana the corresponding figure is negligible.  
 
6.4.3. Education Opportunities 
As noted by Mehta (2003), “It is somewhat odd to wish away the reality of caste when 
society is not willing to invest in creating opportunities that decrease its importance” 
(2003:79). In Himachal, the reality of caste has been diminished precisely by creating 
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opportunities that decrease its importance, particularly through public services. In 
Haryana the lack of similar opportunities is a major factor in perpetuating caste 
inequalities.  
 
Education is of particular significance in this context. As discussed in Chapter 8, the 
promotion of equitable schooling opportunities in Himachal has played a crucial role in 
overcoming traditional inequalities of class, caste and gender, and in particular it has 
helped to narrow caste disparities in the public sphere. 
 
Although there is a gap in literacy rates between the SC and the non-SC groups, in 
Himachal this is not as wide as in Haryana (see Table 6.5). In the younger age groups this 
gap has been eliminated altogether in Himachal, but not in Haryana. School participation 
rates are lower for SCs than for non-SCs in Himachal, but here again the difference 
between the two groups is much greater in Haryana. In my field survey I did not find a 
single child who had dropped out of school in the age group of 6-14 years in Himachal. 85 
 
 
Table 6.3: Literacy Rates in Himachal and Haryana, 2001 
 Himachal Pradesh Haryana 
 SC All SC All 
Literacy rate, all ages (%) 
70.0 77.0 56.0 68.0 
Literacy rate, age 7-15 (%) 94.0 95.0 79.0 86.0 
Source: Census of India 2001. 
 
                                                          
85 These observations are further corroborated by the findings of an unpublished study by Jean Drèze and 
Reetika Khera based on school attendance data from the second National Family Health Survey (NFHS-II, 
1998-99) for the age group of 10-14 years. It turns out that the social disadvantage in school participation 
associated with being SC is lower in Himachal than in any other state except Tamil Nadu. Haryana, on the 
other hand, has high levels of caste differentiation in access to schooling. 
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Table 6.4: School Attendance in Himachal and Haryana, 2003 
 Himachal Pradesh Haryana 
 SC Others SC Others 
Ever enrolment rate 88.6 92.7 67.9 80.7 
Completion of schooling to middle level  
 
14.3 
 
14.5 9.2 11.9 
Source: North India Human Development Report (NCAER, 2003).  
 
 
The high levels of school attendance in Himachal, coupled with relatively small 
differences of caste (and gender), are an outcome of the recent ‘schooling revolution’, 
discussed in Chapter 8. As discussed in that chapter, this schooling revolution in 
Himachal has been brought about almost entirely by state-run schools. A village school in 
Himachal is truly a community school where all social groups, including the upper castes 
and the Dalits, send their children, so that the whole community has a collective stake in 
its functioning. As pointed out in the PROBE (1999) survey, when parents in Himachal 
were asked whether they would prefer to send their children to a government or a private 
school (costs being the same) they said they would prefer the government school! In 
Haryana, on the other hand, public schools have been left to the less privileged and 
voiceless as those with access to better resources have opted for private facilities. As a 
result the quality of government schools there has suffered greatly.  
  
The high level of school attendance among SC/ST children in Himachal reflects not only 
the wide reach and effective functioning of the education system but also special 
incentive schemes and other efforts put into place to promote schooling among 
disadvantaged children. Promotional schemes for SC/ST students such as scholarships 
and subsidies for books and uniforms function better in Himachal than in Haryana, albeit 
with some exertion from the beneficiaries, who have to make several trips to the block 
offices to collect their dues. In Haryana, most of the incentive schemes scarcely function 
at all. Often parents do not consider it worth their while to apply for them as they are not 
convinced that any benefit will come their way. Parents complain about futile trips to 
district offices that usually result in demands for certificates to prove that they belong to 
an SC or ST category or other paperwork that they are unable to complete. In several 
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cases even after they have managed the paperwork they receive nothing. Here again 
levels of expectation from the government and even of information and awareness of 
various government schemes are very low. I was often asked for confirmation about 
schemes: “Has the government really instituted such and such a scheme? How is it that 
we have got nothing from it?” 
 
Another telling example of state apathy towards the less privileged in Haryana is the 
absence of incentive schemes for SC students below high school level. This is ironic as 
most SC students do not reach that level of education anyway.86 In Himachal several 
schemes for SC/ST students are available at all stages, including at primary school level.  
 
The midday meal programme is another example of a government programme 
functioning far better in Himachal.87 In Haryana the children had received nothing for at 
least six months prior to the time of my survey, and even before that the supply had been 
erratic. Parents were routinely asked to pick up their midday meal supplies from ration 
shops, which are notoriously corrupt. As expected, the ration shop owners tried their best 
to avoid parting with the ration, using various excuses about lack of supply. Invariably 
the parents give up after several futile attempts, especially since the rations they did 
receive were usually of poor quality. Since institutional recourse scarcely exists, this 
programme was virtually defunct.  
 
6.4.4 Health and Public Services  
As with education, health facilities in Himachal are also provided largely by the 
government sector. For instance in Himachal, 60 per cent of women live in villages that 
have access to either a Primary Health Centre (PHC) or a sub-centre run by the 
government. In Haryana the corresponding figure is 30 per cent. The population served 
per PHC or sub-centre is far lower in Himachal than in Haryana.  
                                                          
86 Educational Administration in Himachal, 1997 and Educational Administration in Haryana 1994, both 
NUEPA publications. State-wise surveys and reports of educational administration conducted by NUEPA 
during the 1990s have been published by Vikas Publishers, Delhi. For exact references see list of references 
at the end. 
87 Cooked meals had not yet been introduced in primary schools at the time of my field survey. The term 
midday meal programme refers to monthly grain rations that used to be given to children conditional on 
regular attendance. 
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Table 6.5: Reproductive Health 
  Himachal Haryana 
 SC Others SC Others 
Total Fertility Rate (children per woman) 2.15 2.05 3.7 2.5 
Contraception – any method 68.5 64.7 52.9 65.9 
                          modern method 68.4 61.7 45.2 56.4 
No ante-natal check up 12.1 13.0 54.9 34.4 
No tetanus injection during pregnancy 11.3 12.2 17.5 12.6 
Folic acid during pregnancy 84.0 85.5 61.1 70.7 
Delivery at health facility 26.2 33.4 1.9 8.1 
Delivery by doctor 28.0 31.6 19.0 34.3 
Source: NFHS-II (1998-99). Unless stated otherwise, all figures are in terms of 
percentage of ever-married women in the age group of 15-49 years. 
 
 
Table 6.6: Child Health 
 Himachal Haryana 
 SC Others SC Others 
Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1000
live births)  33.2 21.5 67.5 56.5 
Immunisation     
BCG 98.2 92.3 83.1 90.5 
Polio (1st dose only) 3.1 4.8 2.3 8.5 
DPT (incl. 3rd dose) 87.3 87.3 62.0 76.0 
Measles 88.1 90.2 64.1 77.3 
All 82.5 82.9 56.4 67.7 
None 1.8 2.7 14.7 6.3 
At least one dose of Vitamin A 72.8 68.7 37.2 47.3 
Vitamin A in last six months 31.5 36.1 15.9 22.3 
Source: NFHS-II (1998-99). Unless stated otherwise, all figures are in terms of 
percentage of children in the relevant age group. 
 
With respect to most indicators of health, three points emerge (Tables 6.5 to 6.7). Firstly, 
both access to health facilities and health outcomes are far better in Himachal than in 
Haryana. 
 
Secondly, there are no significant caste differences in access to health in Himachal. There 
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are minor differences between SC and non-SC, but these differences can go either way, 
and may reflect small sample sizes. Essentially there is no systematic bias against SCs in 
Himachal as far as these health indicators are concerned. 
 
Thirdly, SCs in Himachal do much better not only than SCs in Haryana but even than 
non-SCs in Haryana. This is a striking indication of how the combined disadvantages of 
caste and class have been effectively overcome in Himachal through public intervention, 
in this field at least. 
 
Table 6.7: Health & Nutrition 
  Himachal Haryana 
 SC Others SC Others 
Ever married women:     
Body Mass Index (BMI) 20.0 21.2 19.8 21.9 
Proportion (%) with anaemia  37.1 38.4 52.5 41.9 
Children 6-35 months:      
Proportion (%) with anaemia 63.8 69.1 87.3 83.6 
Proportion (%) with severe anemia 2.0 2.2 12.0 5.0 
Source: NFHS-II (1998-99). 
 
 
Similar observations apply to many other kinds of public services, as Table 6.8 illustrates. 
What is remarkable about the provision of basic amenities in Himachal is that these and 
other facilities are available relatively equitably across socio-economic groups, 
irrespective of caste. Haryana, on the other hand, in spite of high levels of per capita 
income has failed to provide basic amenities to large sections of its population and 
especially to the marginalised SC groups. While Himachal is no better off than Haryana 
in economic terms (if anything, the reverse is true), a much higher proportion of its 
population has access to basic amenities.  
  141
 
Table 6.8: Access to Public Amenities, 2003 
(% of households) 
 Himachal  Haryana  
 SC Others SC Others 
Piped Water 72.8 71.5 39.4 44.3 
Electricity 86.1 88.1 71.5 83.1 
Toilets 13.6 15.8 3.7 8.0 
Source: North India Human Development Report (NCAER, 2003).  
 
 
6.5. Economic Integration 
A mentioned earlier, the close association between caste and class common elsewhere in 
north India is not so strong in Himachal. While ritual differences between castes are 
significant, gross economic inequalities based on caste is not that apparent. Caste-based 
land ownership patterns have historically been relatively equitable, with Brahmans 
economically similar to lower castes such as Gaddis and Sipis. For instance, according to 
the District Gazetteer of Kullu (1917), the percentage of land owned by the lower castes 
ranged from 7.2 per cent in Kullu Proper to 12 per cent in Saraj. While it is no doubt true 
that the Rajputs (including the Ranas) did own more land than other castes, as discussed 
in the section on land reforms (Chapter 7), land has not been the basis of economic status 
in hill economies in the way it is in other feudal societies. 
 
Occupational rigidity is also not strictly observed in Himachal. Brahmans are cultivators 
in the same way as other castes. This may be influenced by the size of the Brahmans’ 
landholdings, which being small cannot afford leased labour. Newell (1970) found that 
all the Brahman farmers in Himachal were tilling their own land; “The peasant castes 
actually engaged in cultivation also owned much of the land”. In so far as the non-
cultivating Brahmans and Rajputs are concerned, their tenants and at times even servants 
(kamas) acquired cultivation rights with the passage of time. (Singh: 213). 
 
Historically, too, occupational mobility has been relatively high in Himachal. As with 
agriculture, artisanal activity is not confined to any particular community. For instance, 
castes such as the Kolis, who are assigned menial jobs, were engaged in artisan activities. 
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Singh (1998) observed; “The traditional upper castes of a Brahmanical system did not 
uniformly dominate the system. An assertive peasantry existed in virtually the entire 
region, as did a section of mobile artisans and lower castes… the traditional strength of 
the Kanet peasantry of Himachal was derived from their freedom from Brahmanical 
orthodoxy” (Singh: 217).  
 
This is not to deny that the lower castes, SCs in particular, are on average economically 
disadvantaged, but the disparities are not as glaring as in Haryana. While Haryana is on 
the whole economically more advanced than Himachal, income and asset distribution in 
Himachal is less skewed between SCs and non-SCs. This pattern is illustrated in Table 
6.9, based on secondary data, and in Table 6.10, based on my field survey. 
 
 
Table 6.9: Income and Property in Himachal and Haryana 
 Himachal Haryana 
 SC Others SC Others 
Per capita income (Rs per year) 3554 4176 3936 6422 
% of household income from:     
Agriculture and allied activities 29.8 37.7 26.8 57.6 
Waged income 23.5 11.3 28.8 7.7 
Salary 27.5 29.5 27.1 20.5 
% of households owning:     
 Land 88.6 91.7 22.1 56.5 
Draught animals 51.9 57.0 9.5 18.6 
Milch animals 78.5 85.8 62.3 77.5 
Source: North India Human Development Report (NCAER, 2003). 
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Table 6.10: Asset ownership in Himachal and Haryana 
(% of households) 
 
Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
 SC Others SC Others 
Land 70 66 18 92 
TV 67 74 53 83 
Pressure cooker 63 81 35 83 
LCV 4 6 6 17 
Pucca room 67 77 71 100 
Motorcycle 7 8 18 83 
Watch 41 62 65 100 
Radio 33 40 65 75 
Source: Author's field survey. 
 
6.5.1 Equitable Land and Asset Distribution 
Relatively equal patterns of land ownership in Himachal may be attributed partly to its 
history and partly to state commitment to land reforms, as discussed in Chapter 7. 
Traditionally all land was owned by the rajas, who bestowed it on people (or groups of 
people) for various services rendered to them. In Chamba, studied by Newell (1952), for 
instance, the raja depended on the fighting abilities of the Gaddi (a low caste) to protect 
his kingdom. Hence the Gaddis, military by occupation, acquired substantial land. The 
raja bestowed land for a variety of other reasons as well. Land belonging to the temple 
(Devta) that was traditionally quite substantial was routinely used to pay for religious 
services. While the lower castes were forbidden to enter the temple, they played an 
important ritual role in all its ceremonies by providing music. For this they were often 
remunerated with land from the Devta’s properties. Consequently lower caste groups also 
acquired land over the years. Today the temples own little land as most of it has either 
been given away or acquired by the government and redistributed.88  
 
                                                          
88  Historian Chetan Singh at the University of Himachal Pradesh, Simla, told me of this practice after I had 
finished my field visits so I have not been able to fully verify it. I was told however about the government 
giving temple land to the Harijans. And Harijans in general are not landless, even though several said that 
they did not get any from the sarkar (government), so it could be that this is how they acquired what they 
have.  
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A positive result of this distribution of land is that it provided no opportunity for the 
development of a special class of caste-based large landowners. Consequently, caste 
specialisation related to a standard agricultural economy also did not proliferate either. 
However, as all cultivable land came under use, the right to land became inherited rather 
than a reward for military or other service. This change in function of land-users from 
military to agriculturalist eventually separated the castes more decisively around land 
ownership. However, in the post-Independence period land reforms sought to restore the 
balance in land ownership again.89 Arguably the most crucial factor in Himachal’s 
economic egalitarianism is the relative success of its land reforms. The lack of landed 
lobbying groups, unlike in Haryana and Punjab, meant that land reforms faced little if any 
opposition. As a result SCs in Himachal own 14 per cent of all operational landholdings, 
while in Haryana they own only 2 per cent (NCAER 2003).  
 
Manjit Singh (1992) found that of the total area cultivated by the beneficiaries of land 
reform in Haryana, 74 per cent of land belonging to upper castes was irrigated while only 
18 per cent of lower caste-owned land was irrigated. Here again caste and class 
disparities reinforce each other.90 
 
Access to common property resources is another area where discrimination was much 
less in Himachal than elsewhere. Barring some lands, called “deva bhumis”, Dalits were 
allowed access to all other common areas and had the same rights as others to the use of 
their products.  
6.5.2 Public Sector Employment 
The role of the public sector in reducing economic inequalities is another aspect of the 
relatively egalitarian structure in Himachal. The large size of the public sector in 
                                                          
89 Land Reforms in Punjab and Haryana basically followed the modified version of the Congress Agrarian 
Reforms Committee (report submitted in 1949) under pressure from powerful vested interests in the 
Punjab, which influenced the provincial administration responsible for legislating the land reforms. While 
the committee had taken a strong ‘land to the tiller’ stand recommending a low land ceiling on the basis of 
economic efficiency as well as social justice, strong opposition from large landlords resulted in exemption 
from ceilings for efficient mechanized farms. The social justice idea was simply ignored. In Himachal 
Pradesh however land reforms proceeded smoothly after it became a separate state in 1971. 
90 Manjit Singh’s study pertains to Karnal, Hissar and Sirsa districts of Haryana. 
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Himachal and the government jobs associated with it has contributed to reducing 
economic disparities between castes. In particular, the policy of reserving 25 per cent of 
government jobs for the SCs has contributed to reducing inter-caste disparities. As 
Campbell (1976), writing about Kangra says: “The main forces working against the caste 
system are the more or less equal opportunities offered by the government in education 
and civil service employment” (1976:8). 
 
In this context the role of the armed forces as a major source of employment for the hill 
people is worth mentioning. Traditionally the army has been seen as a desired avenue for 
employment in Himachal. What is of particular interest to this discussion is that it has a 
side benefit in terms of caste equations, as life in the armed forces tends to act as a social 
equaliser. As mentioned earlier, retired army personnel traditionally return to their 
villages to become involved in school activities. I met several during my fieldwork, and 
they all told me that their perceptions about caste had undergone drastic changes during 
their tenure in the army. Without exception they had come back to Himachal with their 
prejudices modified.  
 
Interestingly, Haryana also sends a substantial proportion of its adult male population 
(11.2 per cent as quoted in Datta, 1999) to the army. However, most of these men join the 
Jat regiments set up in colonial times. It is believed by some historians that the itinerant 
Jats had begun to acquire martial skills and to use these skills against the British in areas 
such as Bharatpur. In order to bring them under control the British employed a two-
pronged strategy that included settling the Jats on agricultural land and hiring them en 
masse in the British army (Datta: 1999; Irfan Habib: 1976). The Jat regiment was set up 
for precisely this purpose. However, this move contributed to the consolidation of 
Haryanavi identity around a caste-based, masculine, homogenous community. 
Importantly the lower castes were not included in the army recruitment in Haryana, as the 
focus was on the so-called ‘martial castes’ such as Rajputs, Jats, Ahirs and Gujjars (see 
Stephen Cohen, 1990).91  Thus the levelling effects of the army were mitigated by the 
                                                          
91 Typically, in a regiment, battalions are committed to different castes and religions. For instance if there 
are 50 battalions in a regiment ten might be allotted to Jats, ten to ‘Mussalmans’, ten more to Sikhs etc., 
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fact that they were part of an exclusive regiment where their community and caste 
identities were enhanced rather than diluted. The role of the army in Haryana was in this 
respect different from that in Himachal. 
  
6.6. Political Participation of Dalits 
We have seen how access to public services and government employment in Himachal 
has helped to overcome caste inequalities and enabled the Dalits to improve their position 
in terms of human resources. I now examine the participation of SCs in the political 
arena, with special reference to Panchayati Raj Institutions and Mahila Mandals.  
 
6.6.1. Panchayati Raj Institutions  
The 73rd Amendment to the constitution enacted in 1993 sought to ‘restructure, 
rejuvenate and give constitutional status to the Panchayati Raj Institutions’. The main 
feature of this amendment is that it seeks meaningful representation of weaker sections 
and women. In practical terms this has been translated into a 33 per cent reservation of 
seats for lower castes and women at all levels. Thus political representation has been 
extended to sections denied their due for centuries.  
 
Reservation in Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) has not fully succeeded yet and many 
cases are reported of abuse of the newly created system, such as the putting up of proxy 
candidates in seats reserved for women. There are clearly limitations to imposing 
reservation on a social structure that is skewed as it would impair its effectiveness in the 
short term. Himachal is an exception to this. In the course of my fieldwork I came across 
several lower caste Pradhans (heads of the village Panchayats) functioning with no open 
hostility towards them. In one case (village Putlikuhl) the deputy Pradhan was a Brahman 
while the Pradhan was a Dalit, but the Pradhan had no difficulty working with his 
Brahman deputy. If there were any differences in opinion these were resolved by holding 
discussions over the telephone (hum phone par baat kar lete hain)! In another instance 
(village Neoli) it was the deputy who was a Dalit; he had been winning on an open ticket 
(i.e on a seat not reserved for the Dalits) for several years.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Interestingly there is no such commitment for the SC/ST who come under the ‘open’ category. 
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In general, Dalit Pradhans felt that discriminatory behaviour against them is now less 
evident in Panchayat meetings than it used to be. While an odd member may still 
maintain a distance by subtly refusing tea handed by a lower caste member, or by sitting 
on a chair at a distance, most have shed such inhibitions, and none of the Dalits 
complained of open hostility to their work. Ironically the one difficulty they did face was 
from members of their own caste, who often had unrealistic expectations of them. In 
order not to loose credibility the SC officials had to be very careful not to give the 
impression that their work was biased in favour of any group. Upper caste people 
questioned the effectiveness of lower caste Pradhans much in the same way as they did 
with women Pradhans. Comments about the inability of Dalit Pradhans to command the 
same degree of respect (Dalits are not referred to as pradhanji’ as an upper caste pradhan 
would be) and scepticism about a ‘menial worker’ taking on the job of a Pradhan which 
requires different kinds of skills, were commonly expressed.  
 
In Haryana, several villages reported that the reservation of seats for lower castes had not 
yet arrived in their Panchayats. It seems that the system of rotating seats for lower castes 
has not been fully implemented in parts of Haryana. While they are all aware of the 
provision they are still waiting for it to be implemented. In a study of PRIs in Haryana, 
Prashant et al. (1996) found that despite the implementation of reservation in some cases 
Dalits were apprehensive about their role in the Panchayats. They perceived a sense of 
alienation among the Dalits, who commented on the “invisible line that divides them 
(Dalits) and the members of the higher caste”, claiming that their views “really don’t 
carry much weight and their voices are not being heard”. (:164)92 
 
In another study of Panchayats in Haryana, Narendra Kumar (1996) found that they play 
a very limited role in the “political socialisation of the SCs (Dalits)” (: 67). Only 25 per 
cent of his Dalit respondents said they had any interest in Panchayat meetings. Sixty-six 
per cent said that they found the Panchayats unresponsive to their problems. This 
corresponds to my findings, in which lower castes in Haryana felt disengaged from the 
                                                          
92 Prashant, P, Suresh Mishra and Charanjeev Singh (1996). 
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political process and did not receive any benefit from the Panchayati Raj Institutions.  
 
Reservation for women, on the other hand, was being implemented in Haryana, but as 
mentioned earlier, only on paper. Male relatives do the real job in almost all cases. It 
seems that since it is more difficult to have proxy candidates for lower caste seats (as 
there are no lower caste relatives), reservation for the lower caste is facing greater 
resistance and hence delay. This is very different from Himachal, where Panchayat 
elections have always been held on time and with the entire quotas met according to the 
73rd and 74th Amendments to the constitution (Sud: 2001). 
 
Gram Sabhas being functional in Himachal also offer an opportunity for Dalits’ political 
participation. In Haryana Gram Sabhas are non-existent, thus removing another avenue of 
participation for Dalits.  
 
6.6.2. Mahila Mandals  
Social prejudice has prevented lower caste women from being equal participants in the 
functioning of Mahila Mandals. While they are not denied formal membership of the 
Mandals, social opprobrium, which prevents them from interacting freely keeps the lower 
caste women on the fringes of meetings. But interestingly instead of passively accepting 
their subordinate position and remaining on the margins, lower caste women in several 
cases have chosen to opt out and form their own, separate Mahila Mandals. As a result, in 
a single village one can find the ‘official’ Mahila Mandal composed of upper caste 
women and another formed by lower caste women to deal with their own problems. This 
is an interesting phenomenon, which, though at first glance it appears to be strengthening 
casteism, a closer look reveals an important shift towards greater equality in caste 
relationships. It may be hypothesised that inequality is maintained as much by a refusal to 
surrender positions of power by the dominant groups as by the inability of the 
subordinate groups to demand or acquire power. Hence the lower caste women’s refusal 
to accept the unequal status quo and their determination to do something about it by 
setting up alternative Mahila Mandals is a positive step towards dismantling structures of 
social inequality. There is of course the danger that instead of remaining a transitional 
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stage from which more substantive changes in the social position of Dalits can be 
realised, initiatives of this kind will lead to permanent divisions of the Mahila Mandals 
on caste lines. However, as a first step forward they must be given their due. 
 
6.7. Summary 
The evidence presented in this chapter paints a relatively less gloomy picture of 
achievement for the lower castes in Himachal across human development indicators. The 
data stand in stark contrast to figures for Haryana, where the SCs are highly marginalised.  
An important reason for the relatively better performance of SCs is that government 
services such as education and health are of better quality in Himachal and have been 
actively extended to all sections of the population.  
 
While it cannot be denied that SC groups are economically worse off than other caste 
groups even in Himachal (as borne out by my fieldwork and official statistics), they have 
been able to participate in and benefit from the public services provided by the state. 
Given their traditional position of disadvantage it is remarkable that the difference in 
education as well as health indicators between SC and upper caste groups is so small in 
Himachal. Not only are the health and education achievements of the SCs in Himachal 
higher than those of SCs in Haryana; in many cases they are also higher than those of the 
upper castes in Haryana.  
 
Successfully implemented land reforms in Himachal have also contributed to the removal 
of economic disadvantage. Economic redistribution has been accompanied by better 
political representation as well effective and efficient functioning of the Panchayat 
system on the basis of the 73rd and 74th Amendments. This has allowed political power to 
be shared more equally. In Haryana, by contrast, the reservation of seats for SCs is yet to 
be effectively implemented.  
 
In view of the factors cited above it is apparent that greater social equality now exists in 
Himachal, despite the prevalence of caste in the personal sphere. An important lesson to 
be learnt from this is that government can play a positive role in bringing about social 
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change. While personal prejudices cannot be institutionally removed, efforts in the public 
sphere of the kind seen in Himachal can make a significant difference to reducing their 
importance. 
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Chapter Seven 
Social Equality and State Action 
 
7.1. Introduction 
On the 26th of January 1950, India gave to itself a constitutional framework based 
on social justice and equality. Yet, more than fifty years on, vast sections of the 
Indian population continue to live with extraordinary levels of deprivation and 
marginalization. The fact that all these years of development planning and nation 
building have not been able to address gross disparities in the living conditions of 
large numbers of the population calls for a serious re-examination of the role of 
the state in development.  
 
Dr. Ambedkar, Chairperson of the Constituent Assembly, foresaw the difficulties that lay 
ahead in following the objectives of the Constitution. His parting speech to the 
Constituent Assembly contained what now appear to be prophetic words:  
 
On the 26th January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of 
contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in social and 
economic life we will have inequality… How long shall we continue to 
live a life of contradictions? How long shall we continue to deny equality 
in our social and economic life? If we continue to deny it for long, we 
will do so only by putting our political democracy at peril.  
 
These contradictions between the stated constitutional objectives and the social reality of 
most of India have indeed proved to be at the core of many of the interactions between 
state and society as played out in different regions across the country. As argued in 
Chapter 1, they have in places put into “peril” the realization of substantive democracy 
encompassing not just political or procedural equality but social and economic equalities 
as well.   
 
Inter-state comparisons indicate that there are important differences in the nature and 
effectiveness of policies between states. Even though the Indian Constitutional 
framework provides for the same set of formal democratic institutions and national laws 
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across the country, and for development resources to be used in accordance with a 
common set of Constitutional priorities, there still exists a difference in the success of 
achieving these priorities.  
 
One important factor to be borne in mind is the federal structure in India and its impact 
on central and state legislation. The existence of a Central List, State List and Concurrent 
List in the Constitution delineates boundaries and domains of state action. For instance, 
land related matters and Panchayati Raj are on the State list; education on the other hand 
is on the Concurrent list. While this division of powers obviously gives some exclusive 
areas of control to the states, they are nevertheless bound by the overall Constitutional 
framework. For instance, the basic framework of Panchayati Raj in India comes from the 
73rd Constitutional Amendment; its ‘texture’ is dependent on specifics of the state 
legislation and the priority given by each state to its implementation. 
 
Even in matters of setting policy priorities, there is a tension between the Central 
Government and state governments.  The Central Government exercises a huge influence 
over the state’s capacity to draw up policies and schemes because of its disproportionate 
access to revenue and its power to fix norms for its distribution. The state governments 
often end up having to find ways and means of pushing their own policy priorities within 
the framework of schemes drawn up at the centre.  
 
Finally, therefore, when one looks for reasons for the sharp differences between states in 
the nature and effectiveness of policies, it is not just the federal structure but also the 
implementation machinery controlled by the states that matters. This suggests that in 
examining any of the Indian states, such as Himachal, the Constitutional and legislative 
structure is important, to understand exactly where a state can exercise influence on its 
own and where it is constrained to act within a larger national mandate. Therefore along 
with the legal framework, the socio-cultural priorities of the people of a particular state 
have to be carefully understood, as their interactions with the state machinery finally 
determine the nature of state action. 
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It might be useful to begin with a few words on the history of the birth of Himachal - the 
dominant political discourse and the nature of social relations at the time of Himachal’s 
formation as an independent state. In particular the contribution of YS Parmar, the chief 
campaigner for separate statehood of Himachal and the architect of its development 
model is worth elaborating. This will, I believe, help provide the historical context within 
which the state of Himachal was born and which established the pre-conditions that have 
been instrumental in defining the nature of the state in Himachal. In particular the roots of 
the partnership between society and state that I have already referred to can be better 
understood. 
 
7.2 Parmar’s Vision 
“Parmar was a visionary”, is an oft-repeated description of the first Chief Minister of 
Himachal Pradesh. His vision is evident in his writings, particularly from the period when 
he was lobbying for an independent state of Himachal Pradesh. These writings articulate 
the direction of development, different from Punjab that the Himachali people wished to 
follow. They have particular relevance in terms of the way Parmar viewed the role of the 
state. To illustrate: 
 
An important fact to be borne in mind and which places the Province [of 
Himachal] in a peculiar position is that while the rest of the country, 
including East Punjab, is in the grip of a capitalist order, Himachal has no 
capitalists whatsoever…The people of Himachal [now] do not want to 
introduce a new order of capitalists but are on the contrary, determined to 
raise the general standard of living and earning capacity of the people by 
handling all small business and industry on a cooperative basis and get all 
big business and industry nationalized. No monopolies, contracts or 
licenses are to be encouraged or tolerated and everyone is to benefit equally 
from the development of the country. …it is worth mentioning that ever 
since the popular ministry93 has come into power the whole trend of the 
administration and legislation has been according to the policy previously 
declared by its leaders. Whether in the matter of Panchayats or in the matter 
of land reform, land development …the legislation has taken a definitely 
more progressive turn than in the Punjab and the working of the 
cooperatives has put a check on the capitalists. (: 16-17) 
 
                                                          
93 Popular ministry refers to the elected members of the legislative council as opposed to those appointed 
by the Central Government. 
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Recognizing the difference in social structure between Punjab and the Himachal area   
and stressing the importance of a people-centric approach in Himachal, Parmar continues: 
 
Our women, free to marry or divorce, who suffer from no disabilities or 
complexes, work shoulder to shoulder with men in all walks of life which 
concern the village community, and are bound to play a great and noble 
part in the building up of this Province. Our backward people are 
determined to go ahead and in a very short time come up to the standards of 
our neighbours. Only they must be allowed to develop according to their 
own light, traditions and peculiar circumstances …what is required is an 
extension of a helping hand in the shape of the development of these areas 
in the matter, particularly, of communications, health, education and other 
development projects.[: 17] 
 
 
As is clear from these writings, for Parmar Himachal’s development would not be based 
just on economic growth, but also on the full realization of society’s potential based on 
the equal participation of all social groups. Further, the state would play a significant part 
in creating the conditions for their participation. Contained within this vision is also a 
departure from other movements for regional independence which rely on language and 
culture as dominant reasons for seeking separation. It is important therefore to understand 
that the people of Himachal moved beyond the narrow confines of identity, and 
articulated a set of socio-political aspirations that encompassed a range of issues 
including a model of development and a kind of democracy that would be more 
egalitarian and participatory. The fact that they attained this kind of government and that 
it built the foundations of a collaborative state-society relationship has gone a long way in 
enabling not just the egalitarian development that followed, but also unexpected 
achievements in many development indicators.  
 
A desire to catch up with the rest of the country fuelled by a strong sense of identity gave 
birth to an ideology that in fact helped Himachal to overtake other parts of the country in 
crucial spheres. It would be fair to say that in the case of Himachal the state was 
conceived very much in terms of an “ideological project” (Abrams 1988:75) where the 
political rhetoric did not emphasize economic growth as being the engine of 
development. Instead women and backward classes had a special place and benefits were 
visualized for all from the outset. Its subsequent policies and projects translated the 
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rhetoric into action. Hence the state dominated the sphere of health and education and 
created an expectation, among the people, from the state to provide these public services. 
I will explore these issues in greater deal in the rest of the chapter. Suffice it to say here 
that based on this ideological project the state set about its task by setting up offices in far 
flung districts thereby increasing its physical accessibility to the people as it tried to bring 
development to all parts of Himachal. The state by living up to the expectations of the 
people by providing the basic services has also built up political credibility itself cited as 
a factor in sustaining the supply of quality public services. (Keefer & Khemani 2004).  
 
It is interesting to compare the words of YS Parmar, the architect of modern Himachal, 
with those of Ambedkar, the architect of the Indian Constitution. Both leaders articulated 
their concerns for the future in the form of the Indian Constitution in one case and in the 
form of Himachal’s “mission statement” in the other at a point where there was some 
prospect of these statements having a prescriptive impact. 
 
Even though the statements of Ambedkar and Parmar reflect a sharp contrast in optimism 
about the future, both acknowledge that social relations play a seminal role in 
determining the efficacy of state policy. Ambedkar and Parmar were not just ideologues 
but also practitioners with a sound understanding of the social realities of their times. As 
a result their statements are reflections not just of state policy but also of the interplay of 
society and politics especially as it impinges on the objectives of egalitarianism and 
participation. In fact, one could argue that Ambedkar and Parmar were visionaries of the 
same coin - deeply aware of the importance of constructing state policies and structures 
on the basis of egalitarianism and participation in order to sustain development and 
democracy. However one was saddled with the burden of trying to impose an egalitarian 
structure on a sharply entrenched social hierarchy, characteristic of most of India while 
the other was looking for an opportunity to construct a supportive state structure that 
would consolidate the aspirations of the people for equitable development on a smaller 
scale in the state of Himachal. 
   
While Ambedkar, in 1950, worried about the “contradictions” between political equality 
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and social inequality, that he felt would undermine the basic structure of political 
democracy in India, Parmar in 1971 was confident that these contradictions did not stand 
in the way of building a society based on the twin pillars of social and political equality 
in an independent Himachal Pradesh. This confidence stemmed from the consensus that 
existed amongst the people of Himachal in favour of the vision articulated by him for the 
newly formed State.  In fact, YS Parmar was not carving out a different path or imposing 
an inherently contradictory structure on the people of Himachal but articulating with 
confidence the desires and aspirations of the people of the state. In many of his powerful 
statements at the time, Parmar clearly states that he does not speak for himself alone but 
on behalf of Himachali society, which has a vision different from many parts of India but 
embodies the Constitutional objectives of the country. It is not surprising therefore that 
many of Himachal’s achievements are in tune with the Constitutional objectives of social 
equality and have come about with remarkably little social disruption, conflict and unrest. 
Just as Ambedkar’s warning continues to be relevant today for most parts of India, 
Parmar’s sense of hope and confidence also seems to have been borne out by the many 
social development achievements of Himachal Pradesh. 
 
7.4 Establishing the State of Himachal Pradesh 
When the transition to a modern, democratic and socialist state took place in India 
in 1947, there was less of a contradiction between the constitutional objectives of 
the nation state and the vision of the majority of people living in the Himachal 
region, than in many other states. But the “Himachal region” was then part of the 
state of Punjab, where pronounced divisions in society were creating a social and 
political order in sharp contrast to the constitutional objectives of social equity and 
empowerment. This contradiction in interests between Punjab and the Himachali 
people resulted in a period of conflict and resistance that lasted a couple of decades 
before Himachal was granted separate statehood, in 1971. Himachal’s case for 
separation on grounds of basic differences in vision from Punjab was bolstered by 
the fact that Himachal’s vision corresponded more closely to that endorsed by the 
Constitution. It is interesting to note that Haryana, also a part of Punjab when 
separated from it, followed the Punjab model of development. Haryana’s 
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separation from Punjab was based more on parochial notions of language (with 
caste and communal undertones) which unfortunately glossed over other social 
inequities. The difference in development outcomes that emerged in the two states, 
(Himachal and Haryana) after they adopted their separate ways reflects this 
difference in understanding of development including that of the constitutional 
imperative. 
 
Parmar saw the building of infrastructure and the setting up of education and health 
facilities as key to realizing the objectives of development. Understanding that 
infrastructure was crucial to development of any kind, particularly in an isolated 
mountain area, he laid urgent emphasis on this aspect of his plans. He also realized that 
the terrain and limitations in attracting industry and increasing agricultural production 
meant that people would have to look to other avenues for employment. For this 
education would be crucial. And hence he emphasized building schools and expanding 
educational opportunities. 
 
Parmar’s vision laid the foundation for state policy in Himachal and contributed to the 
forging of a lasting social consensus on the constructive role of the state. This consensus 
is reflected in high public expectations from the state, particularly in the form of 
provision of basic services. The political credibility of successive governments has 
hinged to a large extent on their ability to meet these expectations.94 In fact, the social 
development orientation of policy widely shared in Himachal Pradesh politics cuts across 
party lines, and has survived the onslaught of the phase of economic liberalization which 
has seen the dismantling of state institutions for development in many other states across 
India.  
 
How can Himachal be situated in the discourse on state and society theories current in the 
literature? In what ways does it represent a departure from the dominant modes of 
analyzing the nature of the state, state society relations and development outcomes? And 
                                                          
94 See Keefer and Khemani (2004) for an insightful discussion of the role of political credibility in 
sustaining the supply and quality of public services. 
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to what extent can it add to the current understanding of the issues surrounding state 
society and development? Without attempting to disprove or endorse any particular 
theory I hope to enrich the theoretical discourse on state society relations through a 
discussion of the Himachal experience. In particular the Himachal story can contribute to 
increasing our understanding of the possibilities that exist in circumstances where there 
are common objectives between the state and society.  
  
7.5. Does Politics Matter? 
An obvious question that arises at this point is the role of politics in understanding these 
differences. If state structures alone cannot explain differences in policies and their 
implementation across states, then, does politics matter? Can the differences in 
democratic functioning of states be explained by what Harriss (2000) calls ‘regime 
types’? Is it different political parties, their leadership, ideology and organizational 
structures that make the decisive difference?  
 
This question was first addressed in the Indian context by Atul Kohli (1987)95 in his 
comparative analysis of three states -West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka, where 
he looked at the performance of the political regimes in these states with respect to pro-
poor policies, such as land reforms. The conclusion he came to was that regimes that are 
left of centre (like West Bengal) are more likely to adopt and implement reformist 
policies than those that have a “multi-class” base with “loose organization and diffuse 
ideology”. He goes on to argue that a regime that is simultaneously centralized and 
decentralized so that it can be “in touch” with local society whilst not being subject to the 
local power elite, is able to “make the institutional penetration of society possible, 
facilitating a degree of autonomy from the propertied classes” (1987:11). In other words, 
Kohli clearly believes that political ideology and organizational forms of political parties 
make a difference. Harriss’s (2000) study of 13 states, on the other hand, while in general 
agreement with Kohli about the importance of politics and political regimes in facilitating 
development, differs from him in claiming that it is not just left parties that can follow 
pro-poor agendas.  He cites the examples of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh which have 
                                                          
95 Kohli Atul (1987). 
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good records of poverty reduction to show that, even in the absence of overt ideological 
positions, “populist politics” can bring about a consensus on anti-poverty issues. In 
stressing the importance of political organization he elaborates that for populist politics to 
be sustainable they must take the form of competitive populism carried out by well-
organized parties. More importantly however he acknowledges that the “structure and 
function of local (agrarian) power and the relations of local and state-level power holders 
exercise a significant influence on policy processes and development outcome” (:26).96 
 
What these studies do not directly address, although Kohli and Harriss both make 
reference to it, is the importance of the social structure in influencing politics. In other 
words, politics matters but politics itself is an outcome of social processes involving the 
interplay of conflicting social relations. Therefore one still needs to look behind the scene 
of party organizations, local leaders and professed ideologies, to the societies that gave 
rise to them, sustained their ideological commitments and helped build their party 
structures. Party political structures, as much as bureaucratic structures, are a part of the 
social context in which they exist. And just as the state cannot be analyzed by looking 
only at bureaucratic structures without reference to society, the state cannot be analyzed 
by looking at just party structures without reference to society.  
 
Further, ‘regime’ typologies are not always a useful way of understanding the differences 
between states, as indicated by the difference in achievements between West Bengal and 
Kerala, both with left parties in power. As argued by Heller for Kerala, its success in 
development outcomes owes a lot to social mobilization and class action which paved the 
way for the development of a consensus between state and society on development 
issues, which exists even when Left parties are not in power. The Himachal case, as we 
shall see further on, also qualifies the regime type analysis and in fact does not fit into 
any of the situations cited above. In the case of Himachal, traditional social equality 
meant that a leveling of social forces was not required in the way that it was in Kerala 
and other states, in order to focus the attention of the state on people’s issues. The 
                                                          
96 In contrast to these studies that claim that politics matter, Bhargava and Vyas (1995) did a nine state 
study and came to the firm conclusion that the professed ideology of political parties was not a significant 
factor in the success of poverty reduction. 
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relatively egalitarian social structure helped provide the conditions for the participation of 
a wider section of society in development opportunities. This has ensured a ‘continuity’ 
of social policy irrespective of the party in power, as in the case of Kerala.  
 
Kohli may be right in positing that strong ideological commitments and party 
organizations can overcome vested interests, as shown by West Bengal, but the examples 
of Tamil Nadu and Himachal Pradesh (and Kerala) suggest that other possibilities of 
incorporating people centered objectives into the political domain also exist. In particular, 
what these examples suggest is the need for a wider view of politics not limited to party 
politics, but that takes into account a whole gamut of state society relation. Further, 
democratic spaces that provide an opportunity to people to express and articulate their 
demands can also be used to influence policy. The conditions under which these are 
effective arenas of influence are also determined by the structure of society and state 
society relations. If state society interaction is relatively democratic and if there is a 
mutuality of objectives between state and society, as discussed in chapter one, then state 
action and public action are more likely to complement each other. The conditions for 
this complementarity may be historically endowed, or they may have to be created 
through social intervention, as happened, for instance, in Kerala.  
 
In Himachal relative social equality has allowed these spaces to function more 
democratically and hence it is the use of these spaces that has in many ways 
determined the ‘politics’ of Himachal, across party lines. Thus no party that aspires 
to come to power in Himachal Pradesh can ignore the issues raised by the people. I 
shall return to the use of democratic spaces in Himachal Pradesh in section 7.6.2 
below. 
 
To sum up, a closer analysis of the state requires that it be seen in the context of the 
society in which it functions. The social context determines the nature of state society 
relations which in turn influences the choice of policies, their effective implementation, 
the integrity of public institutions and the use of democratic spaces. In turn these 
processes influence changes in the social context. There lies the possibility of a virtuous 
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circle of constructive state action and favourable social context of the kind that has 
developed in Himachal.  
 
7.6. State-Society Relations and Social Equality  
In the first chapter I argued that social equality and the constructive role of the state 
complement and reinforce each other. Here, I explore specific ways in which social 
equality facilitates state action in the interest of the larger public good.  
 
7.6.1 The Problem of State Capture 
The issue of state action has been of particular concern to post-colonial and newly 
democratizing societies as they moved from traditional social and political structures to 
embrace democracy and a developmental state. Traditional societies tend to be dominated 
by hierarchies of class, caste, gender etc., with the state deriving its power and moral 
imperative from the privileges inherent in the system of hierarchies. It has been argued 
that in such societies, political authority remains devoid of an engagement with issues 
related to social re-structuring and in fact strives to maintain the hierarchies. According to 
Kaviraj (1997), for instance, the inability of a state to adhere to constitutional objectives 
can be understood as a result of society being in ‘moral subordination’ to a system of 
hierarchies rather than to constitutional objectives. In India, this phenomenon is further 
complicated by the peculiarities of the caste system which in its pure form segregates 
economic and political classes. The implication of this segregation is that addressing 
social and economic inequalities is seen to be beyond the reach of political action. In the 
words of Kaviraj: “the state is not an authority for appeal against widespread structural 
injustices, oppression, inequities…It cannot be expected to rectify them, because it had 
not created them” (:42). In fact, Kaviraj asserts that this “marginality” from questions of 
social restructuring retained its hold on the newly formed nation-state in India, even 
while it adopted the language and rhetoric of a modern socialist state. As a result, he says, 
“the power to reorder the structure of productive roles, which determined everyday 
destinies of individual men and social groups, remained severely restricted.” (:41)  It is 
interesting to note that for neo-statists, like Reuschemeyer, et al., (1992) the 
differentiation between the realm of politics and the ‘overall system of inequalities in a 
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society’ is actually a way of approaching the ‘ideal’ of democracy as this makes it 
possible for collective decisions to be made without reference to particular individuals or 
groups who derive their power from economic or political status (:41ff). In this way, they 
see a state system that is ‘autonomous’ to interests within society as the closest to a 
democratic system as it reflects a ‘balance of power’.   
  
This inability of the state to effectively counter dominant forces in society has been a 
subject of much debate in development literature. The failure of the state to bring 
development to vast sections of the population has been attributed by many scholars to 
‘state capture’ by social groups that exercise unequal power and influence on different 
structures of the state. State capture can take various forms from manipulation to outright 
capture of institutions, without even changing the constitutional framework and its stated 
objectives. The most obvious and widely discussed form of state capture is through the 
‘hijacking’ of public policy.97 Powerful groups within society that stand to gain from the 
status quo frustrate attempts aimed at a diffusion of privilege by resisting or blocking re-
distributive policies. The influence of “class power” on the Indian state is well illustrated 
by Bardhan (1984), who lists three propertied classes – the agrarian and the industrial 
bourgeoisie and the public bureaucracy (“professional class”) as having determined the 
course of public policy in the interests of one or the other, at different points in time. 
Chatterjee (1994), on the other hand, has focused on the influence of the capitalist class 
on policy makers. According to him, it prevented the state from being identified as “an 
embodiment of the general” and instead, “constructed the framework of legitimacy to 
allow the passive revolution of capital”, thus creating “profound ambiguities… in the 
relations between the modern state and the rest of the people-nation”.  
 
Nevertheless, the theory of state capture encompasses a dual understanding of the 
perversion of state objectives by an exclusive set of vested interests within society, and 
the understanding that there is a need to at least pay lip-service to the stated objectives. If 
this were not the case, there would be no need to “capture” the state. In other words, state 
                                                          
97 Bardhan 1984, Kaviraj, 1993 Jayal, 1998, and Partho Chatterjee, 1993 have all cited state capture as an 
important reason for state failure in India. 
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capture by its very nature acknowledges the legitimacy of the group that the stated 
objectives represent as well as the objectives themselves.  
 
Ambedkar’s concern arose from his fear of the power of groups that could remain 
autonomous to stated public goals or even indulge in brazen perversion of the objectives 
in practice. Nevertheless he concentrated his efforts in framing a Constitution that could 
provide inspiration and support to the weakest and most marginalized sections of society. 
In so doing, he hoped that the moral legitimacy of a Constitutional framework would 
provide the crucial space to those fighting for greater equality to counter the dominance 
of power and use the tools of political democracy to overcome social equality. In fact 
Ambedkar with his focus on a legal Constitutional framework provides the moral and 
ethical touchstone against which even the objectives of powerful groups have had to be 
justified. In this way, the space created by the Indian Constitution has been no less 
important than the power exercised by dominant groups who have sought to subvert its 
objectives.   
 
Haryana’s development experience is an interesting illustration of hijacking of public 
policy by powerful interests to the detriment of the marginalized. For instance, a 
powerful landowners’ lobby was able to subvert land reforms, as discussed further in the 
chapter. Similarly, the heavily skewed emphasis on agricultural subsidies at the cost of 
government spending on health and education disproportionately benefited larger 
farmers. Small and marginal farmers were thus caught in a system of overlapping 
inequalities and the inegalitarian structure remained intact as marginalized groups were 
deprived of both land and quality education. 
 
Himachal, on the other hand, does not fall in this general pattern of state capture. Land 
reforms were successfully carried out, elementary education has been universalized and a 
wide range of basic public services (health care, public transport, water and electricity to 
cite a few) have been provided in an equitable manner to a large section of the 
population. As argued in the previous chapter, this difference in the role of the state 
relates to social equality and state society relations in Himachal. One aspect of this is that 
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public priorities in Himachal Pradesh have more of a social orientation (for instance, the 
overwhelming priority given to universal elementary education) because they have not 
been dominated by privileged interests. Other links between social equality and the 
constructive role of the state are explored below. 
 
7.6.2 Use of Democratic Spaces 
In his seminal piece on the post-colonial state in Pakistan, Alavi (1972) argues that one 
factor responsible for the coalescing of interests around powerful groups and their hold 
on the state is the weakness of civil society. This allows the state to forge ahead with its 
capitalist project (cloaked in ‘nationalist’ jargon) with scant regard for inequalities that 
result. Civil society in post-colonial states, he asserts, is so underdeveloped that it allows 
such alliances to persist without sufficient resistance.  
 
The contrast with the Indian case is useful, as civil society was underdeveloped in large 
parts of India too, at the time of its independence from British rule. But, unlike Pakistan, 
Indian democracy gave rise to a number of social movements led by the groups 
marginalized in the so-called ‘nationalist’ project of the state. These movements have 
covered the spectrum from being highly anti-state/establishment to being quite amenable 
to co-option by the state. Thus, far from being under-developed, civil society in India has 
in fact been very vibrant. Nevertheless, civil society’s success in bringing the agenda of 
social justice centre-stage has been mixed.  I would argue that an important reason for 
this is that civil society in India has not sufficiently used the available democratic spaces, 
to engage creatively with the state. Instead, the main focus of social movements has been 
on adversarial action vis-à-vis the state. In fact a powerful civil society, capable of 
countering vested interests, can be built with the support of the state, rather than in 
antagonism with it. This tends to happen more easily in situations of mutuality between 
state and society where the state-created spaces for the functioning of semi-formal and 
informal social institutions are used to strengthen civil society, as mentioned above. 
However, in India’s divided society, state initiatives to create informal institutions of 
public participation ( eg: Mahila Mandals, Yuva Kendras etc.,) have not elicited much 
interest on the part of civil society. By contrast the potential provided by the state has 
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been used quite effectively by Himachal as a platform for organizing its concerns and, 
when required articulating them to the state. For instance, Mahila Mandals as we saw in 
Chapter 5 are fairly active in Himachal and being an organized voice for women can 
scale up their demands to the level of the state. It is important to note that Himachal has 
so successfully used the available democratic spaces that there has been little “need” for 
large scale social or political movements against the state or to put pressure on the state to 
address the demands of the excluded. This is a defining feature of Himachal and stands in 
sharp contrast to the experience of other areas, such as Kerala, where a “welfare pact” has 
been forged with the state after extended periods of political mobilization and conflict. As 
discussed in the Chapter 4, spaces of closer mutual interaction with political authority 
have traditionally been available in Himachali society. It is probable that these paved the 
way for the adoption of the new platforms created by the modern state.  
 
7.6.3 Social Distance 
The democratic state in India, with its modernizing project, has been criticized for not 
being in touch with the essentially traditional reality of peoples’ lives because of the 
socio-cultural distance between the rulers and ruled. This disconnectedness, which is 
partly cultural and partly ideological, leads to policies that either do not reflect the needs 
or aspirations of the people (Saberwal, 1993), or become distorted beyond recognition by 
the time they reach implementation levels (Kaviraj, 1993).According to Kaviraj, policies 
are often formulated at higher levels of governance where socio-cultural specificities of 
the local level are not accounted for. This could be because of lack of information and 
awareness of ground realities or because of ideological differences in what the policy 
makers perceive as necessary and workable interventions and what is supported by lower 
level of administration and the local conditions. As a result well-intended policy 
measures can get distorted beyond recognition by the time they reach implementation 
levels. The development literature is strewn with examples of the “unintended 
consequences” that result from such distortions.98 This is one way in which social 
distance between the centres of policy making and the people stands in the way of 
constructive state action.  
                                                          
98 See Walton and Rao (2004) for examples of ‘un-intended consequences’ of development practices. 
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In Himachal Pradesh, the relative lack of social distance is conspicuous in the 
accessibility of the state’s bureaucrats as well as politicians to ordinary people. To some 
extent this has been facilitated by the fact that Himachal is a small state with a population 
of six million and hence centres of power are relatively less remote here than in larger 
states. Nevertheless, the accessibility of relatively high-level politicians to the local 
people is striking. Often in interviews at the village level I was told of the ease with 
which people could simply walk into the offices of ministers - not just local MPs 
(Member of Parliament) and MLAs (Member of Legislative Assembly)- if they had some 
problem that needed solving. I was given the impression that they did not hesitate to take 
even local matters up to the highest level, even going straight to the Chief Minister (CM) 
in some cases. Unable to verify these claims, I was sceptical at first. However, the 
regularity with which I heard them forced me to take them more seriously. One place 
where I found evidence of the state’s accessibility was the District Collector’s (DC) 
office in Kullu, where I spent several days observing interactions between the people and 
the DC throughout the day. Two things stood out: (a) the ease with which people could 
approach the DC singly or in groups. They were never turned away, were spoken to 
politely when asked their business and then told to wait for their turn. The DC too 
listened patiently and attentively and then took the necessary steps. It was a direct 
interaction and there were no 'middle persons' to intervene; and (b) the large number of 
women who came to the office with petitions of various kinds. In fact the groups that 
came often comprised more women than men. In many cases it was also the women who 
were most vocal (see Chapter 5 for more on political participation of women). 
 
Social distance is also a critical factor at the lowest level of state society interaction i.e., 
between the local state agents and the people- for instance between teachers and pupils, 
between doctors and patients or between the district administration and the people. The 
lack of social distance between teachers and pupils is a striking feature of classrooms in 
Himachal and an important factor in explaining the education outcomes of Himachal. (I 
deal with this aspect of Himachal’s education scenario in some detail in the Chapter 8). 
The overwhelming number of people who access the public health system is another 
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indication of the lack of social distance between the state and the people. Very often 
socially marginalized groups in India stay away from public institutions for fear of 
disrespect and ridicule, sometimes even abuse. This is a common reason for their 
continued marginalization.  
 
Another critical aspect of social distance is that it can distort public action by preventing 
public pressure from reaching the appropriate authorities. Inequalities that exacerbate 
social distance between people prevent less powerful groups from taking their grievances 
to concerned authorities, as they feel excluded from the processes that can scale up their 
demands to appropriate levels. For instance, lower caste presence is often shunned at 
panchayat meetings or in government institutions. Similarly women feel unable to access 
male-dominated centres of authority. The relative gender equality in Himachal evident in 
the lack of patriarchal norms affecting their visibility and mobility makes it possible for 
women to access public spaces freely. As a result they are often found in government 
offices with a list of complaints: be it against the pradhan (head of village council or 
Gram Panchayat) for malpractice in elections, the school teacher for absenteeism or the 
local bully for diverting a water source. As is well documented (see Drèze and Sen, 2002) 
women can play an important role in exerting pressure for the provision of local public 
services, and hence their contribution to governance is vital. The setting up of Mahila 
Mandals and now self-help groups of women is in recognition of this role. The relatively 
active participation of women in social and political life in Himachal, helped as it is by 
greater gender equality, can be seen as an illustration of how low social distance 
facilitates collaborative state-society relations.  
 
7.6.4 Integrity of Public Institutions 
Social divisions, like social distance, can also undermine the functioning of public 
institutions. Powerful groups by interfering with the state through the manipulation of 
institutions, inhibit their evolution and effective functioning. While institutional failure is 
increasingly cited as a reason for poor governance, and much has been said about the 
need to strengthen institutions, less attention has been given to the role of social equality 
in facilitating the integrity of public institutions.  
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A good example of how social equality can be important for the viability of public 
institutions is the Gram Sabha. In rural India the Gram Sabha is a sort of general body 
meeting of the village community, where all adults are entitled to participate. According 
to the Planning Commission, the Gram Sabha is envisaged as the “foundation of the 
Panchayati Raj System”. It refers to the entire body of persons registered on the electoral 
rolls of an area comprising a Panchayat at the village level. Effectively it is the 
‘governing body’ of the Gram Panchayat (or village council). Any administrative action 
taken by the Panchayat has to get clearance from the Gram Sabha before being put into 
force.99 In particular drafting and implementation of developments plans have to be 
vetted and monitored by the Gram Sabha. A wide range of functions have been recently 
assigned to the Gram Sabhas, such as defining priorities for local public works, 
conducting social audits and constituting local committees like forest protection 
committee etc. However, what policy makers often overlook is that the very functionality 
of the Gram Sabha cannot be taken for granted as it depends on the social context. In 
large parts of rural India, including Haryana, Gram Sabhas are rarely held. Ostensibly, 
because it is difficult to achieve the prescribed quorum, but in reality because society in 
Haryana is so sharply divided that a small group of people hold sway while the majority 
is disenfranchised and unable to influence the process. By contrast in Himachal, lack of 
deep divisions in society implies that no single group is able to override other groups in 
public institutions. Gram Sabhas (called “aam jalaas”) are regularly held on the 
announced dates and elicit active participation by the people.  
 
Similarly the Gram Panchyats which are crucial at the village level for implementing and 
monitoring rural development programmes are relatively active in Himachal. They 
conduct a range of other activities as well. From my field work I found that Panchayats 
are regularly engaged in the following activities: village cleaning drives; organizing 
water sources (obtaining new ones or improving old ones); organizing bus services to the 
village (Jana panchayat); appealing for and getting teachers appointed to schools where 
there is a short supply; arranging for agriculture related supplies such as insecticides and 
                                                          
99 Planning Commission website. 
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fungicides (Shird Panchayat); assisting in cases involving higher authorities (Neoli 
Panchayat). An example of the last was witnessed by me during my visit when an 
accident claiming the lives of four people from a village had taken place. The Panchayat 
took up the case and persisted till all the families had been awarded compensation. One 
of the youths killed belonged to a Dalit family, who were full of praise for the concerned 
Pradhan and the Panchayat.  
 
In his review of the 2000 Gram Panchayat elections in Himachal, Sud (2001) makes 
some interesting observations: (a) “high expectations” and “contempt for political heavy 
weights” were important factors in the elections; (b) there was full compliance with the 
33 per cent reservation quota for women at both panchayat and urban bodies levels; (c) 
younger candidates “proved a threat to established leaders … challenging age-old social 
and economic hegemonies”; and (d) it was on the whole a bloodless election with 
minimal use of alcohol or muscle power. A high voter turnout of over 75 per cent was 
recorded, indicating a “strengthening of the party-less democratic system at grass roots 
level”. He goes on to say that “Himachal Pradesh in fact is one of the few states in the 
country where Panchayat Raj elections/urban bodies’ elections have always been held at 
regular intervals, without exception” (2001: 2126)  
 
My field data, presented in Table 7.1 below, provides further evidence of the institutional 
integrity of local democratic institutions in Himachal.  
 
Table 7.1: Public Perceptions of Gram Panchayats 
(% of households) 
 
Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
 SC/ST Others Total SC/ST Others Total 
Faith in Gram Panchayat (GP) 55 62 60 13 84 45 
Can GP influence schooling and
village life?   31   7 
Sarpanch (head of GP) is honest 81 77 79 42 64 52 
Sarpanch is reliable 63 70 68 19 64 39 
Elect Sarpanch again 63 47 56 16 48 30 
Source: Author’s field survey. SC/ST = Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe . 
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Several points emerge from this table. In general there is greater faith in institutions in 
Himachal than in Haryana, as seen from the first row. The responses are however caste 
specific. While in Haryana lower castes have a greater perception of state corruption than 
do the upper castes, in Himachal this is not the case. This contrast in perceptions in 
Haryana corroborates the disillusionment of the lower castes there, of which there is no 
evidence in Himachal. Upper castes are obviously happy in Haryana as the Gram 
Panchayats are clearly doing the right things as far as they are concerned. For the lower 
castes, on the other hand, the Gram Panchayats do not appear to be working in their 
interests. The upper castes control these institutions while the lower castes feel 
disenfranchised. The relatively similar perception of corruption across castes in 
Himachal, however, indicates that government has worked in the interest (or disinterest) 
of both the upper and the lower castes. This is not just a striking illustration of 
institutional integrity but another example of how social equality in Himachal helps to 
make democracy work for development. 
  
7.6.5 Corruption and Transparency 
An important aspect of institutional functioning relates to corruption. Lack of 
transparency and corruption are critically linked to the failure of institutions to deliver 
and are increasingly emphasized as an important factor in the growing concerns about the 
crisis of governance and its links with development failure.  
 
There is likely to be more corruption where there is more inequality because greater 
concentration of power and resources increases the possibility of using public space for 
private rather than public gain with greater impunity. The relative powerlessness of those 
deprived of their due impairs society’s role of vigilance. If people at the receiving end of 
corrupt practices are unable to “blow the whistle” on corruption because they are in a 
weaker position with respect to the corrupt, corruption continues unabated for much 
longer. In highly unequal societies, institutional recourse also tends to be biased in favour 
of the powerful, removing another channel of accountability.  
 
In unequal societies corruption plays a particularly pernicious role as it disproportionately 
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affects the poor and marginalized. Since the poor are most dependent on public services, 
corruption within the government sector hits them the hardest. In India, this is evident in 
corruption cases involving the Public Distribution System (PDS) or relief programmes 
meant for those on the edge of survival, but it is also true of publicly provided health care 
and education, the only affordable options for the poor.  
 
This is borne out in my comparison, where Himachal has fewer instances of corruption 
than does Haryana. One area where this is particularly evident is in the performance of 
government schemes. For instance, the Midday Meal scheme in schools, the Integrated 
Child Development Services (ICDS) for health and pre-primary education, scholarship 
schemes for SCs and girls and the public distribution system all function relatively well 
in Himachal but are notoriously defunct in Haryana.  
 
In one instance in Shird Panchayat (from my sample), a Pradhan had apparently allotted 
Public Distribution System (PDS) shops, under the control of the Panchayat, to people of 
his choosing, without going through the Gram Sabha (the appropriate body for such 
decisions). The village got together and filed a case against the Pradhan in court. It was 
finally resolved in an out-of-court settlement where the Pradhan retracted and agreed to 
abide by due process.     
 
The ‘culture of transparency’ mentioned earlier is evident in the functioning of the 
Panchayats. Almost universally I was told that Panchayat records, including details of 
schemes, funds received etc., are regularly maintained and available with the Panchayat 
Secretary. On a recent visit to Kangra district (in December, 2007) I was able to verify 
this with respect to the implementation of the government’s most recent flag-ship 
programme the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. In many panchayats the 
records had even been computerized. At any rate they were remarkably up to date and 
complete and most importantly readily available. Gram Panchayat functionaries also 
shared the records without reluctance. All this was in sharp contrast with other states, 
where fudging of NREGA records was common (See the Himachal Pradesh Report). 
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7.6.6 Public Services as a Common Concern 
Social inequality undermines united collective demands for effective public services. As 
privileged sections of the population exit from public facilities in the social sector, the 
voice of users is correspondingly reduced (Hirschman: 1970). This process is 
conspicuous in education. As influential groups exit government schools in favour of 
private options, the accountability of public schools is reduced, leading to further exit on 
the  part of privileged groups. 
 
This is precisely what has happened in Haryana, where increasing privatization has meant 
that government schools are patronized only by the most disadvantaged sections of the 
population who are unable to influence quality as they lack a strong enough voice. The 
available channels of accountability such as the Village Education Committee or Gram 
Panchayat, also tend to be dominated by groups who have no stake in the system. As a 
result, the structural duality that has arisen in the provision of education helps to maintain 
the segmentation of society. In addition, poor quality public schools spawn poor quality 
private schools, negatively impacting the system in general, as has been the case in    
Haryana (CORD, 2002).  
 
In Himachal, on the other hand, everyone has a stake in the government school, as basic 
social equality has prevented a fragmentation of the public schooling system. As a result, 
private options have not appeared to the same extent, at least in most areas. Thus the 
government schools function relatively well and literacy rates for a larger cross-section of 
the population have increased at a faster rate. In fact, as found by the PROBE (1999) 
survey in Himachal, given parity in cost parents prefer to send their children to 
government rather than private schools. The same pattern also applies to other fields such 
as health, where the majority of the population uses public health services. In Himachal 
public services tend to be a common concern, unlike in Haryana where they are the 
concern only of the poorest sections of the population who cannot afford the exit option.  
 
To sum up, what emerges from the above analysis is that elements of capture and 
marginalization exist at varying levels in different areas. Much of this is related to the 
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level of social equality or inequality that foregrounds the functioning of the state. 
Egalitarian social relations are likely to facilitate the constructive role of the state in a 
number of ways. These include a positive influence on policy priorities, wider use of 
democratic space, overcoming the barriers of social distance, enabling public institutions 
to function, fostering public vigilance against corruption and creating a common stake in 
well functioning public services. In Himachal Pradesh, this context of social equality has 
provided the basis for a virtuous circle of complementarity between state and society.   
 
7.7. State Action in Himachal Pradesh 
Having discussed the links between social equality and state action I will now look more 
closely at state action in Himachal Pradesh. To start with, it may be pertinent to say a few 
words about the development of the independent state of Himachal and in particular 
about the role of Parmar, its first Chief Minister, who was instrumental in giving 
direction to the development path adopted by the state. Parmar’s vision which had the 
support of the people established the template for subsequent state action in Himachal 
Pradesh. His contribution to the development trajectory of Himachal is important because 
even while focusing on social development Parmar did not neglect to address the 
practical conditions needed to take the agenda of social development forward. In his 
plans, the development of physical infrastructure was given as much importance as was 
the provision of social services. “Build roads and build schools” was his slogan in the 
initial years of his tenure as Chief Minister. The wisdom of this approach is evident now 
as Himachal Pradesh with a well developed physical as well as human resource base 
stands poised to exploit its economic potential to the full.  
 
In the next part I will focus on two areas of state action (land reforms and provision of 
public services) as specific instances of the constructive role of the state and the 
mutuality of state society relations. Through these examples I will show how state 
intervention was supported by societal response in sustaining state initiatives and 
furthering the cause of societal interests, thus establishing the virtuous circle and bringing 
Himachal closer to achieving the desired development outcomes in line with the 
Constitutional objectives. 
  174
 
7.7.1 Land Reforms  
The history of land reforms is an interesting illustration of the main arguments in this 
chapter as it shows, through the contrast between Himachal and Haryana, how a 
Constitutional priority in the context of egalitarian social forces can be translated into 
public policy and administrative commitment and then successfully implemented, as 
happened in Himachal, while in the presence of a highly fractured social polity it can 
have the opposite result. In Haryana land reforms fell prey to all the pitfalls of state 
capture from the level of policy making to its implementation by public institutions, 
leading to a failure not just of the policy but of the larger Constitutional goal of equality 
and empowerment.    
 
Land reform is a highly contentious issue in the development literature and continues to 
be hotly debated by economists, political scientists and policy analysts. The economic 
arguments tend to revolve around the role of land reforms in poverty alleviation and often 
take conflicting positions. Thus land reforms have been theorized both as a direct 
measure of poverty alleviation (Varshney 1999) and as an indirect measure through the 
inverse relationship between land size and productivity (Binswanger et al., 1993). While 
some (Alesina and Rodrick 1994) cite a negative relationship between re-distribution and 
growth as an argument against widespread land reforms, others (Hoff and Lyon, 1995) 
show a positive relation between the two. In fact there is very little empirical research 
that looks at the impact of land reforms on growth and poverty. One such effort by 
Besley and Burgess (1998) suggests that land reforms that changed the production 
relations in agriculture had a greater impact on poverty reduction, compared to those that 
changed just the pattern of land holdings. In general, arguments in favour of land reforms 
relate ownership of assets to improvements in the terms on which the poor have access to 
all resources, including credit which could help to create a more sustainable exit from 
poverty.  
 
At the time of Independence the land distribution pattern inherited by India was highly 
skewed. According to some estimates 53 per cent of the land was held by 7 per cent of 
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the people while 28 per cent of small and marginal farmers owned only about 6 per cent 
of the land (Ministry of Rural Development, 2001). The history of land relations in India 
went through major transformations in the colonial period especially with the 
introduction of the land tax and the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793. This legislation 
changed the feudal “jajmani” system into the semi-feudal “zamindari” system by 
introducing a class of intermediaries into the agrarian structure.100 Primarily meant to 
facilitate revenue collection for the British, the zamindars in effect destroyed what Scott 
(1976) has called the “moral economy” based on a direct relationship between landowner 
and tenant, and created in its place a powerful interest group loyal to the British. While 
both systems were by no means just, there was a degree of security for the tenant 
provided by the former which disappeared in the latter. The system that was created 
thrived on exploiting the tenants by extracting the maximum possible rent from them, 
leaving no incentive to either, the tenant or the zamindar/ landowner to invest in 
increasing the productivity of land. In addition zamindars shifted their land collection 
duties to more layers of intermediaries creating a multilayered and complex system of 
legal, economic and social relations that acted as a drag on agricultural productivity 
(Thorner and Thorner 1961).101  As a result by 1947, not only was efficiency in 
agriculture very low, the well being of the tenant had also greatly reduced.  
 
The situation in Himachal however was different on account of two sets of 
circumstances. One, being hilly, the size of cultivable landholdings was relatively small – 
often of subsistence size only. In Kullu, for instance the average size as recorded by Lyall 
was only two acres. In fact, according to Singh (1998) smaller land holdings were the 
norm as very few households had the capacity to manage large holdings. Lack of access 
to roads and markets made commercialization difficult and since most people worked on 
their own lands, hiring labour was not always easy. Besides, non-agricultural avenues of 
livelihood were also available to people especially in the higher parts of Himachal 
Pradesh. Sheep grazing, for instance, was a viable alternative to agriculture. Thus, land 
ownership did not carry with it the same meaning as it did in the plain areas. Importantly, 
                                                          
100 See Appu (1996) for more on the historical development of  agrarian systems in India 
101 In fact a review of the literature reveals that different types of agrarian relations ranging from peasant 
proprietors to landlord serf prevailed across the country. 
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it was not the basis of class or caste divisions in society.  
 
Two, the arrival of the British system with its emphasis on private property and land tax 
also had a relatively limited impact in Himachal. The system of common access resources 
(including for instance access to pastures and forests) persisted for much longer in 
Himachal, making private ownership a less controversial issue. Besides, the region being 
geographically remote, the British were satisfied to enter into a revenue arrangement with 
the raja without interfering with land relations. A much larger impact was felt by the 
plains part of Punjab, which included the Haryana region, whereas in the hill regions the 
traditional systems continued to exist. According to Singh, the hill systems were akin to 
the ‘manorial’ systems of Britain, and therefore found a degree of acceptability from the 
colonial administration. 
 
Essentially in Himachal, all land was initially owned by the Raja but the peasants had 
hereditary rights of cultivation and paid revenue to him. The hereditary pattern was 
patrilineal and the land reverted back to the raja in the case of inheritance disputes. 
Hereditary rights gave the cultivators a degree of proprietary claim on the land which in 
some parts was forcefully emphasized. A sense of the lack of powerlessness is indicated 
in the references to instances where cultivators staked full ownership and the rajas had to 
accommodate them by granting them status of “inferior proprietors” (Lyall, Singh).  
 
Common land, such as wastelands and forests, were also owned by the Raja, but people 
had the right to use their products freely. The raja routinely made gifts of land to people 
who rendered him services, such as the priests and temples, or those from whom he got 
military or other assistance. In Kullu this followed a system called jeola by which half of 
the land was given free of rent in lieu of the service provided and only the other half was 
taxed. Interestingly, a family with one jeola on providing two people to the military could 
have all of the jeola rent-free, hence imbuing greater ownership rights in people (Chetan 
Singh, 2002). Some of the services provided to the raja, such as providing music at 
festivals, were performed by lower castes (e.g. Dagis in the Kullu region), which meant 
that castes that were not traditionally landowning also acquired land. As noted by Singh 
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(1998), “…gross economic inequalities based primarily upon caste and landholdings 
were not very apparent” (: 217)102.  
 
Hence, terrain and the land management system of the hills both contributed to a fairly 
egalitarian pattern of land use in Himachal. As a result, land ownership based disparities 
did not give rise to the landed aristocracy characteristic of feudal societies in the rest of 
north India. Instead it created a structure where cultivable landholdings, though small, 
were more widely distributed across the population, while many people also enjoyed the 
use of common access resources. To quote Anon (2001): “ the region was relatively free 
from the ills of an institutional framework marked by separation of ownership of land 
from its cultivation. This appears to have been one of the redeeming features of the 
institutional framework existing prior to the formation of Himachal Pradesh” (:8). 
 
In the post-Independence period, land reform in India was seen as imperative to the 
national objective of poverty alleviation, not only because it was linked to all 
development issues, but also because it represented a social structure, much in need of 
reform. Besides, theoretical arguments, relating to the inverse relationship between land 
size and productivity, also favoured land reforms at that time. Counter arguments citing 
the inverse relationship between equity and growth did surface, but the social justice 
framework of the Constitution won the day, at least in informing the rhetoric of national 
policy. Consequently, land reform has been an important part of all development plans 
and is seen essentially as a re-distributive measure to improve the asset base of the poor.  
 
Despite wide variations across states, land reforms in India can be clubbed into the 
following four categories: a) Abolition of Intermediaries; b) Tenancy Reforms; c) 
Imposition of Land Ceilings; and d) Consolidation of Land (Mearns 1998). Taken 
together these constituted, according to Thorner (1976), the largest body of land reform 
legislation for any country in so short a time. 
 
                                                          
102 There is some similarity here with Maharashtra, where the Mahars (an untouchable caste) who 
performed various hereditary duties for the village headman were often given small allotments of land for 
services provided.   
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States were given a great deal of autonomy in enacting land reform legislation. This 
resulted in variations across states not just in the laws but also in the results. In the 
absence of a uniform set of central guidelines states set different limits for land ceilings 
and different sets of exemptions from these ceilings. Some (like Karnataka) banned 
tenancy, whereas others (like Punjab) did not.  As a result, each of these measures has 
met with a different fate over the last 60 years. On the whole the abolition of 
intermediaries has been the most successful. Tenancy reform, which differed the most 
across states, has had mixed results. In general in states where the land owners were a 
significant lobby in state politics, land reforms were largely blocked (Punjab and 
Haryana) and in states which had greater political mobilization of peasants (Kerala) better 
results were achieved. Land ceiling has been the least successful of all the measures with 
large scale evasion in different forms across states. Consolidation of land has also been 
fairly unsuccessful largely due to the absence of well maintained land records.103 
  
Like elsewhere, land reform was a major part of the development strategy adopted by 
Himachal Pradesh, after it became an independent state in 1971. However, unlike many 
states, such as Punjab and Haryana, which focused on productivity enhancement rather 
than equitable distribution of land, Himachal considered redistribution as the first and 
most vital step in the direction of agrarian change. This was one aspect of the general 
orientation of state policy toward equitable development, and is reflected in the fact that 
the main thrust of the reforms was to ensure that all households had some land. Hence 
land that belonged to the Raja or to temples was acquired and re-distributed to the 
landless (largely Dalit households) and Tenancy Reforms ensured that tenants got 
ownership rights over the land they worked on. During my filed work I was regularly 
reminded about the land allocated to Dalit households by the government. The most 
common perception appears to be that all Dalit households got 5 bhighas of land around 
the mid-1970s. In fact, The Land Ceiling Act of 1972 was among the first pieces of 
important legislation passed by the Himachal state government after becoming a separate 
state. This legislation differed from those adopted by Punjab (Haryana) in significant 
ways. For instance, it did not allow for exemptions to land ceilings as in Punjab. Thus, 
                                                          
103 For more on success / failure of land reforms see Sinha & Pushpendra, Gill et al, and RS Deshpande. 
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size of holdings and productivity considerations were not allowed to override 
distributional concern. Even households that were not traditionally agriculture based, 
such as artisans, received some land. Further, sale of land to non-agriculturalists and for 
non-agricultural purposes was prohibited. In this way, Himachal was able to greatly 
reduce its asset-less population. In fact it has the lowest proportion of asset-poor 
households of all the major Indian states.104  
 
In Haryana, by contrast, land reforms did not have the same support and powerful lobbies 
against it found a sympathetic ear within government. This lack of political will is 
reflected in the fact that the legislation adopted in Haryana left several loopholes that 
could be exploited by big landlords to evade the legislation (see Manjit Singh, 1992)105. 
For instance, the big landowners argued that land reforms would result in inefficient size 
of landholdings negatively affecting agricultural productivity. The small size of holdings 
would not be conducive to modern agriculture and hence the development sought in 
agriculture would not be forthcoming. Consequently, the land reform legislature allowed 
for holdings above the ceiling limits if they could be shown to be economically more 
productive, opening the way for large-scale evasion. As shown by Singh (1992), in 
complicity with the village patwari, the executive engineer and the sub-divisional 
magistrate, land was routinely undervalued by the big landlords in order to go beyond the 
prescribed limit. Another loophole in the Act related to the provision that every adult 
member of a household would be considered independently for land ownership. Thus 
under-aged children with fake certificates and even unborn children and dead persons 
were registered as independent family members to allow larger amounts of land to be 
retained by the family. Further, since the portion of land made surplus was at the 
discretion of the landowner it was usually the least cultivable land that was given up, 
often forcing the beneficiaries to abandon it in favour of the landlord, frustrating the 
objective of the land reform legislation. Other techniques used to resume land were 
leaving no access to allotted land and cutting off the water supply at critical stages, 
compelling the allottee to give up and leave. In addition, several complexities in the law 
                                                          
104 See NFHS data presented in Drèze and Sen 2002, Table A.3. 
105 Manjit Sigh (1992).  
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made it possible for landowners to postpone transferring the land and let the matter 
remain sub-judice for years, effectively getting away with non-compliance of ceiling 
laws.106  
 
Among the states in India, Jammu & Kashmir ranks at the top with 98.7 per cent of total 
surplus land in the state distributed, while Haryana is at the bottom with 28.6 per cent of 
total surplus land distributed (National Commission on Agriculture 1976:119). The fact 
that seventy per cent of surplus land has not yet been transferred is evidence of the 
resistance to land reforms in Haryana (see Manocha et al., 1988).107  
 
The process of polarization in Haryana was accentuated by the green revolution and the 
application of new agricultural techniques, using expensive machines, fertilizers and 
pesticides biased in favour of large farms. This is evident from the increase in the 
proportion of small and marginal landholdings as more and more land was resumed by 
large landholders or tenants were evicted. In Haryana in 1980-81 the number of holdings 
of 2 hectares and below was 51.4 per cent (up from 43.6 per cent in 1970-71) but 
accounted for only 21 per cent of the cultivable area (up from 11 per cent in 1970-71)108. 
The proportion of agricultural labourers also increased as marginal landholders unable to 
afford the new technology sold their land and joined the ranks of agricultural labourers. 
In Haryana they accounted for 23 per cent of the work force in 1981 and in Himachal 1 
per cent (lowest of all states), while the national average was 16 per cent. As Bhalla 
concluded from an extensive study of changes in landholding in Haryana: 
 
Clearly inequality in the distribution of land not only remained but was 
perhaps sharpened. By 1976-77 this inequality was glaringly noticeable: 31 
per cent of operational landholdings in Haryana fell below one hectare; 40 
percent below one to four hectares and together they comprised only 25 per 
                                                          
106 In a study of land reforms in Haryana, Manjit Singh (1992) conducted in depth interviews with the Bar 
Association in Hissar to understand the manner in which stratagems were devised to circumvent The Land 
Ceilings Act (1972). Hissar is one of the districts where large-scale evasion of Land Ceiling Act was 
enacted. 
107 Manocha et al., (1988) note the increasing inequality in landholding in most districts of the state. 
108 Shiela, Bhalla (1993). 
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cent of the total cultivated land in the state. (Bhalla quoted in Chowdhry, 
2004) 
 
The data on land distribution from my fieldwork sheds further light on this contrast.  
 
Table 7.2: Land ownership in Himachal and Haryana 
 Kullu (Himachal) Faridabad (Haryana) 
 SC Others SC Others 
Percentage of Landed 
Households 
70 66 18 67 
Source: Author’s field survey. 
 
Apart from landholdings being spread equally across castes, Himachal has greater 
equality in terms of landholding size as well. Sixty five per cent of households in my 
sample had medium to small landholdings (less than 4 acres) as opposed to 45 per cent in 
Haryana (see also Table 6.10 in Chapter 6).  
 
This relative economic equality is crucial to social and economic cohesion, as it means 
that resources and power are not concentrated in a few hands and a larger section of 
society shares common interests. Further, it has led to the complementarity that exists 
between the state and society in Himachal. State action in the form of laws and 
commitment to enforce the laws coupled with cooperation (or lack of opposition) from 
society has allowed a virtuous circle to develop in the implementation of land reforms.  
 
7.7.2 Provision of Public Services  
As seen above, Parmar’s vision which had wide acceptability among the people focused 
on provision of public services from physical infrastructure to social services such as 
health and education. From the beginning of its formation as a separate state, Himachal 
has given priority to the development of physical infrastructure  − roads and bridges, 
public transport, communications, and so on. Realizing that its hill territory would make 
these absolutely essential to any development effort, the required priority was accorded to 
these early on in the development plans of the state. As a result, today Himachal has 
among the highest road meterage per unit of territory of any state in India − not a small 
achievement given the tough mountainous terrain it has had to negotiate (NCAER North 
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India Development Report, 2003). A motorable road could access all the villages but one 
in my sample, and even there a road was under construction.109  
 
As the next table illustrates, the general physical infrastructure in Himachal Pradesh is as 
good as that in Haryana in spite of the adverse terrain and scattered settlement pattern. In 
fact, in some respects it is even better than in Haryana. For instance, while both Himachal 
and Haryana have achieved 100 per cent electrification of villages, in Himachal it is also 
the case that almost every household (97 per cent to be precise) has an electricity 
connection.  
 
Table 7.3: Physical Infrastructure in Himachal Pradesh and Haryana 
 
 Himachal Pradesh Haryana 
Area (km2) 55673 44212 
Population (millions) 6.08 21.15 
SDP (2002-03 RE in Rs billion) 180 730 
Per capita SDP (Rs) 29605 34515 
Total roads (km) 29337 28871 
% non-highways surfaced 79 76 
% villages electrified 99.4 100 
% households with electricity  97 89 
No of post offices 2777 2650 
Population served per post office 2161 7925 
No. of panchayat offices 3124 6167 
Population served per office 1900 3300 
Source: Statistical Abstract India 2003, NFHS-II and Census of India 2001. 
RE: revised estimates (see below). 
 
Telecommunication facilities in Himachal are also highly developed. The government’s 
investment in rural infrastructure − roads, bridges, electricity and even 
telecommunications − has undoubtedly promoted economic development through easier 
access to markets and job opportunities. With land in relatively short supply and 
opportunities for industrial development limited or as yet unexplored, access to the 
                                                          
109 Contrast this with Uttaranchal, where also I did some fieldwork, but where none of the villages could be 
reached by road. Correspondingly no public transport existed either. 
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outside world has been important for livelihood purposes. This investment has also made 
access to education and health facilities as well as other government facilities, including 
block and district offices, easier. This is beginning to pay off in terms of attracting 
industrial capital, as investors see the advantages of setting up factories in Himachal with 
its relatively good infrastructure, not to mention its literate workforce. This is likely to 
give the economy a much-needed boost in the near future, also making it easier to sustain 
the high levels of spending in the social sector. 
 
Provision of public services, especially education, has put Himachal Pradesh in a 
category by itself. The priority given to education, as part of the state’s strategy towards 
the elimination of poverty, is evident in the level of public expenditure on education as 
well as the scale of physical facilities provided. The contrast with Haryana brings out the 
commitment of the state in the provision of these services.    
 
As the Tables below indicate, per capita spending on education and health in Himachal is 
amongst the highest in the country and certainly much higher than in Haryana. In 
education it has consistently been about twice as high in Himachal than in Haryana. In 
health, in fact the gap is even larger, with per capita public spending in 2000-01more than 
three times higher in Himachal. This is partly because the Himachal government spends a 
larger part of its funds on the social sectors than Haryana, and partly because the share of 
public spending in the state domestic product is higher in Himachal than in Haryana.110 
                                                          
110 Relatively high levels of central assistance have facilitated the high levels of public spending in 
Himachal. We shall return to this in the concluding chapter. 
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Table 7.4: Public Spending on Education 
 1980-81 1990-91 2000-01 
Haryana 
   
% total expenditure 17.9 16.8 18.5 
Per capita expenditure (Rs) 55 197 629 
Himachal 
   
% total expenditure 23.5 20.6 20.1 
Per capita expenditure (Rs) 103 359 1447 
Source: RBI 2004, RBI Bulletins, and NCAER (2003). 
 
Table 7.5: Public Spending on Health 
 1980-81 1990-91 2000-01 
Haryana 
   
% total expenditure 9.2 4.2 3.6 
Per capita expenditure (Rs) 28 50 121 
Himachal 
   
% total expenditure 12.8 7.8 5.3 
Per capita expenditure (Rs) 56 137 380 
Source: RBI 2004, RBI Bulletins, and NCAER (2004). 
 
The financial commitment to the social sectors in Himachal Pradesh is reflected in the 
provision of physical facilities, as the Table 7.6 illustrates. For instance, the population 
served per primary school is only 659 in Himachal compared with 2072 in Haryana. A 
similar contrast applies to health facilities. It is also interesting to note the relative 
emphasis given to different types of facilities within each sector in Himachal Pradesh and 
Haryana. The ratio of primary schools to high schools is about 6:1 in Himachal compared 
to only 3:1 in Haryana. Similarly the ratio of nurses to doctors is more than 1:1 in 
Himachal but only 0.23:1 in Haryana. In short, the provision of public facilities in 
Haryana appears to be more elitist than in Himachal Pradesh.  
 
Further scrutiny of staffing patterns in schools and health centres reinforces this point. 
For instance, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare requires four specialist doctors 
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for every Community Health Centre (CHC). This translates into a requirement of 256 
specialist doctors for Haryana and 260 for Himachal. While Himachal had appointed 108 
of its required 260 specialist doctors by 2000, in Haryana only 25 of its required 326 
were in place. Thus while a patient in a CHC in Haryana has little hope of seeing anyone 
but a general practitioner, in Himachal he/she often has the opportunity to see a surgeon, 
a paediatrician or a gynaecologist. 
  
Table 7.6: Education and Health Facilities 
  
Himachal 
 
Haryana 
 
 
Number of 
Schools 
Population 
per unit of 
facility 
Number of 
Schools 
Population 
per unit of 
facility 
SCHOOL 
FACILITIES 
    
Primary School 9102 659 10134 2072 
Middle School 1173 5115 1718 12223 
High School 1631 3679 3624 5795 
HEALTH 
FACILITIES 
    
Primary Health 
Centres 
302 19868 401 52369 
Community Health 
Centres 
65 92308 64 328125 
Hospitals 89 67416 79 265823 
Nurses/midwives 351 17094 213 98592 
Doctors 326 18405 935 22460 
Source: Calculated from Statistical Abstract 2003 and Census of India 2001. 
 
In the context of high financial commitment to the social sector, it may be useful to look 
at what is happening to budgetary deficits in both Himachal and Haryana. Indian states 
have been under pressure to reduce their deficits and improve budgetary indicators. In the 
revised estimates (RE) for 2003-04, the GFD (gross financial deficit): GSDP (gross state 
domestic product) ratio for Haryana stands at 1.8 per cent. This is the lowest for all 
Indian states with the exception of Jammu & Kashmir, which shows a surplus. But 
Haryana is also among the few states that have reduced social sector expenditure (SSE) 
outlays as a ratio to GSDP. In the same Revised Estimates, the SSE:GSDP ratio in 
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Haryana has fallen from an average of 5.5 per cent to 4.20 per cent. Himachal, on the 
other hand has increased its SSE:GSDP ratio from 13.3 per cent to 15.3 per cent for the 
same period. 
 
The social sector tends to be the first to suffer in the interest of fiscal management, and 
Haryana is no exception. Table 7.7 is revealing in this regard, as it shows that Himachal 
has maintained its commitment to the social sectors even in the face of a rising fiscal 
deficit. Many critics of Himachal’s approach to development have raised the question of 
whether such a deficit is sustainable and its implications for the economy as a whole. I 
return to this in the last chapter, but suffice it to say here that the long-term gains from 
Himachal’s emphasis on the social sector are likely to outweigh the current financial 
stress. The speed, with which industrial capital is being attracted to Himachal today, 
precisely because of its high level of physical and human infrastructure, is one indication 
of these potential long-term gains. Contrast this with the law and order problems 
surfacing in many parts of Haryana, where growing inequalities are leading to discontent 
manifesting itself on the streets. This will no doubt affect the carefully constructed 
investment climate in the state and raises important questions about the sustainability of 
Haryana’s elitist approach to economic development. At the same time Himachal’s 
economic success also raises questions of sustainability for Himachal’s virtuous circle 
(see Chapter 9). 
 
Table 7.7: Budget Deficits 
(average for 2000-03) 
 Himachal Haryana 
GFD – GSDP ratio 12.8 3.6 
Development expenditure (Rs crores) 3831.4 6146.5 
% of GSDP 23.4 10.3 
Social sector expenditure 2177.7 3282.1 
% of GSDP 13.3 5.5 
Source: State Finances: A Study of Budgets (RBI, 2004). 
Social sector expenditure includes social services, rural development, food storage and 
warehousing. 
 
 
While it has been acknowledged by several, such as Datt and Ravallion (1998) and 
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Abhijit Sen (1996), that development expenditures are a significant determinant of 
poverty reduction, the structural determinants of public expenditure remain unexplored. 
In the context of Himachal Pradesh and Haryana, the question arises: what accounts for 
the high commitment to public spending in the social sectors in Himachal and the lack of 
it in Haryana? It has been suggested that the answer lies in the level of Central assistance 
provided to Himachal under the special category of Hill Areas Development Fund. In 
other words that Himachal is able to meet the high levels of public expenditure because it 
is subsidized by the Central government. However such an interpretation still begs the 
question: why the social sector? Himachal could choose to use the central assistance to 
fund other sectors of the economy instead. Besides, even with central government 
assistance Himachal is not ahead of Haryana in terms of the financial resources available 
to it. The more crucial question is thus of choice, not of capacity. What does the state 
choose to do, or not do, and why?  
 
In keeping with the main argument in this thesis the answer lies in the structural 
determinants of overall public policy of which public expenditure is a part. As Jayal 
(2001) has argued, a large part of what the state does not do reflects its ability to ignore 
the demands of the marginalized groups who have no effective voice. This point is 
relevant in interpreting the elitist character of public policy in Haryana, where large-farm 
based agriculture has been subsidized at the cost of greater spending on education and 
health that would benefit marginalized groups. In the case of Himachal, on the other 
hand, the egalitarian nature of society (and linked to that the relatively participatory 
character of democratic politics) has given a more progressive orientation to public policy 
that helps to account for the sustained focus on social sectors. 111 
 
The state’s commitment to provision of public services also reinforces the point about 
social equality facilitating state action in the interest of a wider section of society and 
thus building a virtuous circle between state and society. We saw this in the case of land 
                                                          
111 Further, as argued by Keefer and Khemani (2004), “if in the early years of electoral competition, a 
political class emerges that is able to make credible promises about providing broad public goods, then that 
will shape the nature of political competition in the years following, leading to greater resource allocation 
to public goods” (:938). The case of Himachal with Parmar’s early influence on social development and 
subsequent state commitment appears to bear this out. 
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reforms where a policy initiative was supported by social consensus in favour of it 
allowing the reforms to be carried through successfully without attempts at derailment. A 
similar consensus has been achieved with regard to the public provision of education 
where a corresponding response from all sections of society (low gender and caste gaps) 
in terms of high levels of school participation has helped sustain the virtuous circle. In the 
case of education, the lack of social distance between the education bureaucracy and the 
pupils (and parents) has added to the virtuous circle in the classroom and in the village as 
children from across communities have greater social access to school and learning and 
so do their parents allowing them to engage with the system in a more meaningful 
manner through participation in PTAs and VECs. In both cases, state action reflects the 
interests of wider section of society indicating social cohesiveness and equality and the 
corresponding social response is also likewise a reflection of greater social equality.  
 
I shall discuss the education sector in greater detail in the Chapter 8 but suffice it to say 
here that the resources poured into public education have yielded a corresponding impact 
in terms of schooling and educational outcomes in Himachal. This indication of good 
public service delivery is in fact a manifestation of all the links between state action and 
social equality, listed in Section 4.6 above.    
 
7.8. Conclusion 
Himachal’s experience of constructive state action makes particularly interesting reading 
in the light of recent debates about the role of the state in development. Confidence in the 
“developmental state” tends to be very low today, and the visions of state-led 
development shared (with some differences) by Ambedkar, Nehru, Parmar and many 
other thinkers of the early days of independence, are now widely considered to have been 
mis-guided. Contrary to this view, Himachal presents a remarkable case of a relatively 
successful developmental state particularly (but not only) in the field of social 
development. In that sense, it is an experience of great significance even though it applies 
to a relatively small area and population. Much like Kerala, Costa Rica and other states or 
countries that have received considerable attention in the developmental literature, in 
spite of their small size, Himachal also deserves to be watched with keen interest.  
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In this respect, Himachal like Kerala looks like something of an “anomaly” among Indian 
states. The general pattern elsewhere and particularly in North India has been 
characterized by ineffective governance and elitist policies. The analysis presented in this 
chapter suggests that the root of this contrast lies in Himachal’s distinct social structure 
marked by relatively low disparities of class, caste and gender. This has facilitated 
constructive state-society relations in a wide range of domains – elementary education, 
land reforms, health care, economic infrastructure among others. Not only does 
Himachal’s experience highlights the continued relevance of state action in development 
it also restores social equality as one of the crucial enabling factors that facilitate and 
reinforce the developmental role of the state.   
  190
Chapter Eight 
Himachal’s ‘Schooling Revolution’ 
 
8.1. Introduction112 
An abiding sight in the Himachal countryside is school children of all ages, girls and 
boys, walking on their way to or from school. Even a casual visitor cannot fail to notice 
the educational activity, especially deep in the mountains where one does not expect to 
find anything - and yet there are schools, and schools that function. Often housed in 
frugal buildings with few facilities, the earnestness with which teaching and learning 
appears to be taking place in these schools is inspiring. Torn mats and broken 
blackboards do not affect the order within the classroom and the efforts of both teachers 
and pupils to grapple with the contents of their textbooks. While the schooling system is 
far from perfect, it is nonetheless striking to find that the teachers have not abandoned 
their posts and generally come to school on time to engage in classroom activities, and 
that the children are seated in orderly fashion with books or slates in hand struggling to 
learn. 
 
The contrast with the state education system in Haryana could not be sharper. There the 
buildings are often larger and less dilapidated, but the teachers, if in school, are rarely 
found in the classrooms, let alone teaching. Instead they typically sit outside chatting 
while the pupils are left to their own devices or copy from the blackboard in dark, 
windowless rooms.  
 
The first post-Independence census, in 1951, showed Himachal’s literacy rate to be 19 
per cent, practically at the bottom of the rung. By 2001 it had gone up to 77 per cent; with 
male literacy at 86 per cent and female at 68 per cent, it was third from the top. Literacy 
rates for the 15-19 years age group are 95 per cent for females and 97 per cent for males, 
second only to Kerala, where the corresponding figures are 98 and 99 per cent 
                                                          
112 This chapter builds on earlier work that I did in collaboration with the PROBE Team, and consolidates 
and extends the findings of the PROBE survey (PROBE 1999) based on my subsequent field work in 
Himachal and Haryana, as well as on recent secondary data such as the 2001 Census and NFHS-II (1998-
99).  
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respectively. And, school attendance rates in the 6-12 years age group are the highest of 
all states in the country. The spread of literacy and elementary education in Himachal 
since independence has been so rapid that it has been called a ‘schooling revolution’ 
(PROBE, 1999). 
 
In Haryana, educational achievements are much lower. For instance, in the 6-12 years age 
group in Haryana 11 per cent of girls are out of school, compared to 1 per cent in 
Himachal Pradesh. The distribution of educational achievements in terms of gender and 
caste is also an impressive aspect of schooling in Himachal (see Table 8.1). In the 7-15  
years age group not only are the aggregate levels of literacy very high, but the gender gap 
and caste disadvantage have also been greatly reduced.  
 
Table 8.1: Literacy Rates in Himachal and Haryana, 2001 (%) 
 Himachal Haryana 
All persons Male Female All persons Male Female 
Total population:       
All ages 77 85 67 68 79 56 
7-15 years 95 96 94 86 88 83 
16-19 years 94 96 92 86 90 81 
SC only:       
All ages 70 80 60 56 67 42 
7-15 years 94 95 92 79 82 76 
16-19 years 92 95 89 77 83 69 
Source: Census of India 2001. 
 
In this chapter I review the evidence on schooling to understand the differences between 
the education sectors of the two states. I use data from my own fieldwork in Himachal 
and Haryana and field observations from the PROBE (1999) survey, which reinforce 
each other. PROBE, or Public Report on Basic Education, is based on a survey of rural 
schooling facilities in five north Indian states - Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, 
Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar, in which I participated. Through this survey I got 
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an opportunity to look not just at Himachal but other north Indian states as well.113 The 
PROBE (1999) school survey is complemented by a household survey, which assesses 
parental attitudes to schooling.  
 
The aim of this chapter is not only to describe the schooling environment and 
education records of Himachal Pradesh and Haryana, but to also illustrate the links 
between social equality, state action and human development (discussed earlier in this 
thesis) with reference to education. The education sector is a particularly clear 
example of the virtuous circle between social equality and collaborative state action, 
evident in the interaction between teachers and parents, teachers and students as well 
as between other levels of the state education bureaucracy and society. This positive 
interaction is a unique feature of Himachal Pradesh and has played an important part 
in its education transformation. The contrast with Haryana is particularly relevant 
because Himachal’s schooling revolution was driven by state initiative, while in 
Haryana the private sector has a large presence. In fact, of all states in India, Haryana 
has the highest proportion (48.5 per cent) of primary school pupils enrolled in private 
schools (Aggarwal 2000).  
 
8.2. Education as a ‘Governance’ Issue: A critique 
The challenge of providing adequate public services, including education, has in 
recent years drawn the attention of policy makers and other development practitioners 
towards various issues of service provision. Perhaps the most widely debated issue 
relates to implementation failures in public service delivery. While inadequate 
resources are also recognized as part of the bottleneck, the problem is not limited to 
the insufficiency of funds. Implementation issues are cited as an even larger part of 
the problems plaguing the delivery of good quality public services. These problems 
include a range of institutional and social issues, such as lack of effective 
accountability systems, absence of standards, absenteeism of staff, lack of 
                                                          
113 I was personally involved in the PROBE study including the field survey, some of the earlier pilot 
surveys and some of the background research. 
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decentralization, community engagement etc.  
 
While it cannot be denied that implementation procedures do require improvement 
such as better transparency and accountability measures, focussing largely on 
institutional mechanisms of delivery fails to address the deeper social issues that act 
as a major constraint in the provision of education. For instance, community 
ownership which is often suggested as a means to increase accountability and citizen 
engagement unfortunately does not address the fact that communities are highly 
fragmented. Even the basic question as to who constitutes the ‘community’ is not 
always addressed. Joshi (2004) suggests institutionalising ‘user groups’ by way of 
bringing the relevant community members together into an effective organizational 
form, but her analysis neglects the fact that very often the users of essential social 
services consist mainly of the poorest and most marginalized sections of the 
population, who have little or no voice, thus making these groups quite ineffective. In 
the education sector, many different types of groups have been created over the 
decades, ranging from Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) to Village Education 
Committees (VECs), Mother-Teacher Associations (MTAs) and School Management 
Development Management Committees (SDMCs), but most of them have all 
floundered on the same set of problems – the fragmentation of the ‘community’ and 
the structural powerlessness of the users vis-à-vis the ‘providers’. Each time the 
ineffectiveness of one association emerges, another parallel one is constituted which 
suffers the same fate in due course.  
 
The Constitution, especially the 73rd Amendment, gives many powers to local 
governments, and also explicitly encourages the participation of women and members 
of the Scheduled Castes by reserving places for them within the Panchayats. But as 
we saw in the case of Haryana, the reality is that disadvantaged groups are still unable 
to take advantage of these institutional provisions. Other prescriptions like public 
action (Banerjee et al., 2006) too fail to address the issue of social inequalities in 
building up a critical momentum of public action and scaling it up to the desired 
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levels. Keefer and Khemani (2004) highlight the importance of political pressure to 
improve public services, but do not provide any analysis of why the poor are unable 
to organize themselves to demand better public services. The World Development 
Report (2004) dedicated to the issue of providing public services to the poor, 
highlights a similar range of issues.114 
  
With the recognition of implementation as a problem has also come a range of 
prescriptions largely under the catch-all of ‘good governance’, which is increasingly 
being cited as the mantra for solving the problems of public service provision. The 
literature around this term has emanated mostly from major international donors, 
especially the World Bank, and acquired a fair deal of currency in academic and 
policy circles (see World Development Report, 2004). In many instances, the donors 
have also made attempts to link aid to reforms that ensure good governance as they 
understand it. While there is no satisfactory definition of good governance, a common 
perception among these organizations (based on the World Bank’s framework) is that 
it includes the following eight major ‘characteristics’: (1)  participation, (2) rule of 
law, (3) transparency, (4) responsiveness, (5) consensus-oriented, (6) equity and 
inclusiveness, (7) effectiveness and efficiency and (8) accountability. 115  
 
On the face of it these sound like reasonable indicators of ‘good governance’, but to 
say that governance is poor because ‘effectiveness’ or ‘accountability’ are lacking 
does not go much beyond restating the problem, and begs the question as to why 
effectiveness or accountability are lacking in the first place. Addressing that question 
requires looking at the complexities of the social context within which public services 
are provided. For instance, women’s participation may well be a desired goal from 
the point of view of better governance, but many social and cultural constraints 
inhibit the active participation of women in public institutions, as discussed in 
                                                          
114  Joshi (2004), Keefer and Khemani (2004), Banerjee, and Somanathan (2001).  
115 Das et.al (2003),  Anderson et.al. (2003), Banerjee et.al (2003), Bardhan, Pranab (2002), Manor, James 
(2002), Pritchett, Lant. H. (2002), Rajkumar Andrew Sunil and Vinay Swaroop (2002), Glewwe, et.al. 
(2000), Kremer, Micheal (2000), among others. 
  195
Chapter 5. Without enquiring into these features of the social context, and how they 
can be changed, invoking ‘women’s participation’ does not go very far. Similar 
remarks apply to other features of good governance such as rule of law, transparency 
provisions, and even equity. As discussed in Chapter 7, the same legal and 
institutional structures work very differently in different parts of India, depending on 
the social context. This can also be seen in the field of education. For instance, while 
institutions aimed at fostering community participation in the schooling system, such 
as PTAs and VECs, have been rather ineffective in general, they do work in some 
circumstances. As discussed below, well functioning community based associations 
are an important aspect of Himachal Pradesh’s experience. 
 
The literature on ‘good governance’ is, in a sense, too broad as well as too narrow. 
The canvas seems all-encompassing (including as it does transparency, 
accountability, participation, equity, efficiency, and so on), but the perspective it 
brings to this broad-ranging set of issues is ultimately quite narrow. This also shows 
in the prescriptions that emerge from this line of analysis. These often boil down to a 
few keywords such as ‘choice’ and ‘incentives’ – leading, in turn, quite quickly to 
advocating greater private participation in the provision of social services and 
reduced responsibilities for the state. The effectiveness of these alleged solutions 
looks quite different when they are seen from a broader perspective, which also pays 
attention to the social context of institutional reforms. For instance, if social 
fragmentation plays an important role in undermining good governance, as argued in 
this thesis, then institutional reforms (such as privatization) that exacerbate social 
divisions may not work as well as they might be expected to work from a perspective 
that focuses only on individual “incentives”.116 We shall return to this with reference 
to the growing privatization of elementary education in India. 
 
                                                          
116 Much of the recent research on delivery of public services (including education) has highlighted high 
levels of absenteeism of service providers (teachers) and correspondingly a better structure of “incentives” 
as the solution. See Muralidharan et.al. (2006), Chaudhry et.al. (2006), Bardhan (2002), and other work 
done at the Poverty Action Lab, MIT and the World Bank.     
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Another aspect of the narrowness of the governance approach is that it neglects the 
rights approach to the provision of public services.117 In this approach the basic issue 
is the marginalization of the disadvantaged groups whether it is in terms of financial 
allocations or policy priorities or political attention. Acknowledging their rights and 
putting in place legal safeguards for these rights is a means of enabling them to 
overcome their marginalization. In the context of education, this approach would shift 
the focus from greater ‘choice’ for parents to the state’s acceptance of its 
responsibility for effective provision of schooling facilities under a Right to 
Education Act.118 These issues are beyond the governance framework. In fact, many 
other problems plaguing the education sector in India, relate to lack of government 
commitment to universal provision of essential social services. Instead, there is an 
increasing tendency to abdicate responsibility to non-state providers. It is now fairly 
well-acknowledged that it is the ‘hardest to reach’ children residing in remote areas or 
belonging to marginalized communities who remain out of reach of education 
services (UNICEF, 2006)119. It is the state that will need to intensify efforts to bring 
these groups into the fold of education. Similarly poor learning outcomes that are 
being highlighted also require more than incentivizing teacher performance as 
suggested by the proponents of good governance.120 
 
8.3. Primary Schooling in Himachal and Haryana 
 
Education campaigns in the 1980s and 1990s such as the Total Literacy Campaign have 
helped to increase awareness not only of the importance of schooling but also of the 
relevance of quality. Conventional wisdom has regarded poverty as one of the main 
determinants of schooling. In fact the most widely held belief regarding India's poor 
                                                          
117 The World Bank literature, for instance, makes no reference to the debates around the Right to 
Education Bill and the Constitutional amendment that makes education a fundamental right in India.  
118 For more on the issue of “choice” and the role of conditional cash transfers see, Rawlings and Rubio 
(2005). For a critique of this view see, Ravallion, Martin (2003), Britto (2005). 
119 UNICEF ?? 
120 Poor learning outcomes are currently at the fore front of discussions on education in India. But, much of 
this discussion is dominated by the role of performance incentives to teachers, which is cited as a major 
reason for poor learning outcomes by students. However, some randomized experiments in Andhra Pradesh 
have however shown that increasing incentives did not reduce teacher absenteeism (Muralidharan, et al. 
2006). Nevertheless the call for supply side incentives continues unabated. A larger debate and more 
research are clearly called for.        
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educational status relates the demand for education to the poor economic status of 
parents. It is commonly accepted, particularly in official circles that poor people cannot 
afford to send their children to school. The main explanation offered for this is that the 
opportunity cost of sending them to school is high, as children make valuable 
contributions to the household economy. Hence sending them to school instead of using 
them as household help or wage earners is not an economically feasible option. In 
addition, the direct costs of education such as books, stationery and uniforms put 
schooling practically out of reach for the poor. Higher per capita incomes are therefore 
seen as the best means of reducing the dependence of poor families on children as 
economic assets, freeing them to attend school.  
 
However, there is now a wealth of literature showing that the relationship between 
economic prosperity and education is far from rigid.121 What this literature suggests is 
that while opportunity costs themselves are not a stumbling block to educational 
achievement in conjunction with the direct costs of schooling, they can be a source of 
discouragement, in particular for girls and lower caste children for whom the poverty 
constraint is most binding; and that low quality schooling can play a more decisive role, 
than poverty per se, in schooling decisions.  
 
The comparison of Himachal with Haryana provides evidence of the fact that economic 
factors alone do not account for the differences in educational performance, as 
Himachal’s per capita income is below Haryana’s, which today is the highest for all 
states in India. Yet enrolment rates and education outcomes are better in Himachal.  
 
This is not to deny that poverty or low income often play a role in low schooling 
levels. In general, poorer countries or poorer sections of a population are more likely 
to have poorer educational records. However, many factors other than the purely 
economic are also at work. The poverty constraint can be alleviated or defeated by 
appropriate intervention, most notably by improving the reach and quality of basic 
                                                          
121 For a detailed analysis of the impact of economic constraints on educational deprivation, based on field 
surveys, see Bhatty (1998). 
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education. In particular, as Himachal’s experience shows, much can be done by the 
state both to reduce the private costs of schooling, for instance by providing 
incentives for school meals, scholarships and books, and to improve the quality of 
schooling and hence make it possible for marginalised sections of society to attend. 
 
The quality of a school depends upon a variety of factors, including the physical 
infrastructure, the motivation of the teaching staff and the work culture in the schooling 
system. While there may be disagreement on the relative importance of these and related 
factors, it cannot be denied that certain minimum standards have to be met in order to 
create an acceptable environment in which learning can take place. Thus, every school 
should have a pucca building that does not leak in the monsoons, separate classrooms for 
separate grades, sufficient light and air inside the classrooms, a teacher for each grade, 
usable toilet facilities, safe drinking water, and basic teaching aids such as a blackboard, 
chalk and reading and writing material in usable form. Equally importantly, minimum 
teaching standards include the regular presence of teachers in classrooms during teaching 
hours and a minimum achievement level of the pupils, at the least. Sadly, there is 
overwhelming evidence that only a small proportion of schools in India meet these very 
basic requirements. In the following section I examine some of these aspects of quality in 
relation to the evidence from state schools in Himachal and Haryana.  
 
8.3.1 Physical Infrastructure 
Access to schooling begins with the physical availability of schools. Hence education 
policy has largely been dominated by the physical provision of schools in close proximity 
to inhabited areas. In Himachal, where the terrain is difficult, this is of particular 
importance. The state government therefore adopted the twin approach of building both 
roads and schools. In Haryana, while making roads has certainly been a priority building 
schools has been less so. According to the latest survey on elementary education by 
NUEPA, more than 3000 government primary schools have opened in Himachal since 
1994, but only 900 in Haryana. 
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It is interesting that at the same time private schools have increased in larger numbers in 
Haryana. According to recent National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) evidence 
Haryana has the highest proportion of children attending private primary schools (48.5 
per cent). The all-India average is 17.3 per cent and the figure for Himachal is 3.6 per 
cent. Of these, 18.7 per cent of children in Haryana attend private unrecognized 
schools122. The corresponding figure for Himachal is 0.1 per cent (Aggarwal 2000).  
 
There is no doubt that the physical infrastructure of average government schools in both 
Himachal and Haryana is inadequate. If anything it appears to be a little better in Haryana 
than in Himachal, except for the availability of electricity, as Tables 8.2 and 8.3 indicate. 
These figures should of course be read bearing in mind that many schools in Himachal 
serve small and dispersed settlements. 
 
Table 8.2: School Buildings in Himachal and Haryana 
(% of all schools) 
 Himachal Haryana 
Pukka 61 91 
Partly Pukka 9 1 
Kuchha 7 0 
Other 23 8 
Source: Elementary Education in India (NUEPA, 2004). 
 
 
Table 8.3: Availability of Selected School Facilities 
(% of all schools) 
 Drinking Water Toilets Electricity Blackboard Computer 
Himachal 85 32 50 92 6 
Haryana 88 65 30 91 6 
Source: Elementary Education in India (NUEPA, 2004). 
 
While Haryana compares favourably in the provision of blackboards and computers, 21 
per cent of schools at elementary level have a student classroom ratio of over 60, and a 
significant number of schools have neither teachers nor classrooms! Nearly 40 per cent of 
all children enrolled in Haryana attend a school with more than 60 students per classroom 
compared with only 3.2 per cent schools in Himachal. However, while fewer than one per 
cent of schools in Himachal are without a teacher (NUEPA, 2004; see also Table below),  
                                                          
122 These are schools that do not fulfill government criteria regarding quality and are therefore not 
recognized as legitimate schools.  
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Table 8.4: Congestion in Schools 
(% of all schools at elementary level) 
 Student-classroom 
ratio >60 
Schools without 
Teachers 
Schools without 
classrooms 
Pupil-Teacher 
Ratio 
Himachal 4 <1 4 21 
Haryana 21 7 16 48 
Source: Elementary Education in India (NUEPA, 2004). 
 
What is not reflected in official statistics but was found in the field is the difference in the 
use of the facilities. For instance, PROBE (1999) found that while the physical 
infrastructure of most schools was fairly rudimentary, the maintenance and utilisation of 
the facilities in Himachal were much better than in the other states surveyed.  
 
School premises are usually tidy…there is much less dilapidation of 
furniture and teaching material…A significant proportion of schools in 
Himachal Pradesh even succeed in making active use of relatively fragile 
items such as electric fans, musical instruments and library books.. 
(PROBE, 1999: 119)  
 
 
During my fieldwork I too found that though the children sat on torn mats they were 
invariably seated in neat rows and all had notebooks or slates. The blackboard may have 
been chipped, but it was being used. Most schools did not have proper buildings − often 
they were just a small room, many with one blackboard, no chairs or desks for the 
children to sit on and sometimes even without a toilet. However all the children had 
books to read from and some form of writing implement, and most importantly the 
teachers were teaching. The premises were always tidy and clean, and teaching materials 
obtained from various schemes were used. Charts were on the walls and books had been 
distributed among the children.  
 
Wide use of schooling facilities depends on the presence of complementary infrastructure 
such as roads, bridges, and in some cases even adequate transport. In fact, provision of 
schools must be seen as part of a larger project of development in which basic 
infrastructural facilities are simultaneously developed. Better roads, bridges across rivers 
and electricity in schools are all part of a package that improves physical access and 
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facilitates the use of educational facilities, thus enabling excluded regions and people to 
benefit from development opportunities, including education.  
 
The issue of safety, especially for small children and girls, has an important role in 
determining physical access. If the path to the school is through a quiet, deserted area 
parents are reluctant to let their children use it. Thus provision of education must be seen 
in the larger context of providing public goods to excluded regions and groups and may 
require more than just increases in education budgets.  
 
In other words, even though the facilities are limited and basic in Himachal, the desire to 
use them as well as possible is indicative of a sense of social responsibility. This is 
different from Haryana, where the lack of facilities is used as a reason for giving up on 
the system and in the process on the children whose hopes of a better life depend on it. 
 
8.3.2 Classroom Environment and Work Culture 
The commitment to the education of children is reflected in other aspects too, such as the 
environment within the classroom and the work culture in the schooling system. 
 
PROBE (1999) found in Himachal “comparatively little evidence of practices such as 
closing a school without good reason, allowing classroom chaos to undermine any 
learning activity, and leaving younger children to their own devices”. My field visits 
confirmed the relative orderliness of the schools, compared with schools in other parts of 
rural north India. No doubt some of the teaching involved reading aloud and rote 
learning, but the children were able to answer questions in math, recite poems and read 
from their textbooks. I did not come across a single school where the teacher was not 
holding a class.   
 
One of the schools in my sample, in a remote village called Jana in Naggar Block, had a 
single teacher school, but even there I found that the teacher was working hard to manage 
different sections by rotating groups of children in different activities. While the youngest 
group was sent off to play, another group was assigned some writing and the teacher 
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marked the work of yet another, which had been given math problems. There were 
moments of chaos when the groups overlapped, but none of it got out of control, and by 
the end of the school day each group had managed to do some of each of the activities. 
The quality of instruction may not have been the very best but the level of commitment to 
the job exhibited by the teacher was impressive. 
 
In Haryana the classroom environment reflects the negative attitude and lack of 
commitment of the teachers, as discussed in the previous section. During my fieldwork it 
was common to see teachers sitting outside the classroom while the students copied from 
a blackboard inside. In one village I found to my horror that the writing on the board was 
completely unintelligible! When I questioned the teachers sitting outside, their response 
was that it made no difference since “the children do not understand anything anyway”. 
 
8.3.3 Management Issues 
The sense of responsibility within the education system is reflected in the administrative 
aspects of quality as well. For instance, an impressive indicator of school management 
found by PROBE in Himachal was the accuracy with which records are maintained. 
 
 Village schools in Himachal Pradesh have well-maintained records, 
including accurate enrolment and attendance registers. In most schools, the 
day’s attendance figures are written on a blackboard fixed on the outer wall 
(PROBE, 1998: 120) 
 
In my experience too, registers were well maintained and up to date with all the requisite 
information regarding age, caste and gender completed. I was also shown records of 
which children had received scholarships, books or uniforms, including the dates when 
they had last received these. Keeping good records may seem a trivial achievement but it 
serves many useful purposes, from facilitating the monitoring of the school system to 
curbing corruption. 
 
In Himachal, at Block, District and State levels, education administrators were found to 
be very responsive. As an illustration, PROBE (1999) found that salaries were paid 
punctually on the first day of every month and that very few teaching posts were vacant, 
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whereas in other PROBE states, more than 10 per cent remain vacant. These findings are 
consistent with my own observations. During the period in which I did my fieldwork an 
order was passed that all teachers who had not reported to their teaching posts within a 
specified period of time would lose their jobs and new teachers would be appointed. 
Despite some protests, the government took a strong stand on this issue and most teachers 
did report on time. 
  
In an interview with the state’s Education Minister I was told that there was a move to 
transfer substantial financial powers to the Gram Panchayats. For instance, it was being 
suggested that the Gram Panchayats pay the salaries of teachers. If gross negligence, 
large-scale absenteeism or other major complaints were registered against teachers their 
salaries could be withheld by the Gram Panchayats. It was interesting that at the same 
time Haryana state legislature increased powers at the district level, further curtailing the 
powers of the Gram Panchayats, citing the ineffectiveness of the Gram Panchayats its 
reason. 
 
Another aspect of responsive school management is the requisite sanction of teaching 
posts in Himachal. It has been the experience in many parts of India, that often schools 
are opened but no teachers are appointed, or too few, resulting in severe under-staffing. 
In Himachal there are very few single-teacher schools, with on average at least three 
teachers to every primary school.  
 
A particularly interesting example of the responsible nature of school management in 
Himachal Pradesh relates to school timings. While regular income-earning opportunities 
for children are limited and hence their opportunity costs are not as high as is often 
assumed, it is not uncommon to find that there is a seasonal demand for their labour, for 
instance during the peak agricultural season. The absence of children during those 
periods often leads to their dropping out of education, either due to absenteeism per se, 
their names being struck from the register, or failure in exams caused by their long 
absence from school. Educationists have long suggested adjusting the school calendar to 
accommodate agricultural cycles as a possible solution to this problem. However, barring 
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Himachal none of the other states in PROBE or Haryana have made any moves towards 
this change. In Himachal, the school calendar was found to be adjusted district-wise in 
tune with the agricultural cycle to avoid clashes with periods of high demand for child 
labour such as the apple-picking season in Kullu district. This is a striking example of not 
only efficient management but also school management being geared to the interests of 
children − especially disadvantaged children − rather than the convenience of teachers, 
privileged parents or other powerful lobbies. 
 
In short, Himachal Pradesh consistently out-performs Haryana in terms of the quality of 
schooling. It is revealing that in my sample that 82 per cent of households in Himachal 
but only 20 per cent in Haryana felt that the local school met their expectations. This is 
all the more telling as public expectations of the schooling system in Himachal tend to be 
very high. 
 
8.3.4 Educational Outcomes 
Public expenditure on education in Himachal has been consistently higher than in most 
other states. In this section I look at outcomes to see how the investment has translated 
into results. It is commonly heard that “high outlays are not enough outcomes must be 
high too”. Is Himachal just a case of high outlays un-matched by corresponding 
outcomes?  
 
As we saw earlier in this chapter educational outcomes in Himachal are in fact 
exceptionally high judging from standard indicators such as literacy rates and school 
participation. Similar achievements are reflected in a range of other indicators. For 
instance, pupil achievements are generally much better in Himachal Pradesh than in 
Haryana (see Table 8.5). For instance, the transition rate from primary to upper primary 
school in Himachal is 100 per cent for boys and 96 per cent for girls, compared with 80 
and 74 per cent respectively in Haryana. This reflects the higher dropout rates in 
Haryana. 
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Table 8.5: Internal Efficiency Indicators (%) 
 
 
 
Himachal 
Boys 
Himachal 
Girls 
Haryana 
Boys 
Haryana 
Girls 
Transition rates from primary to 
upper primary (%) 
100 96.2 80.3 74.3 
Exam results (60% & more) (%) 51.3 54.6 30.5 33.6 
Average Grade Repetition Rate 
classes I-V* 
3.2 
(boys/girls combined) 
20.5 
(boys/girls combined) 
Source: Elementary Education in India: Analytical Report (NUEPA, 2004) and North India 
Human Development Report (NCAER, 2003). *Unweighted average of grade specific repetition 
rates. 
 
 
Furthermore, in Himachal more than 50 per cent of boys and girls clear the class five 
exam with first division marks (more than 60 per cent), whereas in Haryana, the 
corresponding figures are 30 and 34 per cent. Similarly, the average grade repetition rate 
at primary level is only three per cent in Himachal compared with more than 20 per cent 
in Haryana.  
 
The next Table, which shows the reasons for repeating grades, is also revealing. In 
Himachal the main reason for repeating a year is exam failure. In Haryana, however, 50 
per cent of repeaters cited prolonged absenteeism and re-admission as the primary reason 
for grade repetition. 
 
Table 8.6: Reasons for Grade Repetition (%) 
 Failure in Exam Long Absenteeism Readmission 
Himachal 88 4 8 
Haryana 48 28 24 
Source: Elementary Education in India: Analytical Report (NUEPA, 2004). 
 
 
A recent survey of rural schools across the country found that learning achievements in 
government schools vary sharply across states. On the basis of literacy and numeracy 
tests conducted by the PRATHAM (a Delhi-based NGO) team, the results for Himachal 
and Haryana are shown in Table 8.7 below. 
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Table 8.7: Learning Achievements 
 % of Class V children who can: 
read to Level 2 do division 
Himachal 82.3 70.5 
Haryana 66.9 61.3 
Source: Annual Status of Education Report 2007 (PRATHAM, 2007). 
 
 
8.4. Role of the State 
 
This section takes a closer look at the role of the state in the promotion of elementary 
education in Himachal Pradesh. The social factors, especially the enabling role of social 
equality (and its complementarity with state action), are discussed in the next section. 
 
8.4.1 State Initiatives for Elementary Education in Himachal 
 
Political commitment and public expenditure: As discussed in the Chapter 1 and 7, the 
universalization of elementary education has been a major policy priority in Himachal 
Pradesh ever since it became an independent state. It was one of the chief goals of Y. S. 
Parmar, the first Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh. Since then it has remained an 
important priority irrespective of political parties.  
 
This policy priority is reflected in various ways starting with consistently high levels of 
public expenditure on education. With per capita expenditure on education at Rs.719 per 
year, it is the second highest spender in India after Kerala (Rs. 754), while Haryana ranks 
far below at Rs. 462.  
 
This commitment to providing adequate resources to education is particularly interesting 
in the context of persistent failures in this respect on the part of other states as well as the 
Central government. Despite recent increases in financial allocations to the social sector 
in India, government resources continue to remain insufficient to meet the level of 
demand at the required quality. For instance, government spending on education 
continues to hover around 3 per cent of GDP (currently 2.8 per cent) despite a long 
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acknowledged and recommended level of at least 6 per cent.123 The government’s 
reluctance to commit adequate financial resources to this sector is a factor in the poor 
quality of education provided in many parts of rural India. It has also played a major role 
in the recent search for “alternative” modes of provision, involving for instance large-
scale employment of poorly-trained, low-paid “para-teachers”, the promotion of private 
sector initiative, and other means of reducing the responsibilities of the state in the 
provision of essential services. The government itself has welcomed these alternatives, 
and the private sector including public-private partnerships (PPPs) are being strongly 
encouraged. By contrast in Himachal Pradesh there has been consistent commitment to 
state provision of schooling facilities and serious efforts have been made to provide the 
requisite financial allocations.  
 
Incentive schemes: Aside from providing school facilities and related infrastructure 
throughout the state, the Government of Himachal Pradesh has introduced a wide range 
of incentive schemes to foster school participation and reduce socio-economic disparities 
in access to elementary education. In PROBE’s experience, ‘incentives schemes such as 
scholarships and prizes were efficiently implemented in most schools’ in Himachal. 
Neither the PROBE team nor I encountered any case of corruption in school incentive 
programmes. Further, numerous incentive schemes in the form of scholarships and free 
textbooks are provided for SC/ST students and girls at the start of their schooling years.  
Hostel facilities offering free board and lodging are also provided for SC/ST children in 
some areas.124  
 
I found that in addition to these schemes the Midday Meals (MDM) Programme was also 
functioning well, in contrast to Haryana and the other PROBE states where corruption 
had practically derailed the scheme. In Himachal, while children in some villages were 
given dry rations, others were served freshly cooked meals. In one of my sample villages 
                                                          
123 This benchmark was initially proposed, as early as 1966, by the “Kothari Commission”, and was later 
endorsed by numerous committees, policy documents and party manifestoes.  The National Common 
Minimum Programme (NCMP) of the UPA Government, which came to office in May 2004, includes a 
clear commitment to raising public expenditure on education to 6 per cent of GDP.  
124 For details see, Sinha et al., (1997) . 
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the teachers employed a helper to prepare the meal and serve it to the children.  
 
In Haryana these midday meals were practically non-existent. Even dry rations had not 
been given for six months prior to the survey. Parents complained that before that the 
supply had been very irregular and was often of very poor quality. Besides this it was 
incumbent on parents to collect the ration from the ration shop, where they were 
invariably harassed and often turned away.125 
 
8.4.2 Private Schooling and Social Divisions 
 
As we have seen, the schooling system in Himachal Pradesh consists overwhelmingly of 
government schools, and private schools are rare. In contrast in Haryana the government 
schools have increasingly been displaced by private schools to the extent that almost half 
of all children at primary level are now studying in private schools. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, the exit of privileged families from government schools has weakened the 
voice of those who have a stake in the effective functioning of these schools, which in 
turn fuels the continuing deterioration of government schools and further privatisation 
through further exit.  
 
It may be argued that there is nothing wrong with this since private schools provide an 
effective substitute for government schools. It is commonly believed, often with good 
reason that government schools are unable to provide the basic minimum quality of 
education and that parents are justified in seeking private options. Numerous studies have 
documented the appalling state of government schools in most Indian states. At the same 
time a surge in demand for education following the campaigns of the 1980s, including the 
Total Literacy Campaign, has put pressure on the government system, which is struggling 
with issues of access and retention. Privatization is thus being hailed as a welcome move 
to fill the gaps and bring about universal elementary education (UEE). The euphoria 
about privatization is further augmented by the global climate regarding privatization and 
                                                          
125 Since my fieldwork the situation has changed. A Supreme Court ruling, in response to a Public 
Interest Litigation on the right to food, makes it mandatory for all schools to provide a freshly cooked 
meal every day. Preliminary evidence from Himachal suggests that this order too has been better 
enforced in Himachal than in Haryana. 
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the ‘market-friendly’ approach to development.126 
 
The contrast between Himachal Pradesh and Haryana highlights serious flaws in this 
argument. First, there is the issue of social exclusion from private schools. Private 
schools tend to out-price children from lower income families, especially Dalits and girls. 
Hence the private school option does not deal with the immediate problem of increasing 
enrolment among excluded groups. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the privatisation 
of the schooling system is associated with massive inequalities of class, caste and gender 
in educational opportunities in Haryana. The schooling system in Himachal Pradesh is far 
more equitable. 
 
Secondly, it is not always true that private schools provide a better quality of education 
than government schools. Recent studies have shown that there is much heterogeneity in 
the private sector, and that the quality of private schools at the lower end (i.e. those that 
are comparatively accessible to the underprivileged) is not very different from the quality 
of government schools. Private schools are profit-making enterprises. As a result, cost-
cutting measures such as hiring under-qualified and poorly paid teachers are common. 
For instance, a study of unrecognised schools in Haryana (Aggarwal 2000) showed that 
24 per cent of male and 36 per cent of female teachers in these schools were matriculates 
at most. Only about eight per cent of the teaching force consisted of graduates. In many 
instances the teachers use a teaching job at these schools as a stopgap before they move 
on to other areas of employment. Hence there tends to be a high rate of teacher turnover 
with a disrupting influence on teaching schedules. 
 
A recent comparative study of government and private schools in Haryana found that in 
areas where government schools are of good quality the private schools also tend to be of 
good quality. This is because government schools provide a quality benchmark (De et al., 
2002).  Hence it is not surprising that private schools in Himachal are also found to be of 
good quality (PROBE). In Haryana, disenchantment with the government system is so 
strong that even the poor quality private schools are widely perceived as the better option. 
                                                          
126 See Kamat (2002) for a discussion on impact of globalization on education policy in India.. 
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Even poor families cut corners to be able to afford private education, at least for their 
male children. Unfortunately there are few pay-offs. It has been noticed that parents often 
move their children from one school to the next in the hope of finding one that will 
deliver the basic minimum standards of learning (CORD 2004).  
 
Third, the segmentation of the schooling system between government and private 
schools, as well as within the private sector, defeats the purpose of common schooling as 
a source of social equity and integration. Instead of alleviating social inequalities, a 
segmented schooling system cements them. By contrast, Himachal Pradesh provides a 
rich illustration of the complementarity between social equality and the common 
schooling system.  
 
There is no doubt that private schools are also on the increase in Himachal, as there is a 
growing demand for them from well-off sections of the population. However, two 
important points must be noted. First, the government system does provide a decent 
alternative and sets an acceptable benchmark in terms of quality; and second, 
privatization has grown up since the government schooling system made basic education 
available to everyone. The introduction of private schools is therefore less detrimental in 
Himachal, in that private schools have to meet basic standards to be acceptable. In 
Haryana, on the other hand, the dichotomy between private and public schooling has 
occurred at a stage where large sections of the population are still completely excluded 
from the education system.127 
  
8.5. Elementary Education and Social Response 
8.5.1 Schooling as a Shared Social Norm 
More than physical access, social access is often a binding constraint on schooling 
decisions, particularly for children from marginalized groups and girls.  For instance, 
social norms regarding the schooling of girls can restrict their access to education beyond 
a certain stage. In a study of Muslim girls (Hasan and Menon 2005) it was found that the 
level completed by the boys dictated the level of schooling completed by girls. Boys 
                                                          
127 A similar situation prevails in Kerala, where too private schools have a large presence. But here again 
they do not play a detrimental role as the general standards and levels are already very high.  
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tended to be withdrawn from school in order to secure apprenticeships. As a result, the 
girls were withdrawn at an even earlier stage to ensure that they were not more educated 
than the boys, which would reduce their marriage prospects.  
 
As seen in Chapter 5, in Haryana, education for girls is not desirable as far as marriage is 
concerned. Also, the dependence on women for family labour has had the effect of 
creating prejudice against female education because of the popular perception that it 
would result in women devaluing agricultural work. In addition, social restrictions on 
mobility and visibility make it difficult for girls to access higher levels of schooling often 
available at a distance from their homes. In Himachal, by contrast, not only is education 
for girls a socially accepted norm; girls are free to travel outside their village to access 
secondary and higher levels of schooling. 
 
The most striking aspect of social norms relating to education in Himachal Pradesh is the 
consensus around the issue of elementary education being an indispensable aspect of 
childhood. It has been forged by active state involvement in the field of education but 
also builds on the relatively egalitarian nature of Himachali society. This consensus cuts 
across class, caste and gender lines. Not only is school enrollment in Himachal close to 
universal at the elementary level, school attendance rates are also the highest in the 
country, with very small socio-economic differentials. 
 
8.5.2 Formal Community Participation 
Another way in which social equality has contributed to the universalization of 
elementary education in Himachal is by facilitating community action. The spirit of 
cooperation and solidarity is reflected in the formal institutions of parent-teacher 
associations (PTAs) and village education committees. For instance, my survey showed 
that there were functioning parent-teacher associations and village education committees 
in all six villages I visited in Himachal but none in Haryana. Himachal also had newly-
established Mother Teacher Associations (MTAs).  
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Table 8.8: Parental Participation in School Management 
(% of respondent households) 
 Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
Aware of a PTA in 
School 
48 5 
Member of PTA 15 0 
Think Meetings with 
teachers are Useful 
44 21 
Aware of VEC 10 2 
Source: Author’s field survey. 
 
As seen from Table 8.8, parental involvement in schools is much higher in Kullu than in 
Faridabad. Not only are more parents aware of functioning Parent Teacher Associations 
and village education committees, a much larger proportion of parents also reported that 
they found meetings with teachers (through PTAs, VECs or otherwise) useful.  
 
This is not to suggest that PTAs and VECs function ideally. Even in Kullu, members of 
the associations often felt discouraged by their lack of powers and hence ability to bring 
about significant change in the local school. Lack of financial autonomy was articulated 
as a major constraint. Lack of clarity about the respective roles of the PTA, VEC and 
Panchayat was also cited as a common problem. As a result there is some confusion 
about the division of responsibilities between them, making it hard to fix accountability. 
In their current shape it is probably true that none of these bodies have the power to 
significantly alter the schooling situation. Nevertheless, meetings are held, debate takes 
place and letters requesting greater powers are sent to Block Education Offices. While 
administrative reform beyond the village level is required to make the system more 
participatory and decentralized, at least the ground has been prepared for public 
participation in the schooling system in Himachal.  
 
In Haryana, on the other hand, I did not come across a single functioning PTA or VEC. 
Some respondents told me that one had once been formed, but no meetings were held. 
Parents were often summoned by teachers who mostly wished to complain about either 
the inability of the child to cope with the curriculum or the quality of the child’s clothing 
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(there were innumerable complaints by teachers about “how dirty the children are”). 
There was an acute sense of helplessness among the parents with regard to the quality of 
schooling, the attitudes of teachers and their own inability to help their children with the 
academic content.  
 
8.5.3 Informal Community Support 
Aside from formal community participation through institutions such as PTAs and VECs, 
various kinds of informal community support for schooling are often observed in 
Himachal Pradesh. In the sample villages, I found that mutual understanding and 
cooperation between the school and the community extends to various forms of 
assistance such as help in building extra classrooms, donating land for a school, 
providing fire-wood or coal for heating in the winter months or helping with the midday 
meal. Similar observations are made in the PROBE study (PROBE, 1999). This 
cooperative attitude is lacking in Haryana, as Table 8.9 illustrates. 
 
 
Table 8.9: Community Support for Schooling 
(% of positive responses) 
 Kullu 
(Himachal) 
Faridabad 
(Haryana) 
Can parents contribute to improving schools? 54 42 
Do you participate in school activities? 64 24 
Has the school asked for your help? 59 11 
Did you help? 79 7 
Source: Author’s field survey. 
 
 
The sense of responsibility in the teachers (see below) reflects a relationship of mutual 
respect between teachers and the community, as well as a sense of solidarity within the 
community. Just as teachers in Himachal have a relatively positive attitude, towards their 
pupils parents are also forthcoming in their support and cooperation. In Haryana the 
community is so divided along class, caste and gender lines that this sense of collective 
responsibility does not exist. The privileged, including teachers and others in education 
administration, send their own children to private schools as the government schools are 
seen to be only for the most disadvantaged. The divide between the two sections is so 
complete that there is little sense of empathy, let alone solidarity or responsibility, 
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towards the less privileged. As a result, the whole system is marked with hopelessness. 
 
8.5.4. Teachers’ Attitudes 
A major factor affecting the social accessibility of schools is the classroom environment. 
In socially divisive societies children from marginalized communities are often 
discriminated against or mistreated, leading to their dropping out of their education. 
Unfortunately, in most such situations the teachers tend to imbibe societal prejudices, 
adding to the hostile environment. In Haryana, for instance, bullying by upper caste 
students (in some cases even violence) and teacher apathy to the problem were regularly 
cited as reasons for the withdrawal of lower caste children from schools. In this respect 
the positive attitudes of the teachers in Himachal towards the children as well as the 
parents stands out. As noted in the PROBE (1999) report:  
 
In contrast with the antagonistic patterns of teacher-parent relations found 
in other states we noticed a good deal of positive interaction between 
parents and teachers in Himachal Pradesh. While complaints do exist on 
both sides, there is also mutual understanding, and even practical 
cooperation. (1999:121).  
 
I found that the adverse attitude of the teachers in Haryana included an element of public 
humiliation in the form of harsh and even abusive treatment of the children, especially 
those from low caste poor families, and a belittling attitude towards their parents. Often 
parents were hesitant to talk about the school or the teachers, but on probing further I 
found that the interaction at the school had been so negative that they preferred to 
withdraw the child in order to preserve some self-esteem. Ill-treatment of Dalit children 
by upper caste children with no interjection by the teachers is a common phenomenon 
and forms a routine aspect of the humiliation faced by underprivileged school children in 
Haryana. 
 
In Himachal, severe ill treatment of children is practically unheard of. In my survey I 
learnt of one case where an upper caste teacher beat a lower caste boy, causing the entire 
community to protest. The protests eventually led to the teacher’s removal. In general 
teachers have a genuine concern for their pupils, which often goes beyond their progress 
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at school to also encompass their health and well-being.128 
 
This is evident in a variety of ways, such as the diligence with which records are 
maintained, the Midday Meal Programme being implemented, the regularity of teacher 
attendance and the teachers’ general involvement in their work. In all the schools that I 
visited, unannounced, I encountered teachers conducting classes. Not once did I find 
teachers sitting around chatting, knitting or doing non-school related work – a familiar 
sight in rural schools all over north India. This was the case even in remote areas where 
inspections are irregular.  
 
This is not to deny that some teachers were frustrated in their efforts and had complaints 
about management and infrastructure and the difficulties of teaching first generation 
learners. Nevertheless, they were genuinely trying to overcome these difficulties. Their 
concern for their pupils, as opposed to the disdain, which so sharply marks the attitude of 
many teachers in north India, was very noticeable and reflected their solidarity with the 
people. Unlike teachers in Haryana, whose belief that pupils from underprivileged 
backgrounds were incapable of learning, which justified their lack of interest and effort, 
teachers in Himachal identified with parents and pupils and made special efforts to help 
children learn.129 
 
Another aspect of teacher involvement that I found in Himachal was the regularity with 
which teachers visit the Block Education Offices (BEO) to discuss school problems. 
What was striking was that I rarely heard them complaining about their own conditions of 
work or personal problems as was the case in Haryana. Instead they were there to discuss 
issues related to the syllabus or school facilities, new methods of teaching, the usefulness 
of teacher training workshops and so on. By contrast, in Haryana the teachers were either 
trying to get themselves transferred to urban areas, applying for leave, or complaining 
                                                          
128 Similarly school inspectors did not confine their attention to the registers - some even enquired about the 
health of the children (PROBE). This is a good example of the personal involvement with the children and 
their welfare, which is a striking feature of the schooling system in Himachal.  
129 Nidhi Mehrotra (1995) in her study in Himachal has made similar observations about the involvement of 
teachers in their work. 
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about their personal hardships and conditions of work. 
 
It would be no exaggeration to say that teacher attitude probably stands out as the most 
impressive factor in the schools of Himachal. As PROBE found, “…teachers in Himachal 
Pradesh have a responsible attitude towards school duties” (: 120). One particular remark 
by a teacher in Himachal summed up the attitude towards children in the community (and 
the link with social equality) very evocatively. He said; Bacche to saanjhe hote hain, inki 
zimendari hum sab ki hain (children belong to the community and as such are the 
responsibility of us all). 
 
8.6. Revisiting Education for All 
Ten years after the PROBE Team (1999) did its survey in five North Indian states 
(Himachal and the so-called BIMARU states), it has re-visited the same states (and for 
most part the same villages) to document the change that has taken place in the decade 
gone by. Even though the sample does not include Haryana, it is worth commenting on 
the findings of this survey known as Revisiting Education For All (REFA, 2006) as it 
reinforces earlier findings and also suggests that rapid progress in the field of elementary 
education continues.  
 
In the last ten years the Government of India has substantially increased its commitment 
to education. In a bid to accelerate its progress towards universalization of elementary 
education, it has initiated what has become its flagship programme in education, the 
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA). This programme began in the year 2002, with a mandate 
to provide ‘reasonable quality elementary education’ to all children and especially to 
reduce the gaps in gender and other marginalized groups. It cannot be denied that the 
programme has made a substantial difference to the accessibility of schooling in all parts 
of the country. By all accounts its main success has been improving the availability of 
schools and the physical infrastructure within them (REFA, 2006, JRM reports).130 While 
this improvement has taken place across all states, there are significant differences in 
Himachal, as reported in the REFA survey, which are worth highlighting. 
                                                          
130 Joint Review Mission (JRM) Reports: These are evaluation reports prepared for review by the 
government and the primary donors for SSA – the World Bank, the European Union and DFID.  
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1. While seventy three per cent of schools in the BIMARU states had at least 2 pukka 
rooms and 74 per cent had drinking water, in Himachal 93 per cent of schools now have 
at least 2 pukka rooms and an equal proportion (93 per cent) have drinking water. It is 
worth pointing out that in Himachal infrastructure was not substantially better than the 
other states at the time of the PROBE survey. The earlier short fall in this area can easily 
be ascribed to the harsher terrain that makes construction activity more difficult and more 
expensive. But ten years on Himachal seems to have overcome this disadvantage and 
overtaken the other states as far as schooling infrastructure is concerned. 
 
2. Ninety-nine per cent of all children in the age group of 6-12 years in Himachal were 
enrolled, showing that the state had for practical purposes reached the goal of universal 
education at the primary level. Also, 92 per cent of children in this age group were 
actually attending school at the time of the visit, as opposed to 66 per cent in the other 
states. Further, drop out rates at the primary level were negligible in Himachal but still 
quite substantial in the BIMARU states.  
 
3. According to REFA findings, all schools in Himachal (100 per cent) were providing 
free text books and 77 per cent were providing free uniforms and scholarships as well. 
Cooked mid day meals were also in place in all the sample schools.  
 
4.  In the comparison over ten years that the REFA survey has enabled, perhaps the most 
disheartening finding is the almost unchanged situation as far as classroom activity is 
concerned – half (48 per cent) of the schools surveyed had no teaching activity taking 
place when the investigators arrived. In this area, the situation in Himachal is again 
somewhat better, but unfortunately not spectacularly so. In roughly 30 per cent of 
Himachal schools no active teaching was taking place at the time of the investigators 
visit. Single teacher schools also continue to be a problem in Himachal. The REFA 
survey found that as many as 11 per cent of the schools surveyed had appointed only one 
teacher. However, in the other states nearly 40 per cent of the schools were single teacher 
schools. Besides, pupil teacher ratios are much better in Himachal, making the condition 
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in single teacher schools somewhat less problematic.  
 
5. One area of teaching where Himachal appears to be doing much better is in the 
appointment of contract teachers. In contrast to other north Indian states which showed 
more than 40 per cent of teachers as contract or para teachers, Himachal had only 15 per 
cent contract teachers. What is interesting is that Himachal is one of the pioneers of the 
system of para-teachers (Govinda and Josephine, 2005). The Himachal system began as a 
means of overcoming a shortage of teachers in far-flung remote areas. It was meant to 
tide over a period before a permanent teacher could be appointed or took her place. As 
will be seen Himachal has a good record of filling teaching posts and so this system has 
not needed to expand. Further, Himachal has also sought to train and upgrade the skills of 
some of the para-teachers in order to mainstream them into the profession. In isolated 
areas where the state has faced difficulties getting teachers to go, there have been 
instances where para-teachers appointed from the local population have been trained and 
upgraded.131 In general, this system remains a stop-gap arrangement as it should, and has 
not overtaken and de-professionalized teaching as it appears to be doing in some states 
(e.g. Madhya Pradesh).  
 
6. The recent REFA figures show that while the presence of private schools has increased 
in Himachal too, it is mostly confined to the urban areas. Their influence in rural areas is 
still negligible. 
 
7. The most significant difference however relates to the role of community based 
organizations in the functioning of the schools. This is one area which appears to have 
shown further progress in Himachal according to REFA findings. Not only are VECs, 
PTAs, MTAs and SDMCs set up in all schools, 69 per cent of surveyed schools reported 
recent elections to appoint members to these committees. In the BIMARU states 
surveyed, two-thirds of the parents had never heard of a PTA and VECs were almost non-
existent. Besides, the chief contribution of the community organizations that do exist in 
the BIMARU states appears to be improving infrastructure and selecting contract 
                                                          
131 Personal communication with SSA Director in Simla. 
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teachers. In a telling comment on the gender divide that exists in these states, it was 
found that within these organizations men handle finance and women organize mid-day 
meals. Such gender stereo-typing does not appear to exist in Himachal and the 
community organizations are reported to be active in a range of areas including 
maintenance, construction, monitoring and attendance.  
 
The REFA survey confirms that Himachal is still “doing very well”. As pointed out in an 
article based on the survey findings, “this success is not based on a ‘quick-fix’, but on 
responsible management of a traditional schooling system, based on government schools 
and regular teachers…”  
 
8.7 Concluding Remarks 
The schooling revolution in Himachal Pradesh is an enlightening example of the 
complementarity between state action and social equality. On the one hand, the relatively 
egalitarian nature of social relations in Himachal Pradesh has facilitated the 
universalization of elementary education in many different ways: it has helped to make 
schooling a policy priority, especially at primary level; fostered the emergence of 
consensual social norms on schooling matters; reduced the social distance between 
teachers and their pupils; and facilitated community participation in the schooling system, 
among other links discussed in this chapter. 
 
On the other hand, the schooling revolution was fundamentally a state initiative. 
Himachal Pradesh’s common schooling system, which contrasts so sharply with the 
segmented schooling system found elsewhere in India, has played a key role in sustaining 
the egalitarian features of Himachali society. In particular it has virtually eliminated caste 
and gender discrimination in access to elementary education, guaranteeing basic 
opportunities that ultimately extend beyond the field of education to all citizens. Thus, 
effective state intervention has contributed to social equality and vice versa.
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Chapter Eight 
 
Looking Back, Looking Ahead 
 
 
8.1 Looking Back 
This thesis has been a little like a trek into the development topography of the Himachal 
State. I was drawn to study Himachal because of the positive development picture it 
represented. Development literature, particularly in India, tends to be full of stories of 
development failures and Himachal’s success was a welcome contrast that seemed to 
deserve more attention than it was getting. The nature of its success- rooted in a 
development model very much its own (even somewhat in defiance of the trends at the 
time of its adoption)- and the larger significance of the results it has achieved called for 
more exploration. The interpretations offered for its success, so far, seemed somewhat 
superficial and the Himachal story appeared as a bit of a mystery. There was clearly a 
need to put the spotlight on Himachal. Given that this was to a large extent un-chartered 
territory, the road map I started off with went through changes as I went along. However, 
the learning through these changes proved to be as important as arriving at the 
destination. 
  
The rapid and somewhat seamless progress in development and democracy evident in 
Himachal was a puzzle that motivated me through the course of my trek. I have much to 
thank my thesis for as it has been for me a journey of discovery and learning - sometimes 
un-learning and re-learning as well. I hope I have been able to convey at least some of 
that through this thesis with the added hope that it can lead to a wider understanding of 
development and democratic processes in Himachal, and perhaps even outside it. 
 
The development indicators for Himachal are well established. Through the course of my 
work I have tried to look for the most credible interpretation of this remarkable 
development performance. This interpretation is obviously open to challenge. The 
journey was undertaken in the spirit of opening up the discourse on Himachal and in 
keeping with that spirit, the completion of this study does not signify the end of the story. 
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In fact I would like to conclude by attempting a peep into the future; not to speculate, but 
to keep the discussion alive especially on emerging issues that raise pertinent questions 
about the future of Himachal’s development trajectory.  
 
8.2 Wider Significance of Himachal’s Experience 
Widely considered fifty years ago as one of the most backward regions of India, 
Himachal is now doing better than most Indian states in terms of many aspects of social 
development. Further, social disparities in human development in Himachal are relatively 
low, and basic opportunities, such as elementary education, are close to universal. I have 
argued that this success essentially reflects the reinforcing effects of state action and 
social equality. In particular, I have argued that relatively egalitarian social relations in 
Himachal have facilitated collaborative state-society relations and laid the foundations for 
participatory democracy. This reading of Himachal’s experience, points to wider lessons 
about the relationship between equality, development and democracy. 
 
8.2.1 Social Equality and Development 
The first lesson is the central role of social equality in development, especially in a 
democratic political system.  
 
In much of the development literature, equality is seen as antithetical to development. An 
initial increase in economic inequality is often regarded as a natural feature of the 
development process.132 This outlook is common, for instance, in the context of recent 
debates on economic reform in India (even China). In both countries there is much 
evidence of a sharp increase in inequality in recent years.133 However, this is not regarded 
as a major issue. Instead it is accepted as an inevitable byproduct of rapid economic 
growth which is of little consequence as long as the poorer sections of the population also 
enjoy increases in per capita income. Redistributive policies are considered superfluous 
or undesirable.134 
                                                          
132 This is a common reading of the Kuznets Curve pattern. (Kuznets, 1955).  
133 Deaton and Dreze (2002).  
134 An interesting recent example is the hostility of the establishment (including large parts of the 
economics profession) to the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, which has been the target 
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Using the comparison between Himachal Pradesh and Haryana I have tried to bring the 
issue of equality to the forefront of the debate on development and democracy. As we 
have seen, the experience of Himachal provides a counter to these dismissive views, on 
two counts. First, it shows that in many ways equality is important for development and 
second, that social equality can be sustained by constructive state action. In fact, the two 
reinforce each other in many ways. The comparison with Haryana in particular brings 
equality issues to the forefront of development, as despite spectacular economic growth, 
disparities based on caste, class and gender have not only persisted in Haryana but are 
possibly becoming counter-productive for further development. In other words, not only 
is equality an end of development, it is also, and perhaps more importantly, a means to 
development.  
 
At least four important connections between social equality and development have 
emerged in this case study of Himachal Pradesh. 
 
Policy Priorities: An important way in which social equality affects development is 
through its impact on policy priorities (see Chapter 7). The presence of inequalities can 
lead to the state being co-opted by powerful social groups, resulting in policies that 
reflect their interests. An obvious example of such state capture is the failure of land 
reforms in Haryana. As we saw in Chapter 7, a powerful landowners’ lobby prevailed on 
the state to adopt a weak policy with many loopholes that allowed them to successfully 
subvert it. Further co-option of state machinery through bribery and corruption led to 
failures at the implementation level as well. As a result, very little surplus land was re-
distributed, and much of the land that was distributed was of such poor quality that it did 
not provide the beneficiaries with the security it was meant to afford, frustrating the basic 
objectives of land reforms. In Himachal there were no powerful lobbies interfering with 
land reforms and all the surplus land was successfully re-distributed. It is among the few 
states (along with Jammu and Kashmir and Kerala) where land reforms have been 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of relentless attacks in the mainstream media and particularly in the business press (see Right to Food, 
India website for a selection of media reports on NREGA, www.righttofoodindia.org ).  
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implemented on a substantial scale. This in turn has played an important role in 
preventing a rapid rise in economic inequality and enabling people to participate in the 
process of economic growth. 
  
Public Services as a Common Concern: Another important link between social equality 
and development arises from the fact that in a relatively egalitarian social setting public 
services are a common concern (see Chapters 7 and 8). Thus in Himachal there is broad-
based pressure on the government to invest in public services and to ensure their effective 
functioning, unlike in Haryana, where inequalities have segmented the provision of 
services, making public services largely the concern of the marginalized. The dichotomy 
in the schooling system is a clear example of this segmentation, which has further 
reinforced social inequalities. However, a major endeavour of the thesis is to establish 
that Himachal’s schooling revolution is in fact part of a larger canvas of social 
development in the state. Himachal has also done much better than most other North 
Indian states in many other fields of social development, relating for instance to health, 
social security, women’s empowerment, and freedom from violence. 
 
Gender Equality and Women’s Agency: Gender equality, which has played a major role 
in Himachal’s development success, is a crucial aspect of social equality (see particularly 
Chapter 5). Not only do women in Himachal have equal access to health, nutrition and 
education; their acceptability in the public domain has allowed them to make use of 
educational facilities, employment opportunities and even political spaces, all of which 
have enhanced their sense of empowerment. Their active participation in public life has 
altered the quality of the public discourse and action. In Haryana, women’s presence 
outside the domestic fields is disapproved of. Stringent patriarchal norms have inhibited 
their opportunities for independence and participation in society as equal members. It has 
also lowered their sense of entitlement to health, nutrition and education and other basic 
foundations of the quality of life. In these and other ways gender inequality and the 
suppression of women’s agency in Haryana have not only reduced the quality of life for 
women but have also held up social development for society as a whole. 
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Collective Action and Democratic Participation: One of the most significant ways in 
which social equality aids development is through its impact on the democratic 
functioning of institutions (Chapters 1 and 7). In Himachal, traditional social equality has 
nurtured many diverse forms of community collaboration and collective action. Some of 
these, such as the system of exchange labour and other forms of reciprocity at the 
community level, survive even today. They have helped to sustain solidarity within 
communities and prepared them to engage with democratic institutions more effectively. 
Hence, for instance, participation in Panchayati Raj Institutions is more democratic than 
in many other states such as Haryana. Marginal groups such as women and Dalits are also 
better represented in political processes, while in contrast in Haryana there is strong 
resistance to sharing power with women and the lower castes. Similarly, associations like 
Mahila Mandals and Yuva Mandals are fairly active in Himachal but virtually defunct in 
Haryana.      
 
8.2.2 Constructive Role of the State 
The second important lesson highlighted in the Himachal story is the enabling role played 
by the state. Just as Himachal draws our attention to the role of equality in development, 
it also calls for a reexamination of the role of the state. Even as the minimalist view of the 
role of the state in development has acquired much influence in recent years, Himachal’s 
experience vindicates the notion that the constructive role of the state is, in fact, crucial 
for development. This is especially so if development is viewed as a broad-based 
improvement in the quality of life rather than simply economic growth. However, state 
action has not been limited to human development alone; it extends into many other 
fields. For instance the physical infrastructure in Himachal is well developed – roads and 
bridges as well as electricity and telecommunications are as good as the best in the 
country (Chapter 7). State action has also promoted economic development in other ways 
such as through infrastructural, technical and market support to agriculture. Even the 
widely acclaimed ‘apple revolution’ in Himachal Pradesh owed much to these and other 
forms of state support.135 State intervention in Himachal Pradesh has also played a key 
role in removing social disparities and creating universal entitlements to basic services. 
                                                          
135 Laxman Thakur (ed.) (2002). 
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The state in Himachal does not subscribe to the standard formulation of a “strong” state 
dictating development priorities and outcomes, but neither is it a “weak” state co-opted 
by powerful groups and thus governing in accordance with their vested interests. Instead 
it is a state that recognizes itself as a partner in collaborative state-society relations where 
development is an important shared goal (Chapter 2). An important aspect of this 
partnership in Himachal is the understanding, that while the state can initiate and 
formulate development priorities, the people play an equally important role in making 
them work. The combined role of state and society helping each other to meet 
development goals is clearly visible in many sectors such as education (Chapter 8) or 
land reforms (Chapter 7).  
 
The direct and easy access of politicians that ordinary people in Himachal have is a 
particularly interesting feature of the role of the state in people’s life. The lack of social 
distance between state and society has led to recognition amongst its leadership that they 
have a crucial role to play in development. This is coupled with an understanding that it 
cannot function without the support and participation of the people. What is interesting in 
this dispensation is that the people’s access to the political class serves to reduce the 
influence and power of the bureaucracy as people are able to approach the politician 
directly with their problems. The highly skewed distribution of power in favour of the 
bureaucracy seen in most other parts of India is thus found to be much less in Himachal. 
The distortions associated with that distribution are also corresponding much less.  
 
The state’s priorities in Himachal reflect the influence of social concerns and its style of 
functioning reflects the influence of egalitarian social relations that have contributed 
significantly to the culture of democracy within which it operates. The idea of a strong 
but accountable state, such as Himachal’s, has few parallels in India and sits 
uncomfortably with proponents of the minimalist state approach.  
 
The claim that state intervention has played an important role in Himachal’s success is 
often underplayed on the grounds that it depends to a great extent on financial assistance 
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from the central government and is not sustainable. Given the low levels of development 
at the time it acquired independent status, Himachal, along with other hill states, was 
allotted a special financial package from the central government. Hence central financial 
assistance to Himachal has been consistently high through its period of development. The 
high level of investment in the social sectors is often attributed to this special assistance. 
Critics point to this dependence on central funds as unsustainable in the long run. While it 
is undoubtedly true that state intervention in Himachal Pradesh has been substantially 
funded by the central government, what this critique tends to miss is that the state in 
Himachal used its financial resources to focus on social development and other forms of 
human development. It could have used the central funds to jump-start the economy by 
focusing exclusively on the capitalist development of agriculture, as happened in 
Haryana. While this no doubt allowed Haryana to achieve high per capita income, it was 
at the cost of continuing exclusion for large sections of the population. Further, the fact 
that financial resources in Himachal often came from the centre does not detract from its 
success in making effective use of these resources. There is a particularly sharp contrast 
here with states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh that routinely under-utilise central 
assistance and squander much of what they receive. 
 
8.2.3. Compatibility of Social and Economic Development 
The third major lesson relates to the compatibility of social and economic development. It 
is often assumed that there is a trade-off between the two (and specifically that active 
pursuit of social development through state intervention tends to slow down economic 
growth or invite financial bankruptcy), but Himachal’s experience suggests that the two 
can also complement each other.136  
 
In order to understand this better I must first acknowledge that I have focused mainly on 
a set of development indicators that are linked with social, rather than economic 
development. In other words I have chosen to look at development in terms of a range of 
                                                          
The question has even been raised whether the so-called Kerala model is sustainable, considering the 
financial burden it places on the state (Parayil, 2000). Not only has the rapid progress of social indicators 
continued in recent years it has also become one of the fastest growing states in India, in economic terms 
(Dreze and Sen, 2000. Table A.3). 
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indicators that relate to the quality of life and not simply to economic growth. However, 
having established the social development story of Himachal it is worth taking a quick 
look at where Himachal stands in terms of economic development as well. What emerges 
from a quick look at the economic statistics of the state is that in fact it has done rather 
well in this sphere as well. Per capita incomes are far above the national average (Rs. 
24,903 in 2003-4, current prices); assetless-ness among the population is the lowest of all 
states in the country and growth rates are rising (currently about 6.3 per cent). What this 
indicates is that it is possible to have balanced development that encompasses both 
economic and social well-being.  
 
8.2.4. Complementarity between Development and Democracy 
The fourth lesson is the complementarity between development and democracy in 
Himachal. In trying to understand how state action and social equality worked together, 
democracy emerges as the obvious – in some ways natural and in some ways deliberate – 
mode for pursuing the goals of development. State and society needed a system which 
would enable them to collaborate and communicate on an interactive universal ground. 
Democracy not only offered a platform of universality, it also enabled social equality to 
find an institutional forum and in turn it gave the modern democratic state its legitimacy 
in society.  
 
Himachal’s experience has demonstrated the complementarity of development and 
democracy by showing not just the importance of democracy in development but also 
how social development can enhance democratic functioning. In other words, 
development aimed at establishing social equality fosters democratic practice. As Sen 
(1999) says, development strategies are “inescapably valuational”, involving “serious 
judgements by people as citizens on what priorities to attach to different goals” (1999:10, 
11). But participation and consensus building − the cornerstones of democratic practice − 
are both contingent on a degree of equality amongst the participants. In a society where 
there are basic disparities between the people, the political participation of the 
marginalized is inhibited and development choices are bound to be oriented towards the 
interests of the privileged and powerful. This not only excludes the less powerful from 
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development gains; it also hampers the overall goals of development. The project of 
democracy that India is proud to proclaim a success is in fact incomplete until the goal of 
enabling all its citizens to participate actively in democratic institutions is achieved. 
Himachal Pradesh has moved positively and creatively in that direction, not just in 
enabling participation in democratic institutions, but by building a culture of democracy 
and participation in civic life.   
 
The democratic success of Himachal’s development is most strikingly illustrated in the 
integrity of its public spaces and institutions, which are a) not divided by categories of 
class, caste or gender and b) relatively free of corruption and capture. For instance, the 
lower castes in Himachal have as much faith in the Sarpanch as the upper castes do, and 
women are as able to access the District Administrative offices as men. Crimes against 
women and Dalits are relatively few and the reservation quotas for them in public office 
are strictly adhered to. Institutional integrity is also seen in the relative lack of corruption, 
which has meant that government programmes as well as public services run fairly 
efficiently and without diversion of public funds. This is illustrated in the performance of 
the education sector described in Chapter 8. 
 
By contrast, in Haryana public identities and entitlements are determined by caste, class 
and gender. The primary identity in Haryana is caste-based, with the dominant caste of 
the Jats determining the socio-cultural ethos of the state. The low status accorded to 
women within this ethos, as discussed in Chapter 5, has reinforced patriarchal norms and 
the exclusion of women from public life. In this environment it is very difficult for 
participatory democracy to flourish. 
  
In Himachal Pradesh the integrity of public institutions is maintained in part due to the 
expectations that people have of them. Relative social equality implies that everyone has 
a similar stake in development. Therefore people across the social categories have a 
common sense of entitlement from and expectation of public offices and political 
processes. The widespread use of government schools and public health facilities reflects 
a shared notion of universal entitlements to be provided by the state. There is some 
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evidence of a historical basis in people’s expectations of the state and public institutions. 
The traditions of dhoom and other forms of social protest, discussed in Chapter 4, have 
been adapted to modern forms of public action in a democratic setting. Hence democratic 
institutions, such as the Panchayats, Mahila Mandals and district administration are being 
actively used by the people to put pressure on the government and demand their 
entitlements.  
 
8.3. Looking Ahead: Sustainability of Himachal Pradesh’s Approach 
An obvious question arises about the sustainability of Himachal’s development 
trajectory. If social equality has played a critical role in Himachal’s success, can 
Himachal’s rapid progress in human development be expected to continue? In particular, 
are there indications that social equality itself may be threatened?  
 
There are several reasons for concern here. To start with, economic disparities are likely 
to widen over time. As discussed earlier, the legacy of relatively egalitarian social 
relations in Himachal Pradesh partly reflects the fact that the rural economy used to be 
largely based on “common property” (or, more precisely, “common access”) resources. 
This is no longer the case, and in Himachal Pradesh as elsewhere in India, rapid 
economic growth seems to be associated with rising economic inequality. This increase 
in economic inequality may undermine the “common concern” for effective public 
services, and affect the prospects of equitable development in other ways as well. 
 
There are similar concerns relating to the disquieting signs of rising gender inequality in 
Himachal Pradesh. With rising economic affluence, women are often withdrawn from the 
labour force, undermining an important basis for their economic independence and 
participation in public life. There is also a danger that the influence of the patriarchal 
norms of North India will permeate into Himachal Pradesh as the cultural integration of 
this region proceeds. This hypothesis is consistent with recent patterns of change in sex 
ratios in Himachal Pradesh; the adverse changes (i.e. declines in female-male ratios) have 
occurred mainly in the districts bordering Punjab and Haryana. 
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The decline between 1991 and 2001 of female-male ratios in the age group of 0-6 years 
(from 0.951 to 0.897) is particularly alarming.  Recent changes are much the same in 
Haryana and Punjab, even though the initial ratio was higher in Himachal. This decline of 
child sex ratios (associated with the spread of sex-selective abortion) appears to be driven 
by rising incomes, better access to sex determination technology, and in the case of 
Himachal, possibly also the growing influence of North Indian patriarchal values.137 
Perhaps Himachal Pradesh will be better able to address this alarming trend, but as things 
stand it is certainly a matter of concern. In a symptomatic way this is illustrative of the 
kind of hurdles equitable human development may face from the twin challenges posed 
by the driving forces of economic growth - the market and the accumulation of wealth. 
While the experience in Himachal Pradesh so far richly illustrates the positive 
contributions of social equality to development and democracy, sustaining the relatively 
egalitarian character of Himachali society presents a major challenge to future public 
action.  
 
In this scenario of high rates of growth, and a dominant economic paradigm of 
competition that has been adopted by governments in most parts of the country, will 
Himachal be able to sustain its own model of human and social development? As pointed 
out, some of these growing inequities can already be seen in gender and class related 
domains. As the gap between social groups increase, the virtuous circle of social equality 
and constructive state action is bound to get affected. If the traditional basis of social 
equality is undermined, what will sustain the development model of Himachal? This is 
one of the most interesting questions that Himachal faces as it moves towards giving 
greater priority to economic growth in its development plans.    
 
On a more positive note, recent developments show that Himachal’s approach has not yet 
exhausted itself and can still be expanded to new domains. For instance, a recent study of 
the implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), one of 
the most challenging social programmes initiated in India in recent years, is doing better 
than in many other states in several respects, including transparency of records, active 
                                                          
137 George Sabu and Dahiya (1998), 
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participation of PRIs (GPs and Gram Sabhas) and overall ability of the state to manage 
complex programmes.138 In fact this study corroborates many of the general observations 
made in this thesis, in a new domain. There is thus a possibility that the enabling 
conditions that have facilitated the constructive role of the state in Himachal will find 
new expressions in the future.  
 
There are also countervailing factors that may balance the polarizing tendencies 
mentioned earlier. For example, universalization of elementary education is yet to realize 
its full impact as it gradually translates into universal literacy in the adult population 
including women and Dalits. Similarly caste disparities may narrow as the 
universalization of basic services continues to erase the historical legacy of caste 
discrimination. There are thus still some equalizing tendencies at work in Himachal 
society along with growing economic inequalities. 
  
Further, the virtuous circle in Himachal has acquired a degree of resilience because 
egalitarian values and the culture of democracy have permeated wide sections of society 
and a range of institutions. The enthusiastic participation of citizens in parent teacher 
associations, mahila mandals, youth groups, and various other platforms, is not just an 
indication of local civic enthusiasm, it reflects the high level of expectation from public 
institutions and extends to higher levels of government as well. This institutionalization 
of participation has created the space to reign in the challenges posed by inequality. Thus, 
even if some aspects of social equality are undermined in the new dispensation, 
participatory processes sustained by state action are likely to act as a safeguard against 
the radical changes that iniquitous growth brings.  
 
The move from personal to public identity – from family and caste to village and 
community gives new and important space for equality and participation. Therefore while 
addressing the future of the virtuous circle, hope comes from the evidence of 
participatory processes being developed within both state and society. If market forces 
                                                          
138 This is one of the main conclusions of a survey of NREGA in Himachal conducted in December 2007 in 
which I participated. For a summary report see, Siddhartha and Vanaik (2008). 
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are hard to suppress, participation is harder still. Whether the “virtuous circle’ can be 
maintained or not will depend on the degree to which participation is sustained in 
democracy and in civic institutions. A lot will depend on how the social and political 
spaces are used. 
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